STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 



STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 



FROM THE FRENCH 



COUNT BENEDETTI 

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FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT THE COURT OF BERLIN 



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NEW YORK 
MACMILLAN AND CO. 

1896 

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CONTENTS 



PAGE 



Preface vii 

The Triple Aliance 70 

Armed Peace and its Consequences 180 

My Mission to Ems 267 



PREFACE 

When a person has been caught, in the 
front row, in an immense and painful national 
catastrophe, when he has issued from it injured 
by the iniquity of party feeling and the bad faith 
of the enemies of his country, he has lost peace of 
mind, and to regain it resorts to the study of 
the events that made him a victim. That fate 
has been mine. I venture to put together, in this 
volume, the writings I have been occupied with in 
silence and retirement ; they are purely diplomatic 
essays, and have appeared in the Revtie des Deux 
Mondes. 

It seems to me, however, fit and opportune that 
they should be preceded by a few rapid remarks 
which cannot be without interest to the reader, 
whilst they will have particular value for the 
author of these pages. 

Those who lived through the woeful year have 
certainly not forgotten the explosions of anger 
that resounded all over France at the time when 
the question of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern's 



viii PREFACE 

candidature to the Spanish crown sprung up, and 
which became still more acute after the invasion 
of our territory. Public opinion, or rather the 
press, did not confine itself to Prussia's direful 
underhand dealings, it denounced with equal 
violence the want of forethought on the part of 
the Imperial Government, and what it termed the 
incapacity of its agents. I was personally held 
up to the indignation of the country. Strange to 
say, it was a semi-official newspaper, the Consti- 
hUionnel, that first put me on the rack. At that 
time I had only just reached Ems, entrusted with 
a mission fraught with difficulties apparent to 
every one, and to bring it to a happy issue it was 
essential I should enjoy, above all that I should 
appear to enjoy, the entire confidence of my 
Government. I thought it right to call the Due 
de Gramont's attention to this unfortunate inci- 
dent, begging him to dispel the unjustifiable 
accusations of which I was personally the object, 
either at the tribune or in the Joitrnal Officiel. 
He paid no attention to my entreaties. 

They bitterly reproached me with having neither 
foreseen, nor even had a presentiment of, the 
agreement come to between Berlin and Madrid to 
the advantage of Prince Leopold, and made the 
same charges in regard to the cordial understanding 
arrived at between Prussia and Russia. But, as a 
matter of fact, I had fathomed Count Bismarck's 



PREFACE ix 

design in the course of the preceding year, as soon 
as it had been conceived, and without having been 
incited to do so otherwise than by a sense of duty, 
and I had called the attention of my Government 
to the matter, whilst requesting to be authorised 
to have an explanation on the subject with King 
William's Prime Minister. My first despatch in 
regard to this bears the date of March 27th, 
1869, Acting in accordance with the instructions 
I had thus invited, I had a long interview with 
Count Bismarck. I gave an account of it on 
May nth, and was able to affirm, after having 
received my interlocutor's avowal, that I had 
been quite right in my conjectures, namely, that 
Prince Leopold's candidature had been brought 
forward and discussed at Berlin. I shall have 
occasion to return to this subject later on ; but it 
Is of importance to me to establish here, that by 
having my correspondence of the preceding year 
placed before him again, M. de Gramont could 
have safely shielded me, and put an end to the 
erroneous rumours, reproduced and commented on 
by the press to the prejudice of the consideration 
enjoyed by the agent representing him at Ems. 
He wrote afterwards, but too late, in a book 
published in 1872 : ^ " Count Benedettl's complaint 
was justifiable; but, to have defended him, at that 
moment, against the newspapers that were attack- 

^ La France et la Prusse avant la guerre^ p. 382. 



X PREFACE 

ing him, it would have been necessary to divulge 
the whole exchange of views that took place in 
1869, a-nd this narration could not have failed to 
have considerably increased the irritation of the 
public mind, as it would have shown that Prussia 
acted with full knowledge of the circumstances, 
and that the Prussian Government was aware to 
what point it was wounding French interests and 
feelings, by raising the question of the Hohen- 
zollern candidature again. The Government 
therefore considered it right to keep silent, at least 
for the moment, and thought Count Benedetti 
would continue for some time longer to make a 
sacrifice of his personal feelings, which were justly 
wounded by the undeserved attacks of a few 
newspapers." 

This sacrifice was imposed on me, and I sub- 
mitted to it although it was prejudicial to the 
task I was performing at Ems. But was I 
relieved at the proper time ? By no means ; 
I continued under the weight of those accusa- 
tions, which should have been refuted at once so 
as to show the country that the Imperial Govern- 
ment was right in repelling the audacious com- 
bination prepared at Berlin, and that its agents 
had served it well ; to show Europe to what 
degree of perfidy the policy of the Prussian 
Government had attained in this affair ; finally, 
to thoroughly establish that it had conducted 



PREFACE xi 

the matter in such a way as to place France 
in this dilemma : to go to war or accept the 
accession of a German prince in Spain. Count 
Bismarck would certainly not have failed to have 
done so. 

As a matter of fact, what happened ? Finding 
authority in the blame the Constitutionnel in- 
flicted on me, its contemporaries of all shades 
hastened to multiply the reproaches it had been 
the first to pronounce. According to some, 
the Government I had kept so ill-informed 
should recall me from Ems and revoke me 
by a minute, setting forth the motives for 
doing so, inserted in the Journal Officiel ; in 
the opinion of others its duty ordained that it 
should bring me before a committee of inquiry. 
These amenities so ill-adapted to uphold me 
in the negotiations, at once so arduous and 
so delicate, that I was engaged in with the 
King of Prussia, reached me each morning 
with the Paris mail. They continued more 
ardent and bitter, without being any more justi- 
fiable, after my return. "If Count Bismarck," 
wrote M. About in the XIXe Siecle, "imagines 
we are thirty-six million Benedettis in France, 
he is making a great mistake." 

No one troubled about the justice of these 
invectives, however cruel they were. As no 
part of my correspondence had been published. 



scii PREFACE 

it was impossible for any one to determine how 
I had acquitted myself of my functions, and 
public opinion remained convinced that I had 
neglected to give the Imperial Government 
information, that I had failed in all my duties, 
and that they were therefore authorised to 
load me with a good share of the responsibility 
of our disasters. As our defeats became more 
serious, public feeling was exasperated, and the 
conviction that I was devoid of all diplomatic 
understanding, that during my mission to Prussia 
I had been constantly inferior to my task, 
gained consistency as it spread, like a fact 
henceforth beyond discussion. I then noticed 
persons who, on all occasions, had shown them- 
selves anxious to give me proof of their esteem, 
slip away so as to avoid my presence. Sharing 
the general uneasiness, and anxious for news 
from the seat of war, I often visited the Corps 
Legislatif, persuaded that the Government might 
at any moment give some information to the 
Chamber. A friend came and found me in 
the gallery to which I had access, to advise 
me not to show myself there, as my presence 
so aroused the anger of certain members of the 
Assembly. " There is the culprit," they exclaimed 
forgetting that the real guilty parties were, in the 
first place, the deputies who had refused the 
Government, notwithstanding the patriotic efforts 



PREFACE xiii 

and eloquent demonstration of Marshal Niel, 
the means to carry on a war which had been 
foreseen and had become inevitable since 
Sadowa. "You want to make France an 
immense barracks," they said to this brave 
soldier. "You will make it a huge cemetery," 
was the rejoinder. One knows, at the present 
day, on which side was foresight and reason. 

Party spirit leads the best minds so thoroughly 
astray that, on the occasion of Count Bismarck's 
last avowals an important journal placed me in 
presence of this singular dilemma : " Either our 
Ambassador," it said, " had seen at Ems the 
despatch addressed, in accordance with the King's 
commands, by H err von Abeken, to the President 
of the Prussian Cabinet, a despatch which was so 
fraudulently altered at Berlin, and he communi- 
cated its terms to the Imperial Government; or 
else he was unable to get the information and 
was ignorant of the contents of that document. 
In the first of these two suppositions, M. de 
Gramont and his colleagfues should alone assume 
the responsibility of ulterior events ; in the 
second, on the contrary, the Ambassador failed 
in the most essential of his duties, that of keep- 
ing his Government correctly informed. He is 
the chief culprit." 

How could I know the contents of the despatch 
sent from Ems to Berlin ? Could I have my eye 



xiv PREFACE 

and hand in the King's private room, and thus be 
immediately informed as to the instructions the 
sovereign sent his Ministers ? The argument is 
really not worthy of the newspaper, generally 
more serious and circumspect, that appropriated 
it, and the tenour of which it found in publications 
without consistence. Would the writer in the 
same journal admit, indeed, that it is impossible 
to pen either a telegram or despatch at the Quai 
d'Orsay without the diplomatic agents accredited 
to Paris being in a position to send a copy to their 
Governments ? But, besides, what did Herr von 
Abeken say in his despatch to Count Bismarck ? 
We now possess the exact text of it brought 
to the tribune of the Reichstag by General 
Caprivi. Herr von Abeken gave a summary of 
the incidents that had occurred at Ems during the 
day of July 13th, and of which I had, having taken 
part in them, given an account on my side. Now 
the versions forwarded to Paris and Berlin were 
absolutely identical. If I had had the despatch I 
am reproached with having been ignorant of be- 
fore me, I could not have given the Imperial 
Government more correct information. It pleased 
Count Bismarck to alter the communication of his 
sovereign so as to inform Europe and particularly 
Germany, contrary to all truth, that an Ambas- 
sador at Ems had been humiliated by the King. 
Can I be in any way responsible ? And is it not 



PREFACE XV 

singular that, when Count Bismarck boldly lays 
claim to the initiative of this misdeed, a French 
newspaper should find a pretext, in this incident, 
for reverting to the accusations that were dis- 
avowed even by the man who was the cause of 
them ! 

I have pointed out before with what unanimity 
and bitterness they reproached me — apart from 
the ignorance in which I was accused of having 
left my Government in regard to the candidature 
of Prince Leopold — with the little care I 
had taken, as they said, to control the relations 
between Russia and Prussia, to call attention to 
the close intimacy established between those two 
powers to our prejudice. This is what ^ht. Journal 
des Ddbats observed on this subject, adding 
nothing, for that matter, to what was related, in 
still more disobliging terms, by other organs of 
the Parisian press : " Light will be thrown on all 
these mysteries at the proper time. In the mean- 
while, let us remember, that our Ambassadors at 
Berlin and St. Petersburg were ignorant of all, 
and that this understanding between the two 
sovereigns, which was to be so disastrous to us, 
was concluded before their eyes without them 
noticing anything. M. Benedetti did not have 
the least suspicion. . . ." 

On what basis do such positive statements 
repose ? We shall see how utterly unfounded 



xvi PREFACE 

they were. When my correspondence has been 
gone into it will be established as a matter of 
fact that, at every moment since 1866, I noted 
the incidents that revealed to me the harmony, 
becoming closer and more cordial, that was being 
established between the Courts of Prussia and 
Russia, that from these circumstances I obtained 
the proof of the existence between them of an under- 
standing in regard to approaching contingencies. 
I shall be pardoned if I do not resist the desire 
to supply here an irrefutable demonstration of it. 
This is what I wrote on January 5th, 1868 : 
" What distinguishes Count Bismarck, is not 
merely the rapidity of his resolutions ; it is 
also his foresight and activity. He has under- 
stood that it would not suffice, to put his new 
plans into execution, to appease all internal 
dissensions, he has shown himself convinced that 
it is necessary also (after Sadowa) to protect 
himself against the discontent of France. For 
that purpose, and without losing a day, he has 
set about seeking security and an alliance at 
St. Petersburg. 

"General von Manteuffel was suddenly recalled 
from the army and sent on a mission to the 
Emperor Alexander. What did the King's con- 
fidant do at St. Petersburg? . . . Nothing has 
placed Prussia under the necessity of divulging 
the arrangements she may have concerted with 



PREFACE xvii 

Russia ; but it is certain that General von Man- 
teuffel resided for several weeks at the Imperial 
Court, and that since that time, the Russian Govern- 
ment has not ceased to observe an attitude that 
has been manifestly friendly in its relations with 
Prussia. Its representative at Berlin, who was 
so much alarmed by the success of the Prussian 
arms, and who did not conceal his anxiety, was, 
in his turn, summoned to St. Petersburg ; he 
returned, a few weeks later, entirely reassured and 
affecting an attitude of satisfaction which was no 
more departed from. . . , All these events are 
recorded in my correspondence ; I nevertheless re- 
call them because coupled with ulterior incidents, 
they show there exists an understanding between 
St. Petersburg and Berlin. . , . The English 
Ambassador here for a long time refused to 
admit that the agreement between Prussia and 
Russia should be regarded with uneasiness. 
For some time past, his views have become 
considerably modified, and at present he is not 
less persuaded than other members of the diplo- 
matic body, that contingent arrangements have 
been made between the Governments of King 
William and the Emperor Alexander. For my 
part, I have discovered the pe^nnanent demon- 
stration, if I may so express myself, in the firm 
resolution of the Berlin Cabinet to prepare 
German unity without allowing itself to be turned 

b 



xviii PREFACE 

aside for an instant by the possibility of a 
conflict with France. . . ." 

Apart from producing the written proof of the 
bonds uniting Russia and Prussia, it seems to me 
that it would have been difficult to explain myself 
on this subject with greater care and emphasis. 

The Journal des Debats therefore was as ill- 
informed as its contemporaries, and its good faith 
was strangely led astray when it affirmed that 
I had seen nothing, and learnt nothing of what 
was passing before my eyes. 

At what moment — it is necessary to note and 
retain this — did I make it such a constant practice 
to call attention to the relations springing up be- 
tween the Cabinets of Berlin and St. Petersburg ? 
The page you have just read was written by me 
in January 1868, thirty months before the war, and 
it will be observed that I refer to previous des- 
patches written in the same sense and in the same 
line of thought. 

No one will ever know what I have suffered, 
the bitterness in which my mind has been so long 
and so pitilessly steeped, the anguish in which I 
have lived for several years. My grief was all 
the more keen as I had the conviction of having 
shown myself worthy of the confidence that had 
been placed in me when I was appointed to the 
Embassy at Berlin, and my hands are full of 
proofs bearing witness to it. 



PREFACE xix 

Unable to endure the torments that encompassed 
me, and taking my inspiration from my patriotism 
as much as from feelings of self-esteem, I decided, 
in the year 1871, to appeal from an opinion 
deceived by organs that had an interest to lead 
it astray to an opinion better informed, and I 
resolved to put together, in a volume,^ the im- 
portant despatches I had penned from Berlin, and 
to add to them the whole of the correspondence 
I had exchanged with M. de Gramont during my 
mission to Ems. I nursed the illusion, which, 
however, was very natural, that by placing all 
the documents in the case before my readers, 
I should set public opinion right again and obtain 
the reparation due to me. 

These documents, in fact, established beyond 
doubt, not only that I had not been surprised 
at the candidature of the Prussian Prince, but 
further that I had not been mistaken, at any 
time during my long residence at Berlin, as to 
the real intentions of the Government to which 
I was accredited, any more than I had been as 
to the intrigues of Count Bismarck ; that I had 
on the contrary, observed them with the greatest 
care ; that, finally, I had given almost a daily 
account of them. To prove this, it will suffice 
for me to reproduce here the conclusion of the 
despatch from which I recently quoted a first 

^ Ma Mission en Prusse. 



XX PREFACE 

extract. After having grouped together all the 
elements of information authorising me to be- 
lieve that they aimed, in Berlin, at the restora- 
tion of the German Empire, whilst acknowledg- 
ing to themselves that they could only attain 
that end after having placed France, by a suc- 
cessful war, in the impossibility to raise an 
obstacle to it, I added in concluding : ". . . We 
must not dissemble : public feeling in Germany, 
generally, has urged the Prussian Government to 
enter on the path along which it is now advanc- 
ing. Union first of all, then liberty, such has 
been the programme of the National Party, 
comprising all shades of moderate Liberals, since 
it has been able to form an idea of the import- 
ance attendant on the success obtained by the 
Prussian armies ; and it is with transports of en- 
thusiasm and hatred that it would second the 
King's Government in a war against France. 
There are Particularists ^ in Germany. . . . There 
exists, in some secondary States, an invincible 
feeling of aversion for everything connected with 
the Prussian Government. . . . But at the outset 
of a national war, the most stubborn of those 
who share this feeling would be obliged to 
abstain from indulging in it ; they would have to 
give way before the masses who would applaud 

1 Adherents to a political party in Germany who wish the dif- 
ferent States forming the German Empire to maintain their inde- 
pendence and their own institutions. — Translator. 



PREFACE xxi 

at the conflict whilst passionately imposing on 
themselves the sacrifices that would be imposed 
on them. The German populations, in general, 
would regard the struggle, whatever the circum- 
stances under which it broke out, as a French 
war of aggression against their country ; and if 
the fate of arms were favourable to them, their 
exactions would know no limits ; they would 
equal those of Prussia, which have always been 
so difficult to satisfy each time she has been 
victorious. We should therefore have to keep 
up a formidable war in which a whole people at 
the outset would take part against us. I here 
close this explanatory summary, which I recom- 
mend rather to your indulgence than to your 
attention." 

I resumed in these few words : " German union 
will soon be accomplished ; ought we to accept 
it ? If so, do not let us conceal the fact that we 
shall give it a kindly welcome. ... In the contrary 
event, let us prepare for war without respite, and 
let us form a clear idea as to what assistance 
Austria is likely to be to us. . . . We shall need all 
our forces to ensure victory on the Rhine ; the 
campaign of 1866 has more than amply shown, 
by the defeat of the Austrian armies, the dangers 
of a struggle engaged in on either side of the 
Alps." 

Does not this despatch show that I had long 



xxii PREFACE 

since had a presentiment of the conflict, of 
Prussia's well-determined intention to provoke it, 
and had pointed out the obligations this contin- 
gency imposed on us ? Could I have shown 
greater attention, greater forethought, have 
pointed out the dangers threatening us at a 
more seasonable time ? 

To prove that my convictions did not vary, 
that I persisted up to the last moment in the 
judgment I had expressed on the policy and 
calculations of the Prussian Cabinet, I will quote 
an extract from the last despatch I wrote from 
Berlin. The Emperor Alexander II. had just 
reached Ems ; King William, followed by Count 
Bismarck, had hastened to join his guest. I had 
on more than one occasion, and notably in my 
report of January 5th, 1868, noted the efforts 
made with unswerving steadfastness by the 
German Chancellor to cause a feeling to prevail 
at the Russian Court in accordance with his 
designs. On the occasion of the meeting of the 
two sovereigns, at which I was not present, this 
is how I thought I could sum up the views the 
King and his Prime Minister would give expres- 
sion to : 

" If I must confide to you," I wrote on June 
30th, 1870, two weeks before the opening of 
hostilities, "my personal impressions, I will 
say that it suffices to remember what was the 



PREFACE xxiii 

thought of the Bedin Cabinet in constantly ex- 
erting itself to strengthen its intimate relations 
with that of St. Petersburg, to form an idea of 
the object the King had in view in proceeding 
to Ems, accompanied by the Chancellor, and of 
the interviews they have had with the Emperor 
Alexander. Count Bismarck, being of one frame 
of mind in this respect with his Sovereign, has 
invariably sought to ensure the eventual con- 
currence of Russia in their views. With that 
aim he has shown himself, on the one hand, 
favourable to the policy of the St. Petersburg 
Cabinet in the East ; on the other hand he has 
not ceased to awaken susceptibilities in regard to 
questions that agitate national feeling in Russia. 
I have no fear of being in error in presuming 
that he has been careful to give his views on the 
state of affairs in the Principalities, and in all the 
Levant, so as to please the Emperor ; and he 
cannot have failed to point out the tendency of 
the Vienna Cabinet to re-establish autonomy in 
Polish Galicia. Whilst the Minister will have 
assumed the task of setting the Emperor at ease 
on the first of these two points, and of alarming 
him on the other, the King will have displayed 
that good grace which he has always known 
how^ to turn to such wonderful account, to capti- 
vate the kindly feelings of his august nephew ; 
and I have no doubt, for my part, that, together. 



xxiv PREFACE 

they have produced on his mind the impressions 
they desired. . . . 

"It must not, however, be supposed that Count 
Bismarck considers it advisable to bind his poHcy 
closely to that of the Russian Cabinet. My views 
are that he has not contracted and is not disposed 
to make any engagement likely to cause him diffi- 
culties or to weaken him on the Rhine. The 
Chancellor's complacency towards Russia will never 
be of such a nature as to limit his liberty of action ; 
he promises, as a matter of fact more than he 
intends to perform, or in other words he seeks the 
alliance of the St. Petersburo- Cabinet in order to 
have the benefit of it in the event of a conflict in 
the West. . . . And so I have always felt per- 
suaded that no official engagement has ever been 
made between the two Courts. ..." 

Ulterior events, and particularly the resolutions 
that the Chancellor caused to prevail at the Berlin 
Congress, when Russia was pitilessly sacrificed, 
have entirely justified my conjectures, however 
premature they may have been at the time I put 
them in writing. In regard to this matter, again, 
was I wanting in foresight, and was I mistaken as 
to Count Bismarck's real intentions ? But what 
my readers will retain above all, is that, from 1866 
until the last moment of my stay at Berlin, I have 
never, at any time, omitted to set forth in my 
correspondence not merely the calculations I 



PREFACE XXV 

felt justified in considering the Prussian Govern- 
ment was making, but its ceaseless efforts to 
ensure the neutrality of Russia and eventually its 
armed co-operation, if Austria determined to give 
assistance to France in the ensuing war. 

Since Austria had been expelled from Germany, 
they had had but one object at Berlin, that of 
uniting the Southern States to the Confederation 
of the North and of re-establishing the Imperial 
Crown for the benefit of the House of Hohen- 
zollern. They would not hesitate at war if re- 
course to arms became necessary. In the mean- 
while they were preparing to attain their end 
in a military sense, by making the armies as 
powerful as possible ; diplomatically, by display- 
ing dazzling perspectives at St. Petersburg, 
which, although fallacious, were sufficient to con- 
vince the Sovereign he could rely on a kindly 
attitude, and if occasion offered on active 
support, particularly in view of keeping a check 
on Austria. That is just what I was con- 
stantly pointing out, and my volume, Ma Mission 
en PrtLsse, is swarming with indications bearing 
testimony to my vigilance and to my eagerness 
to collect every kind of information in regard 
to the frame of mind and aims of the Prussian 
Government. 

Did I err at Ems ? Did I mistake the King's 
real intentions and the nature of my instructions ? 



xxvi PREFACE 

Did I imprudently create the incidents that per- 
mitted Count Bismarck to hurl the two countries 
in arms against one another ? What interest 
had we in this affair, what could we, what ought 
we to exact ? First of all, the desistance of 
Prince Leopold. It was granted us. Was 
it necessary and advisable to obtain that the 
King should impose it on him and enter into an 
engagenient with us ? M. de Gramont thought 
so, and I was not of his opinion. It is not the 
place here to enumerate the reasons of this 
disagreement : they are, however, easy to guess. 
What it is of importance for me to add, is that 
the King consented to give his personal and 
sovereign assent to the Prince's determination, 
and communicate it to us, thus sharing the 
responsibility of his nephew's declaration. I 
thought, for my part, that this solution gave us 
most entire satisfaction, without any prejudice 
to the dignity of either party, and consequently 
that it was acceptable on both sides. 

During the whole course of these negotiations 
nothing occurred to disturb the courtesy with 
which they were carried on. It is necessary I 
should repeat here, that at Ems there was neither 
an insulter nor a person insulted. Questioned at 
Baden, on this subject, some years later, the King 
replied : " M. Benedetti performed his duty cor- 
rectly ; nothing more." 



PREFACE xxvii 

There was a change in the aspect of things on 
July 13th, due to the communication which I 
received orders to make to the King at the last 
moment, and also to a despatch from his Ambas- 
sador at Paris. I was instructed on the night 
of July 1 2th, to solicit the King's verbal assurance 
that he would not authorise Prince Leopold to 
accept the offer he had just declined in case it 
were made to him again. Baron Werther, on 
his side, became the intermediary of another 
desire, which was not com'municated to me : it was 
a question of deciding the King to write the 
Emperor a letter conceived in such terms as would 
appease the irritation the incident had provoked 
in France. The King rejected my last overture, 
and gave orders to inform Count Bismarck of 
these final phases of our conferences. The 
despatch prepared with that view bears the same 
date, day and hour, as that in which I announced 
to M. de Gramont that the King gave his ap- 
probation to Prince Hohenzollern's desistance, 
whilst authorising me to notify the same to the 
Emperor's Government. Had it not been for the 
last wish that I was requested to express to the 
King and the desire that the Prussian Ambassador 
at Paris consented to transmit to his sovereign, 
]the despatch destined for Count Bismarck would 
merely have announced the closure of this dis- 
cussion, and the text, in that case, would not 



xxviii PREFACE 

have undergone the criminal aUerations of which 
the Chancellor has boldly assumed the responsi- 
bility. My mission would therefore have been 
happily fulfilled, and war averted. 

Consequently no more at Ems than at Berlin 
had I in any way betrayed the confidence of my 
Government. I therefore had reason ,to think, 
that my volume would throw a brilliant light on 
the way in which I had acquitted myself of my 
professional duties, and cause the most prejudiced 
to modify their opinions in my favour. Nothing 
of the kind occurred, I had not made allow- 
ance for passions, particularly for legend, that 
occult power which exercises such baleful influ- 
ence on the credulity of the masses. A few 
earnest men, desirous of gaining information, 
were struck with the authority of my revelations 
and so expressed themselves to me. But the 
•general public, who read little or not at all, 
who have formed their opinion and abide by 
it, showed me no consideration. A new trouble 
was added to the others, that of seeing writers 
worthy of all esteem abstain, with the exception 
of Jules Favre,-^ from relieving me of the accusa- 
tions brought against me. 

I incurred even another reproach. I had, they 
said, overlooked a duty of the first order in 
diplomacy, I had failed to maintain professional 

^ See Le Goiiverneinent de la Defense Nationale^ vol. ii., p. 349. 



PREFACE xxix 

secrecy. M. de Gramont, in his book, La Finance 
et la Prusse avant la Guerj^e, made himself the 
authorised mouthpiece of this charge. " An agent 
or a functionary," he wrote, " should submit to pass 
as unskilful and thoughtless ; it matters little for 
his country's future if his reputation as a talented 
man be eclipsed." ^ This opinion is at least 
controvertible ; is it not rather permissible to 
think that a Minister, conscious of his duty, can 
always protect a servant placed under his orders 
against accusations which touch his honour and 
concern the welfare of the country ? " The 
Government," he said again, " considered it should 
preserve silence for the moment," and he recalls 
the pressing requests I had sent him from Ems to 
contradict rumours that were injurious to the 
esteem in which I wished to be held. He there- 
fore intended to deny them. If he failed to 
acquit himself of that task, how could he blame 
me for doing so ? Besides, when did I publish 
the documents in my possession ? When the 
Government which I had served, and which could 
have screened and rehabilitated me in the eyes of 
the public, had already been overthrown ; when 
peace had been concluded ; when there was no 
longer any peril for public interest ; when there 
was, on the contrary, every advantage in reveal- 
ing the truth, in making it all known. Were 

1 Page 2. 



XXX PREFACE 

the despatches I made use of with this aim in 
view, still, at that moment, discreetly hidden in 
the cardboard boxes at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs ? By no means. They had, for the most 
part, been handed to the Committee appointed by 
the National Assembly to proceed to an inquiry 
into the acts of the Provisional Government. 
M. de Gramont appeared before it as I did ; he 
could convince himself that our correspondence 
was no longer a secret or a mystery for any one, 
that it had become public property. I could 
therefore decline all responsibility in this respect ; 
I will do nothing of the kind, considering that 
real independence of character, that the first of all 
duties, consists in claiming the share of responsi- 
bility one has incurred and in appealing to the 
judgment of one's fellow citizens. 

I took but one step before deciding definitely 
what I would do. I solicited the Emperor's con- 
sent, and I carried him the first proof sheets of 
my book over to England. " I fully authorise 
you to publish it," he answered me. " The docu- 
ments it contains will be evidence for future 
historians of these unhappy times ; they will 
supply them with indispensable elements to 
thoroughly establish that our diplomacy, whatever 
may have been said of it, has never set deceitful 
snares anywhere. Relying on our own loyalty, 
we have had confidence in the loyalty of others, 



PREFACE xxxi 

and that error has been the origin of all our 
disasters." 

What results from these circumstances which I 
have had to recall, in order to respond to the 
reproach pronounced by M. de Gramont ? That 
I have published diplomatic documents which the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had parted with, and 
that in doing so I was protected by the Sovereign 
to whose intentions my acts and conduct had been 
obedient, as duty commanded. 

Disappointed in my hope of bringing national 
feeHng back to a more healthy and enlightened 
appreciation of events, I became resigned and 
waited until time, that includible redresser of 
public errors, could do so efficaciously. It was 
during this period that, in my painful anxiety, I 
penned the pages reproduced in this volume. I 
was supported and encouraged, in that work, not 
only by my ardent desire to contribute towards 
making the truth manifest, but also by new pub- 
lications, due to the investigations of laborious 
and sincere writers who threw fresh light on the 
origin and causes of the events that have been so 
fatal to us. I was also buoyed up by indiscretions 
that came from all sides, by those which Count 
Bismarck considered he could indulge in, in the 
guest-chamber among his familiar friends, thus 
revealing his inward strategy and increasing his 
importance in their eyes. These indiscretions, 



xxxii PREFACE 

more or less well combined, were repeated outside 
and commented on. They were confided to cer- 
tain organs of publicity. From that moment the 
veil was rent asunder in the opinion of independ- 
ent and conscientious persons, and I received con- 
soling proofs of it. 

The newspapers, especially foreign newspapers, 
who had had faith in Count Bismarck's word, 
who had, after and with him, obstinately pre- 
tended that France had wished for war at any 
price and provoked the conflict, the whole press 
in fact, led astray by the Chancellor of the 
Empire, felt, nevertheless, reluctant to recognise 
that it had been his dupe, and it persisted in the 
opinion it had made its readers share. The 
masses were thus kept in the first error : France, 
people continued to say, by making herself the 
aggressor deserved the reverse inflicted on her, 
and her diplomacy was the first at fault. 

It required the stormy and haughty intervention 
of Count Bismarck himself, it needed the audacity 
he displayed in claiming the benefit of an act of 
treachery, to open all eyes, to implant the con- 
viction in every conscience that the war was 
exclusively his personal work, that he had willed 
it, and that he had had, to use his own expression, 
the good fortune to impose it on his own 
Sovereign as well as on the French Government. 

All remember the echo of that unexpected 



PREFACE xxxiii 

explosion, that story of three Germans seated 
round a dinner table mutually elated at the 
thought of crushing the Gaul, in turn delighted 
or in dismay accordingly as the struggle appeared 
imminent or the affair seemed likely to end in 
smoke. The details of the incident will be found 
in this volume reproduced from the Chancellor's 
own version. 

Is there any necessity to recall with what 
surprise and indignation Europe suddenly heard 
Count Bismarck claim his due ? The London 
newspapers, unable any longer to disguise the fact 
that he had imposed on their good faith, spared him 
neither invectives nor recriminations. An im- 
portant organ of the Berlin press declared that 
it felt the keenest shame in acknowledging 
that not only it but the whole of Germany, 
had been impudently deceived by the highest 
representative of the King and Country. I have 
nothing to say that is not present to every mind 
anent the painful and irritable feeling provoked 
in France by this incident ; but I shall be per- 
mitted to mention that it was universally ac- 
knowledged that I had not deserved any of the 
accusations that had been so obstinately, and so 
generally laid to my charge. I am thus indebted 
to Count Bismarck for having recovered, along 
with public esteem and consideration, the peace 
of mind which I had lost. 



xxxiv PREFACE 

In the history of the events of this period, 
three points, three questions, have particularly 
exercised public opinion. Presented, from the 
commencement, under a deceitful aspect by 
Count Bismarck, they contributed to form that 
erroneous opinion which so long prevailed. 

Of these three points, the first in date, that of 
ascertaining who insisted on and provoked the 
war, who will have to assume all the responsi- 
bility of it in the eyes of posterity, has been 
enlightened by Count Bismarck himself. The 
matter is settled. 

The second, which is really the corollary of the 
first, may be resumed in these terms : Did the 
Prussian Government take an active part in 
the candidature of Prince Leopold ? Was it 
their work, and did they conceive it with the 
idea of aggression, with the design of making 
the conflict, foreseen and desired, result from it ? 
Or was the Government a stranger to the inci- 
dent, as has always been maintained at Berlin, 
" looking upon the matter as a family affair in 
which they took no interest " ? 

At present we know the whole truth in respect 
to this. Last year a book of the utmost interest ^ 

1 Aus dem Leben Kbnig Karls von Rumanten, Aufzeichnungen 
eines Augenzeugen. 2 vols. The work has been epitomized in the 
Revue des Deux Mondes by M. Valbert, who, with his smart 
analytic talent, has placed the precious revelations it contains 
in bright relief. 



PREFACE XXXV 

appeared at Stuttgart ; it is the story of the 
private life of King Charles of Roumania, and is 
rich in documentary information in the form of 
the private correspondence of that Prince with his 
family, and particularly with his father. There is 
no author's name to the work ; but the person 
who wrote or published it has been the recipient 
of all the confidences he could have desired to 
interest his readers. And yet, although the in- 
formation which the author divulges to the public 
is full of family and personal details, although the 
subjects of general politics on which he touches 
are very important, and notwithstanding that he 
often brings forward Count Bismarck and King 
William, there has been no denial or rectification. 
Under these circumstances it is permissible to 
conclude that the exactitude of the historical 
facts, with which the book is teeming, is beyond 
doubt. We may, therefore, pause and glean from 
it the irrefutable evidence by which a point of 
contemporaneous history that has hitherto given 
rise to much controversy is enlightened. 

When a fortuitous incident aroused my attention 
in 1869, and put me on the trace of the underhand 
dealing they were engaged in at Berlin, I ques- 
tioned Herr von Thiele, Under Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, in the absence of Count Bis- 
marck, on the subject of Prince Hohenzollern's 

candidature. This functionary, who possessed 

c 2 



xxxvi PREFACE 

the Chancellor's entire confidence, returned me a 
clear and categorical answer. " Herr von Thiele," 
I wrote, " has given me the most formal assurance 
that he has not, at any time, had knowledge of any 
sort of indication that could authorise such a con- 
jecture. The Under Secretary of State, without 
my having said anything to provoke such a mani- 
festation, thought proper to engage his word of 
honour." ^ 

I nevertheless considered It necessary to ques- 
tion Count Bismarck himself, as soon as he 
returned to Berlin. The Chancellor was not so 
discreet as the Under Secretary. He made no 
difficulty about acknowledging that my information 
was correct : " ' The sovereignty that would be 
offered to Prince Leopold,' he said to me, ' could 
only be of ephemeral duration, and would expose 
him to more dangers than mistakes. The King 
being convinced of this would certainly advise 
him to abstain from acquiescing in the vote of the 
Cortes, The Prince's father shares this view.' 
Fancying that Count Bismarck had not expressed 
his whole thought to me, I pointed out to him that 
as Prince Leopold could not comply with the 
wish of the Cortes without the King's approval, 
his Majesty would have to dictate to the Prince 
the resolution he would, under such circumstances, 
have to take. Count Bismarck acknowledged 

1 Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of March 31st, 1869. 



PREFACE xxxvii 

this, but instead of assuring me that the King 
was irrevocably decided to recommend him to 
abstain, he returned to the question of the perils 
with which the new sovereign of Spain would be 
encompassed from the moment he ascended the 
throne. . . . However it may be," I said in conclu- 
sion," I cannot, as you see, place implicit confidence 
in the explanations that were given me by the 
President of the Council, and if I had not feared 
to exceed the limit that the Emperor's Govern- 
ment may be disposed to go to in such a delicate 
matter, I should have requested Count Bismarck, 
without failing in any of my duties, to express 
himself more clearly ; but I thought I ought to 
await your orders before becoming more pressing 
and insisting further to be definitely informed as 
to the eventual resolutions that might be taken at 
Berlin." i 

What happens, indeed, shortly afterwards, and 
what became of the first overtures, the avowal of 
which I had wrung from the Chancellor of the 
Northern Confederation ? The correspondence 
of Prince Anthony with his son, the King of 
Roumania, reveals it. It tells us a Spanish 
deputy, vSenor Salazar, had been entrusted with 
the mission of sounding the Hohenzollern Princes. 
He was introduced to them at one of their 
castles, in November, 1869, by Herr von Werther, 

1 Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of May nth, 1869. 



xxxviii PREFACE 

then Prussian Minister in Bavaria, who would 
certainly not have performed such a delicate duty 
without a formal order from Count Bismarck, who 
was thus following out his design. The sugges- 
tion was unfavourably received by Prince 
Anthony and his three sons. General Prim's 
emissary, in his desire to contribute toward giving 
Spain a sovereign, offered the crown to each of 
them successively and in vain, even to King 
Charles himself. 

Sefior Salazar left discouraged. He had, how- 
ever, acquired the certitude that he would, in case 
of need, meet with powerful support on the banks 
of the Spree. After a few weeks' residence at 
Madrid, he reappeared in Germany; this was in 
January, 1870. He did not go, as on the 
occasion of his first visit, to the south where 
the Hohenzollern Princes reside. Changing his 
itinerary, he arrived direct at Berlin, with letters 
from the Regency for the King of Prussia, for 
the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern, and for 
Count Bismarck. On May ist following, Prince 
Anthony announced this new apparition of the 
Spanish messenger to King Charles. He did 
better, he came himself to Berlin, accompanied 
by the eldest of his sons, apparently in answer to 
an invitation he could not decline. At the same 
moment, Count Bismarck called his Sovereign's 
attention to a report tending to show how 



PREFACE xxxix 

advantageous it would be to Germany, to place a 
Hohenzollern prince on the Spanish throne. " It 
would be an inestimable advantage for her," he 
said, " to have a friend south of the Pyrenees, in 
the rear of France." 

Prince Leopold, however, hesitated. The Crown 
Prince of Prussia, giving proof, on this occasion, 
of his upright feelings, animated his relative's 
scruples and encouraged him to persist in his 
desire to escape from the affair. The King 
himself dreaded the adventure proposed to him. 
But he soon gave way to pressure, and left the 
matter to his nephew's free decision, showing him- 
self disposed to acquiesce in it, whatever it might 
be. Vanquished by the persistent arguing of his 
Prime Minister, he consented to act the part of 
the worthy head of a family, on condition that his 
sovereign responsibility would not be pledged. 
He imagined, or rather they had persuaded him, 
that by intervening in his quality of first Prince of 
the house of Hohenzollern, he in no way impli- 
cated the King of Prussia. That was the thesis 
on which he was shortly to take a stand at Ems. 
Here are the terms in which Prince Anthony re- 
lates these incidents : " Bismarck," he wrote on 
March 20th, "desires acceptance for dynastic and 
political reasons ; the King only desires it, if 
Leopold so decides, of his own free will. On the 
15th we held a very interesting and important 



xl • . PREFACE 

conference, presided over by the King, and at 
which the Crown Prince, Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, 
Schleinitz, Thiele, and Delbriick were present. 
These gentlemen unanimously decided to recom- 
mend us to accept, as by doing so we should be 
performing a patriotic duty to Prussia. After 
some hard fighting Leopold, for more than one 
reason, refused. . . ." 

They then conceived the idea of putting for- 
ward his second brother. Prince Frederick, in his 
place. "One perceives clearly," M. Valbert 
justly remarks, " that it was no longer a question, 
at this juncture, of family interest, of provid- 
ing for an elder or younger son, but of perform- 
ing a duty to Prussia, of a political combination 
that was to have grave and important con- 
sequences." However, it was not Prince 
Frederick who definitely became candidate for 
the Spanish crown, it was Prince Leopold himself, 
who, circumvented by the King's advisers, and 
more particularly by Count Bismarck, suddenly 
changed his mind and consented to the proposal 
of the Spanish Regency, " the most competent of 
the judges having made it clear to him that the 
interest of the State required it." 

Compendious though these rapid indications 
be, do they not superabundantly prove that the 
candidature of Prince Leopold was regarded 
by Count Bismarck as a means of causing 



PREFACE xli 

difficulties to France of a political and inter- 
national order ? — that it was brought forward 
long in advance and discussed from the point of 
view of German interests, " with a determined ob- 
ject {init einem bestimmten Zweck),^' as the Crown 
Prince observed when arousing his cousin's dis- 
trust ? — that it was, in a word, looked upon as 
a fortuitous event, favourable to the ambitious 
calculations which already, in 1869, haunted 
statesmen and warriors at Berlin ? Decided on 
provoking a conflict with France, they required a 
plausible pretext to force us into it ; the over- 
tures of the Regency at Madrid supplied them 
with what was wanting, and they hastened to lay 
hands on it. We have seen how stubbornly 
Count Bismarck caused his schemes to be ac- 
cepted by the King on the one hand, by the 
Hohenzollern Princes on the other, constraining, 
with the aid of Generals von Roon and von 
Moltke, every will to bend to his own. The 
King of Prussia's Prime Minister was therefore 
the chief labourer at this underhand machination 
which concealed an intrigue, a snare set for the 
good faith of France. He knew very well that 
the accession of a German Prince to the throne of 
Charles V. would be an adventure of brief dura- 
tion ; he had made no difficulty in admitting it in 
his conversations with me in May, 1869. But 
his design was not to place the Spanish crown 



xlii PREFACE 

on the head of a HohenzoUern whose fate, what- 
ever it might be, did not interest him beyond all 
measure ; he had another aim, that of setting 
France and Germany at each other. Count 
Bismarck and the chiefs of the army, consistent 
with their principles, bent on the same object, 
could not fail, from the moment they were of 
opinion that war alone could ensure the triumph 
of the policy of which they were the organs or 
rather the inspirers, could not fail, I say, to seek 
an opportunity to bring it about. It was in that 
line of thought that they showed themselves 
unanimous in advising acceptance ; but hence- 
forth, in face of the revelations supplied by 
Prince Anthony's correspondence, it would be 
offending public conscience, if any one still dared 
pretend that the German Government rem.ained 
a stranger to the negotiations carried on between 
Madrid and Berlin, and that the candidature 
offered and accepted was never anything more 
than a family affair discussed exclusively be- 
tween the Spanish Regency and the House of 
HohenzoUern, 

Thus of the three questions to which I called 
the attention of my readers two are absolutely 
elucidated. The first, that of learning which of 
the belligerents of 1870 wished for war and ren- 
dered it inevitable, has been decided by Count 
Bismarck himself with such an explosion and 



PREFACE xliii 

such evidence, that there can be no longer any 
doubt on the subject. The second, namely, that 
which concerns the character and object of 
Prince Leopold's candidature, is solved in an 
equally clear and irrefutable manner by Prince 
Anthony's correspondence with the King of 
Roumania. One has shown, let us say it with- 
out fear of repeating ourselves, that the aim of 
his policy was a violent aggression of Germany 
against France ; the other that the candidature 
of his son was, above all, destined to furnish the 
pretext, having never been considered as anything 
else than "the accomplishment of a patriotic duty 
to Prussia." 

There remains the third question ; I refer to 
the scheme for uniting Belgium to France. 
From the outbreak of the war Count Bismarck 
presented it to Europe with a display worthy of 
his skill. Speaking alone, and in his customary 
light-hearted fashion, he taxed France with ideas 
of covetousness that he had in vain endeavoured 
to drive into her head. In spite of the efforts I 
have made to place this affair, so insidiously dis- 
guised, in its real light, it remains obscure and 
confused to many worthy minds. Still I have 
published official documents of incontestable im- 
portance, establishing beyond a doubt that Count 
Bismarck on many occasions offered us compen- 
sations everywhere on our frontier where French 



xliv PREFACE 

was spoken, and that, conforming to my instruc- 
tions, I declined to discuss such a subject. He 
alone has placed this question in the dark ; he 
alone can throw light on it ; until conscientious 
writers are in a position to detach the truth from 
the documents that time will place at their dis- 
posal. 

Come, Prince von Bismarck, edify us by an 
honest effort ; make a final avowal, let one sincere 
word fall from your lips, and this time again there 
will be an end to all doubt. Instead of speaking 
of France with unseemly disdain, instead of calling 
the attention of the deputations who present you 
their homage, to the copy-books of our elementary 
schools, to our folly for conquests, instead of ad- 
vising them to close the ranks and keep shoulder 
to shoulder, instead of feeding and exalting the 
hatred of two neighbouring peoples by such lan- 
guage, examine your own conscience. Who was 
it, if not Prussia, who in our times pursued and 
realised vast conquests ? You made three wars 
in six years, sprinkled the bones of several hun- 
dreds of thousands of men from the Baltic to the 
banks of the Danube, from the Danube to the 
banks of the Loire ; you issued triumphant from 
this triple struggle, loaded with titles, honours, 
rewards of every kind. History, assuredly, will 
not relate that you deserved well of humanity ; 



PREFACE xlv 

but you will none the less remain the prodigious 
man of our time. Your prestige was not seriously 
affected by your first revelations, and you have 
been able to tell Europe, without prejudice for the 
regard in which you are held, what use you could 
make of your pencil to convey to a communication 
from your Sovereign a feature and a bearing it 
did not possess. At each of your anniversaries 
Germany acclaims you with renewed fervour. 
Why should you not take the noble resolve to set 
matters straight in regard to those conversations 
into which you introduced the words Luxembourg, 
Belgium, and even the canton of Geneva — that 
French enclave, as you termed it. It will cost 
you less than to have assumed the responsibility 
of the last war, as your overtures produced no 
result. 

On a recent occasion, replying to a group of 
notabilities from Leipzig, you freely expressed 
the opinion that Germany should continue closely 
united to Austria, " but that she is nevertheless 
bound to cultivate friendly intercourse with her 
eastern neighbour Russia," as that is necessary to 
her security. But this intercourse existed ; it 
was cordial, intimate, family-like : it was you who 
upset it at the Berlin Congress ; it was you who 
stripped Russia of all the advantages she had 
acquired by the treaty of San Stefano after a 
glorious war sustained at the cost of the greatest 



xlvi PREFACE 

sacrifices ; it was you, again, who tried to 
give Austria the influence she exercised in the 
Lower Danube by assigning to that power Bosnia 
and Herzegovina which you had snatched from 
Turkey whose defender you had made yourself 
If, on that occasion, you had joined your efforts 
to those of the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor 
Alexander II., that faithful prince who gave you 
his most generous co-operation, no one could 
have compelled him to renounce the concessions 
the Sultan had made to his conqueror. Russia 
would have been grateful, and her relations with 
Germany would have been strengthened and con- 
solidated for long. But you had contracted a 
debt with her that it displeased you to discharge, 
as it displeased you, in 1866, to remember the 
assurances you had lavished on France, and 
accord her the compensations you had promised 
her. Those two powers have not forgotten this, 
and you cannot now fail to see that Germany is 
reaping at the present day the fruits of your in- 
gratitude. How could so powerful a mind as 
yours, gifted with such lucid foresight, fall into so 
grave an error, and voluntarily break those 
precious bonds which, after having facilitated 
such vast conquests to Germany, would have 
guaranteed her the peaceful possession of them ? 
That is for you to say. For my part, I limit my- 
self to conjuring you to go the whole length, and 



PREFACE xlvii 

display your frankness even in regard to the 
Belgium affair. 

Consider, Prince Bismarck, that truth, though 
it come sometimes late, like justice, always 
succeeds in piercing the obscurity devised to 
hide it. The force of circumstances sometimes 
constrains even those who have the least appre- 
ciated its value to assist in divulging it. It 
is thus that, in your speeches, in your circulars, 
you have never ceased affirming that the war 
of 1870 was imposed on Germany by a violent 
aggression of France. In September of that 
same year, in a first conference with M. Jules 
Favre, did you not hold this language to him : 
** I only want peace. It was not Germany who 
troubled it. You declared war on us without a 
motive, with the sole design of taking a portion 
of our territory . . . " ? That was reversing the 
parts — acknowledge it. The following day, at 
the Chateau de Ferrieres, did you not renew to 
him the same assurances ? "I have no serious 
reason," you added, "to love Napoleon III. If 
he had liked, we could have been two sincere 
allies, and together we would have disposed ot 
Europe,^ but I would not fight him ; I proved 
that in 1867, ^^ the occasion of the Luxemburg 
affair. All those about the King were for war ; 

^ That is to say, if the Emperor had consented to the proposals 
concerning Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Canton of Geneva. 



xlviii PREFACE 

I was the only one to reject it. ... I merely tell 
you these things to show you that war was not to 
my taste : / would certainly never have waged it 
had it not been declared against tis, and even 
when it was declared I could not believe it would 
occur. . . ."^ 

But there came a time when it pleased you to 
remind your young Emperor that he owed you 
his Imperial Crown, and, discarding the language 
you had invariably held for twenty years, you 
took upon yourself to inform your contemporaries 
that the reconstruction of the German Empire was 
your personal work, being the result of a war of 
which you were the principal author, and which 
would not have broken out without your inter- 
vention. 

In the same way you, for a long time, accused 
France and her agents of having credited you, in 
regard to the candidature of Prince Leopold, with 
intentions and intrigues of which you were abso- 
lutely innocent. You pretended that this affair 
interested the House of Hohenzollern only, and 
that the Prussian Government had never at any 
moment given attention to it. The publication 
of Prince Anthony's correspondence upsets all 
your affirmations at a single stroke. You con- 
sented to, you supported the proposals of the 

1 See Gouvernement de la Defense Nationale, by Jules Favre, 
pages 165 and 170. 



PREFACE xlix 

Regency of Madrid ; you imposed them because, 
in your state of feeling, they were most advan- 
tageous to your poHcy, because they could not 
fail to become the source of most grave difficulties 
for France. It was from this double point of view 
that your colleagues, after you, advised accept- 
ance. This is now a matter so thoroughly 
established that you have not attempted to con- 
tradict it. 

Why do you not take the wise resolution to 
pay the same homage to truth in the Belgium 
affair ? If you abstain from doing so, light will 
sooner or later be thrown on it, in spite of you 
and to the prejudice of your mxemory. The future 
historians of our times will multiply their investi- 
gations, and numerous documents have already 
appeared which will place them on the way to 
a sincere and truthful narrative. They will in- 
quire what was the message you took to Biarritz 
when you went there ; you certainly made that 
journey to ensure the neutrality, if not the co- 
operation, of France in the war you meditated de- 
claring against Austria. What was the price you 
intended paying for it ? What advantages did 
you offer the Emperor in compensation for your 
future aggrandisement ? You often opened your 
heart to me at that time on this grave subject, 
and you did not conceal from me that it would 
be extremely difficult to persuade King William 

d 



I PREFACE 

to make the sacrifice of any part of German 
territory. What you offered the Emperor Na- 
poleon then was what you mentioned to me — 
territories bordering on our frontiers, the re- 
union of which to France you proposed to 
guarantee. You have certainly not forgotten 
that you held this language to me on more than 
one occasion, notably on the eve of the war of 
1866, when you insisted so warmly on the ad- 
vantage of arranging a threefold understanding, 
including Italy. 

Do you remember having informed me on 
May 1 8th, that Major von Burg, who had gone to 
Paris, the bearer of a letter from the King to the 
Emperor, had returned to Berlin without having 
performed his mission, Herr von der Goltz, your 
ambassador, being of opinion that this communi- 
cation was not quite opportune at that moment ? 
Herr von der Goltz, you told me, had himself had 
an explanation with the Emperor and his Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, concerning the desire of the 
Prussian Government to arrange a preliminary 
understanding with France and Italy ; but if he 
had been listened to with kindness, it would never- 
theless have been impossible for him to persuade 
his Majesty to receive this overture favourably. 
At that moment, you were very uneasy, and in 
your anxiety you were lavish in confidences. "If 
the Emperor abandons us," you said to me, " by 



PREFACE • li 

refusing to concert with us, and if he faciHtates 
the cession of Venice to the ItaHans, Prussia 
will stand alone in face of Austria. . . ." You 
were nevertheless full of hope in the valour and 
might of your troops, and you added: "If the 
King listens to me we shall fight ; the army is 
superb ; at no period has it been more num- 
erous, more solidly organised, or better armed. 
I feel confident it will triumph over our 
enemies. . . ." ^ 

Not many days afterwards war became im- 
minent, Austria having declined the proposal of 
the Powers to assemble in Congress. You 
counted on attending this reunion of plenipoten- 
tiaries in person, and I wrote to M. Drouyn de 
Lhuys : " Count Bismarck will regret losing the 
opportunity it would have offered of showing 
himself at Paris. He would have desired to 
confer again with the Emperor and yourself. 
He mentioned to me yesterday, whilst express- 
ing his anxiety as to our intentions, that he 
would have been very pleased to sound you 
before the opening of hostilities, especially in 
view of Prussia attaining great success, as he feels 
confident she will do. I gathered from what he 
said that the King still refuses to admit he 
could be led to cede a portion of the territory he 
actually holds to France. According to his 

1 Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of May 19th, 1866. 

d 2 



lii PREFACE 

Majesty, at least so Count Bismarck states, the 
compensations there might be occasion to offer to 
France, would have to be taken anywhere where 
French is spoken on her frontiers. The President 
of the Council had himself pointed out to his 
Sovereign that to dispose of this territory it would 
first of all be necessary to conquer it. It, how- 
ever, escaped the President of the Council to say 
that if France claimed Cologne, Bonn, and even 
Mainz, he would prefer to disappear from the 
political stage rather than consent to the cession. 
Without my having pressed him, in any way, to 
explain himself further, he mentioned that he did 
not think it impossible to decide the King to 
hand us over the banks of the Upper Moselle 
which, with Luxemburg, would correct our 
frontier so as to give us entire satisfaction. I 
limited myself to answering him that Luxemburg 
was no more a property without a master than 
Belgium and certain cantons of Switzerland. 
Not wishing, however, to discuss these contin- 
gencies (being absolutely forbidden by my in- 
structions to do so), nor to allow him to suppose 
that such arrangements would have any chance of 
being looked into at Paris, I broke up the con- 
versation on this subject so as to let him under- 
stand that I did not wish to continue it. I cannot 
say whether Count Bismarck, in unbosoming him- 
self to me in this matter, without having any 



PREFACE liii 

pretext for doing so, wished to sound me or to 
let you know from now, through my intermediary, 
what were the compensations he could offer us 
and what were those we should abstain from 
asking him for ; but I should not be surprised if 
it were so, these sorts of expedients being very 
common with him." ^ 

Have I reported your words incorrectly, and 
have I mistaken your real intentions ? My belief 
that I have not done so finds additional strength 
in the fact of my being able to corroborate my 
own language by that of an auricular witness, 
whose sincerity is above suspicion, and who was 
at Berlin for the purpose of concerting with you 
and of associating the policy of his Government 
with yours, I refer to General Govone. He 
negotiated the Prusso- Italian treaty, and after its 
conclusion remained near you as the confidential 
agent of the Cabinet of Florence, touching upon 
all diplomatic and military questions in the inter- 
views you had together and those he had with 
General von Moltke. His correspondence has 
been published by the Minister to whom it was 
addressed. General La Marmora, President of the 
Council. At the time when it appeared, you dis- 
played the most lively, I might say, the most 
violent resentment. No one was surprised, for 
the letters of the Italian Emissary, like those of 

^ Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of June 4th, 1866. 



liv PREFACE 

Prince Anthony, contained revelations calculated 
to annoy you. 

In a report of May 7th, General Govone was 
already writing : " Count Bismarck desires to 
know the Emperor's intentions and wishes ; he 
has spoken on the subject to Count Barral (the 
Italian Minister accredited to Berlin); he asked 
him to try and learn something through Com- 
mander Nigra. . . ." And the 22nd of the 
same month, three weeks before the outbreak of 
hostilities, you again said to him, as you had been 
continually repeating to me : " Six months ago, 
when I spoke to the Emperor of what is now 
taking place, he appeared satisfied at certain 
arrangements which also suited Prussia ; now 
that we are on the eve of the event, and it is the 
moment to conclude 7nore positive conventionSy 
he absolutely refuses to have any explanation." 
" I then resumed," adds General Govone : " ' But 
the whole of Europe says openly what the 
wishes of France are ; perhaps those of the 
Emperor are the same.' Count Bismarck re- 
plied : 'In all this afi'air it is a question of 
Prussia acquiring preponderance in a part of 
Germany and of attaching this latter to her by 
certain bonds. To obtain such advantages, can 
Prussia and the King cede to France these vast 
provinces which are of German blood ? It would 
be much more satisfactory for the Emperor to 



PREFACE Iv 

obtain the . . .' " For the name that certainly 
follows these last words in General Govone's 
report, they have placed dots instead of publish- 
ing it ; but every one has understood that this 
name was that of the Kingdom of Belgium. The 
answer your interlocutor gave you allows of no 
doubt in that respect ; he replied, indeed, that 
the . . . (here dots again appear) had "such a 
vigorous vitality of its own and sueh a pro- 
nounced sentiment of autonomy, that the matter 
might be sufficiently difficult for the Emperor 
not to be tempted by it. ..." Can these obser- 
vations apply to Luxemburg ? Does there exist 
on the French eastern or northern frontier, 
another country, apart from Belgium, having 
suck a vigorous vitality of its own, and such a 
pronounced sentiment of autonomy ? 

Thus the language you held to the representa- 
tives of Italy does not differ from what you said 
to me, which proves you were, at that moment, 
perfectly sincere : the same desire to concert with 
France, to conclude positive conventions with her ; 
the same difficulty in inducing the King to make 
a sacrifice on the Rhine ; the same suggestion to 
buy us out with French-speaking countries. I 
could quote other extracts from my own cor- 
respondence, from that of General Govone, or 
from that of the official representatives of Italy 
in France and at Berlin, showing you never 



Ivi PREFACE 

varied either in your speech or proceedings. I 
will limit myself here to reminding you that you 
persevered in the same views, when the Prussian 
Army was already at the gates of Vienna. 
Thanks to our intervention, you opened negotia- 
tions with the Austrian plenipotentiaries. I had, 
then, to remind you that, in presence of the 
aggrandisements of Prussia and in accordance 
with the assurances you had not ceased to renew 
at Paris, the moment was approaching when it 
would be advisable for you to come to an under- 
standing with the Imperial Government in regard 
to the compensations due to France, and I did 
not hide from you that those compensations could 
not be conceded elsewhere than on the Rhine. 
What was the objection you made ? The 
difficulty of inducing the King; and you resumed 
your favourite theme, that of establishing the new 
equilibrium by making the sacrifices it necessitated 
weigh on other States bordering on France. My 
official correspondence, lying in the Archives of 
Foreign Affairs bears testimony to this in the most 
explicit manner^ as it reproduces your language. 
After a first conference which we had at Briinn, I 
wrote in fact to Paris: ". . . . The President of 
the Council made no difficulty in owning to me 
(replying to my observations on the importance 
of the acquisitions Prussia was aiming at, and 
which at that moment comprised Saxony) that 



PREFACE Ivii 

the instructions sent to Herr von der Goltz on 
that subject were in no way peremptory ; that 
their principal object was to combine an ztnder- 
standing with the Emperors Govermnent ; they 
authorised him to effect a compromise by regu- 
lating Prussia's pretensions according to what 
France might name as the price for concerting 
with her. . . . Count Bismarck particularly in- 
sisted on the propriety of the two countries 
uniting and understanding one another, . . . 
Following the same order of ideas, and going 
further still, without any encouragement on my 
part, he endeavoured to prove to me that the 
Austrian reverses permitted France and Prussia to 
modify their territorial position. ... I reminded 
him of the existence of treaties, and that the war 
which he desired to avert would be the first result 
of such a policy. Count Bismarck answered that 
I was mistaken, that Prussia and France united, 
and resolved to correct their respective frontiers, 
by binding one another by formal engagements} 
were in a position to settle these questions 
together without fear of encountering armed 
resistance on the part of either England or 

Russia " ^ 

Already, at that moment, and I noted it in my 

^ It has been seen on a previous page, that Count Bismarck him- 
self reminded M. Jules Favre of these offers and combinations at 
the Chiteau de Ferrieres. 

2 Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of July 15th, 1866. 



Iviii PREFACE 

correspondence, your design was evidently to 
give me to understand that the success of the 
Prussian armies became a fresh obstacle to the 
advantages that might have been conceded to us 
on the Rhine previous to the war. A few days 
afterwards, and whilst we were at NIkolsburg, 
I received orders to sound you on this subject. 
What did you say to me ? That It would be 
difficult for you to Induce the King, conqueror of 
Austria, to abandon to us any part of Prussian 
territory ; that in any case you would have to 
prepare him for it, and that the compensations we 
considered it just to obtain might, perhaps, be 
found in the Palatinate. You were however 
inclined to think that it would be preferable to 
concert together on other bases, and for another 
combination, the one you had often spoken to me 
of; and In Informing my Government of the way 
In which you had received my communication I 
concluded my despatch thus : — " I shall be con- 
veying nothing new to your Excellency In an- 
nouncing to him that Count Bismarck is of 
opinion that we should seek it (the compensation) 
in Belgium, and that he offered to co77te to an 
understanding with you^ ^ 

You will admit that I have no need to demon- 
strate at greater length that previous to the war 
of 1866 but one voice was raised, your own, to 

^ Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of July 26th, 1866. 



PREFACE lix 

suggest the annexation of Belgium to France. 
What was then the Emperor's feeUng ? Did he 
show an incHnation to enter into your views, and 
employ force to shelter the frontiers of France by 
advancing them towards the north ? The Em- 
peror certainly desired the solution of the Venetian 
question, which would have crowned the work of 
emancipation for which France had fought ; but 
he dreaded war, and he declined all overtures, 
yours especially, that would have forced him to 
participate in it. He ardently desired the main- 
tenance of peace, and had no other object in 
negotiating, at Vienna, the cession of Venice, 
which Austria made to him so that it might be 
restored to Italy. I can, in this respect, appeal 
to your own testimony. Did you not say, in fact, 
on May 29th, to Count Barral with profound 
dissatisfaction, long before the outbreak of hos- 
tilities : " The Emperor of the French now wants 
peace at any price " ? Such was also Commander 
Nigra's conviction. On May 28th he informed 
General La Marmora : " The Emperor decides for 
the Congress ; he now desires it sincerely, and is 
loyally and conscientiously endeavouring to bring 
it about . . . ." And on the 3 ist of the same month 
he wrote again : " The Emperor decidedly pre- 
fers a peaceful solution. He formally told me so 
yesterday evening." ^ 

1 For all the quotations from the correspondence of the Italian 



Ix PREFACE 

I was therefore the organ of my Sovereign's 
intentions when I dechned to follow you on the 
ground where you insisted on keeping the discus- 
sion concerning the compensations claimed by 
France ; and you had no better fortune at Paris 
than at Berlin in seeking an interlocutor disposed 
to listen to you. In this respect there is no room 
for doubt for the period which preceded 1866. 
Let us see if it was otherwise after the re-estab- 
lishment of peace with Austria. You have pre- 
tended that it was so, with a wealth of affirma- 
tions and transpositions of dates admirably con- 
ceived to lead public opinion astray. I set your 
errors right in a volume to which I could refer.^ 
You will permit me, however, to pause an 
instant. 

On our arrival at Berlin, returning from 
Nikolsburg, we resumed our conferences. After 
having withdrawn the draft of a treaty concerning 
an important rectification of the Rhenish frontier, 
the bases of which you had declined to accept, 
I wished to obtain an exact statement of the 
proposals you had over and over again put for- 
ward. It was thus that we came to draw out, in 
your study, the draft of a convention, for which 
purpose I held the pen and which disposed con- 
agents, see General La Marmora's volume : Un piu po di luce. 
Chaps. XIII., XIV., XV. and XVI. 

1 Ma Mission en Prusse, pp. 147 and following. 



PREFACE Ixi 

tingently of Belgium. ^ I forwarded it to Paris 
as your work, as a very precise indication of the 
arrangements which, according to you, might be 
concluded between France and Prussia, and thus 
unite the two countries in lasting harmony by the 
aid oi fo7nnal engagements. How was it received ? 
A letter from the Emperor, discovered among 
the papers at the Tuileries and published by the 

1 How, it will be asked, could I lend myself to this discussion, 
so far as to fix, with Count Bismarck, the essential points of an 
understanding, despite the recommendations of my Government ? 
I have no difficulty at present in giving the reason. Having been 
a witness of the ambitious views that were manifested each day 
more clearly, I was very soon convinced, particularly after the 
defeats of Austria, that the Prussian Government would actively 
apply itself to subjugate the whole of the German States without 
distinction, those of the south like those of the north, to the 
hegemony of Prussia and thus form the German Empire. My 
correspondence proves it, as has been seen from the extracts I have 
given. Already from August 25th, 1866, I had been able to send 
to Paris the table of the army of the Northern Confederation, the 
effective of which attained eight hundred thousand men, in official 
figures, which were in no way fantastical, as was pretended at the 
Tribune of the Corps Legislatif to combat the proposals of Marshal 
Niel, who had given attention to the information transmitted by 
the Embassy and military attache whilst elaborating it. It was 
evident to me that Prussia, so powerfully armed, pushing forward her 
aggrandisements to their utmost limits, was about to become the 
preponderant power on the European continent. The acquisitions 
she had already realised, and those she was preparing to make, 
brought before my mind the troubled vision of coming events. 
From that moment I was persuaded that France would find 
herself relatively deprived of her rank and that her security would 
be in peril, unless she obtained equivalent compensations. On 
June 8th, before the outbreak of the war of 1866, I had written to 
M. Drouyn de Lliuys, who had questioned me on this subject : 
" I know only of Count Bismarck who is familiarised with the 
thought that it might be to Prussia's interest to make us a territorial 



Ixii PREFACE 

Government of National Defence — a document 
which is consequently irrefutable — settles the 
matter completely. I cannot do better than place 
it before your eyes. Here it is :— 

"August 26th, 1866. 

" My dear Monsieur Rouher, 

" I send you the draft treaty with my 
remarks on the margin. It is necessary to add, 
in the form of conversation, that the Germanic 
Confederation having ceased to exist, the federal 

concession, and then he would only consent to correct the frontiers 
common to both countries. But the King, like the most humble of 
his subjects, would not tolerate, at this moment, the least suggestion 
of the possibility of a sacrifice of this nature." After Sadowa, 
I felt even more convinced that King William would not agree to 
grant us any important advantage on the banks of the Rhine. In 
accordance with fresh instructions, I nevertheless, at the com- 
mencement of August, proposed a rectification of frontier in that 
direction. Count Bismarck rejected my communication without 
allowing me an opportunity to resume it. 

Therefore, to my mind, the equilibrium of power, upset by the 
acquisitions of Prussia, could only be re-established by the aid 
of the union to France of adjoining countries. It was under the 
influence of that conviction that I took upon myself to confer with 
Count Bismarck on the bases of his own constant overtures. I 
admitted that Luxemburg could be acquired without delay, by aid 
of an understanding with the King of Holland, and that we should 
be justified in proceeding, later on, with Prussia's co-operation, to 
the reunion of France and Belgium. I of course reserved to the 
Imperial Government the right to examine the idea and form an 
opinion in respect to it. It was thus that I was led to engage in 
this negotiation. If my patriotic feelings were misled, I cannot, 
even now, attach to myself any blame. The thought that guided 
me, the legitimate apprehensions in which I found my inspiration 
and which were only too well founded, absolve me entirely, if I 
am not mistaken, in the eyes of my fellow countrymen. 



PREFACE 1x1 

fortresses erected against France should no longer 
belong to the Confederation, but to each state 
that has them in its territory. Thus Luxemburg 
to France, Mainz and Saarlouis to Prussia, 
Landau to Bavaria, Rastadt to Baden, Ulm to 
Wurtemburg. 

"In regard to another matter, I think Prussia 
is raising a good many quibbles with Saxony. 
Would it not be better for Prussia to annex 
Saxony, which is a Protestant country, and place 
the King of Saxony on the left bank of the Rhine, 
a Catholic country ? 

" But all this should only be insinuated ami- 
cably. The treaty must remain secret. The 
question of Luxemburg will come out of itself 
as soon as the negotiations begin. That is the 
most pressing. 

" Believe, my dear Rouher, in my sincere 
friendship, 

" Napoleon. 

" P.S. — Benedetti can therefore, apart from a 
few slight alterations, accept in principle." 

The Emperor, as you see, alters our wording. 
Preserving silence in regard to Belgium, which, 
besides, we had only mentioned in view of ulterior 
and eventual combinations, he fixes his attention 
on the acquisition of Luxemburg, which is to be 
obtained by the aid of an understanding with the 



Ixiv PREFACE 

King of Holland and without having recourse 
to violent measures. But what displeased you 
was the Emperor meddling in the arrangements 
you meant to impose on the whole of Germany, 
so as to ensure exclusive hegemony to Prussia ; 
that he dared stipulate that each State should be 
the custodian of its territorial fortresses, formerly 
entrusted to the care of the Confederation which 
you henceforth dissolved. From that moment 
you took the firm resolution to substitute your 
own personal authority to that of the Federal 
Assembly, to possess yourself, not only of the 
fortresses, but of the direction and free disposal 
of the active forces of all the German States 
without distinction. 

What did the Emperor say further ? " Bene- 
detti can therefore, apart from a few slight altera- 
tions, accept in principle." Accept what ? It 
could not be a proposal of which, with or without 
orders, I had taken the initiative at Berlin, 
as I had written it. One does not accept 
what one proposes. It was therefore a combina- 
tion that was offered to us. Who could have 
done this ? You, evidently. And what could 
have been the object of it, if it were not the 
arrangement you had always considered as the 
only way of forming between France and Prussia 
a durable and sufficiently powerful alliance to 
permit of them settling everything in Europe 



PREFACE Ixv 

together, without fear of meeting with armed 
7^esistance on the part of either England or 
Russia ? 

How was it that these conferences had no con- 
tinuation and were abandoned ? The observa- 
tions the Emperor had placed on the margin of 
the draft convention tended to limit our immediate 
aggrandisements to the acquisition of Luxem- 
burg and the re-establishment of our frontier of 
1 8 14, combined, in a fair measure, with the main- 
tenance of the sovereignty of the Southern 
German States, stipulated at Nikolsburg on our 
representations, which were to remain in ex- 
clusive possession of their respective strongholds. 
But you desired to have your hands free in Ger- 
many to crown your work, and you rebelled at 
the idea of France having authority to exercise 
any control there. Obedient to this feeling you 
had already despatched General von Manteuffel 
on a mission to St. Petersburg, and he assured 
you that you could certainly rely on the 
best intentions of the Emperor Alexander. 
Events have shown that was so. By the aid 
of what concessions did you succeed in binding 
Russia to your policy ? That is your own secret, 
and I have not the childish pretension to seek to 
penetrate it. I may, however, be permitted to 
recall the fact that when in the month of October, 
1870, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg denounced 

e 



Ixvi PREFACE 

the convention limiting the Russian forces in the 
Black Sea without any previous understanding 
with the other Powers who signed this inter- 
national act, the favourable view you took of the 
proceeding ensured its success. Prussia had not- 
withstanding subscribed to all the stipulations of 
the Paris Congress, and it was her duty to 
uphold them and see they were respected. The 
opinion prevailed then that you had entered into 
an engagement at St. Petersburg to disavow the 
one which your Government had contracted in 
1856. Whatever may be thought of this conjec- 
ture, you will certainly not contest the fact that 
from the moment you were able to rely in all 
contingencies on the goodwill of Russia, you put 
an end to our interviews by slipping away, 
thoroughly convinced that you need no longer 
show any regard for the French Government, 
and that you could without detriment forget all 
the engagements made with it. 

I do not ask you to admit this, but I conjure 
you, in the interest of your own renown, to 
acknowledge that you were the originator of the 
combination concerning Belgium. Your glory 
cannot suffer from doing so. You had conceived 
vast designs ; you could not, on the one hand, 
follow them up and realise them without having 
aid Austria low and expelled her from Germany, 
on the other without having come to terms with 



PREFACE Ixvu 

France. Being unable to obtain the King's con- 
sent to sacrifices that were repugnant to his 
pride, the idea occurred to you of disinteresting 
us everywJiere where French was spoken, and 
you applied yourself to that end with all the 
strength of your intellect so long as the co-opera- 
tion or the neutrality of France appeared to 
you to be a condition essential to your success. 
When that moment was over, you changed your 
mind. 

You were no longer compelled to abide by 
your proposals, and you repudiated them. The 
history of diplomacy offers examples that absolve 
you. Victory, moreover, by crowning your efforts, 
has so exalted you as to place you beyond 
censure. 

You will permit me, however. Prince Bis- 
marck, to point out to you that your policy has 
engendered militarism ; that it has placed Europe 
in the necessity of arming, of arming unceas- 
ingly and beyond all measure, that nations live in 
terror of immense, of frightful catastrophes which 
some fortuitous event may suddenly cause to ex- 
plode notwithstanding the prudence of the various 
Governments. To maintain this sad state of things 
the people stagger beneath the burden of taxation 
which is out of all proportion with the economic 
resources of each country. This situation has 
favoured the development of socialistic doctrines, 

e 2 



xviii PREFACE 

and you know whether they constitute a grave peril 
for social order. You are the generator of this 
double evolution ; posterity will hold you responsi- 
ble and call you to account for it. Cease then in 
your retirement to excite human passions, to irri- 
tate feelings of self-esteem. Apply yourself, on 
the contrary, to attenuating your errors, either by 
confessing them, or by appealing to the necessities 
that compelled you to have recourse to them. 

By abstaining to do so you will not free your- 
self from the responsibility you have incurred 
in the eyes of public morality. However modest, 
however feeble my own personal efforts may be, 
I feel confident they will not pass unperceived. 
Others will come, persons more competent, sup- 
plied with fresh documents, who will make truth 
evident. New voices will issue from silence to 
acclaim it. Future historians of our times will have 
that task to perform, and it will not be a difficult 
one for them to accomplish. If you then be still of 
this world, you will regret having failed to provide 
for this contingency yourself in the nightfall of 
your existence. If it be too late, you will turn 
in your grave at a contradiction that would have 
wounded your feelings. Speak, speak then, 
whilst it is still time ! 

" Prince Bismarck," you have said, if Herr 
Maximilian Harden is to be credited, "cannot 
disappear as a lamp that flares up and goes 



PREFACE Ixix 

out. He must go down like a planet." To do 
this, he must, first of all, pay homage to truth. ^ 

Cte. Benedetti. 

1 At the end of the following essays is an account of the mission 
I performed at Ems. The reader, if I am not mistaken, will find 
therein, new elements which will enable him to form a better 
judgment on the events to which the essays refer, events that have 
been so diversely viewed, especially in Germany, up to recent 
times, and particularly on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anni- 
versary of the war of 1 870. 



STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 



STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY. 

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM L AND PRINCE 
BISMARCK.i 

The retirement of Prince Bismarck will have 
marked a date in present times that history will 
retain. After the death of the Emperor William, 
the Chancellor of the Empire still looked like 
the continuer and most solid pillar of the policy- 
he had so gloriously served. On relinquishing 
power, he seemed to have himself closed the long 
period during whic|i he had exercised it. The 
scene remains the same. The actors chano-e. 
The moment strikes us as favourable to cast a 
glance over this past, recent though it be. Let 
us hasten to say that he who would now under- 
take to give an account of such an undertaking 

1 These papers also deal in a general way with the circumstances 
which led to the Franco-German War and the situation it created 
in Europe. They were written successively at long intervals, with 
the result that they contain repetitions which I should have liked 
to have avoided in placing them together in a volume. But these 
mutilations would have rendered the statement of facts less clear and 
intelligible. The reader will therefore kindly bear this explanation 
in mind when meeting with similar remarks on different pages. 

B 



2 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

and express an opinion on it, would assuredly be 
rash. That task belongs to writers of the future 
generation. Those who have attempted it in 
our days must have done so under the influence 
of feelings that all who are contemporary with 
their subject endeavour in vain to avoid. And so 
we have no intention of touching upon events. 
But it seems to us that it will not be out of place,, 
just now, to take one of their particular features, 
in regard to which we believe opinion has been 
absolutely misled, in order to put it to the test 
of facts. 

It is generally thought that Prince Bismarck 
was the originator of the policy to which Prussia 
owes all her success, and that he had to force it 
on his Sovereign, which, it is added, he only did 
with difficulty. Is this judgment a correct one, 
is it just.'* Is Prince Bismarck the real, sole 
founder of the new German Empire ? was King 
William merely the beneficiary ? That is what 
we desire to elucidate, simply in the interest of 
historical truth. 

Before approaching this task, it will be ad- 
vantageous to show the character and aptitudes 
of Sovereign and Minister ; to recall the position 
of the kingdom at the accession of King William 
and the idea he had formed of it ; to ascertain, 
on the other hand, what Prince Bismarck thought 
on the same subject, and what was his judgment. 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 3 

The predecessor of the future Emperor, 
Frederick William IV., possessed none of the 
qualities of his race. Mystical, irresolute, and 
yet authoritative, he constantly deviated from 
the line traced out by his ancestors. He was 
never the same man two days together, and his 
ministers exhausted their efforts in rectifying or 
rather concealing his inconsistencies. If fortune 
smiled on him, he avoided it. But in face of a 
complication he had the pluck to brave it out. 
Two events of equal importance suffice to deter- 
mine the character of the prince and the aspect 
of the reign. He declined the Imperial crown 
offered him by the Frankfort Parliament, and he 
bore the humiliation Austria inflicted on him, 
at Olmtitz, by the hand of Prince Schwarzen- 
berg. He could not make up his mind to side 
either with Russia or the Western Powers during 
the Crimean War, as he would not or dared 
not support or combat the policy of the Vienna 
Cabinet, which had associated itself, in a certain 
measure, with France and England. Democracy 
and the Holy Alliance inspired him with equal 
distrust and plunged him into the same state of 
irresolution. He was nevertheless jealous of his 
authority, and carefully avoided allowing his 
brother, the Prince Royal, to have any share in 
the Government. The latter was able to meditate 
for many years on the errors he silendy and 

B 2 



4 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

powerlessly witnessed. It was assuredly during 
this long period that he conceived and cherished 
the ambitious schemes that were to illustrate his 
reign. 

This Prince had faith. He ascended the throne 
with the deep, resolute feeling that he was destined 
to accomplish great things : he gave a clear indica- 
tion of this at Koenigsberg, on the day of his 
coronation. He thought he held his sovereign 
rights from God, and owed no account of them 
but to Him and his own ancestors. At the time 
when his brother granted the first constitutional 
reforms, in 1847, he made reservations in his 
quality of heir to the throne : according to his 
ideas the elective assemblies should never know 
anything of the budget or foreign policy. It was 
with these convictions that, from the commence- 
ment of his reign, he decided on his programme, 
finding inspiration for that purpose in the tradi- 
tional policy of his house, so strangely disregarded 
by his predecessor. The difficulties he had to 
overcome required extreme caution ; they indicated 
a necessity for reserve : he therefore was and 
remained taciturn. He hid his thoughts beneath 
studied and never-failing courtesy. By his gentle 
and affable good grace, he exercised an ever 
powerful charm on the other sovereigns of Europe. 
It was thus that he won over the Emperor 
Alexander, his nephew ; we know what con- 



THE EMPEROR AND, PRINCE BISMARCK 5 

cessions, so unfortunate for the most precious 
interests of Russia herself, he obtained from him 
in 1866 and in 1870. He came to Paris, at the 
time of the Exhibition of 1867, shortly after the 
Luxemburg affair, preceded by a natural feeling 
of resentment of which he might have had cause 
to fear an open expression. He went away 
leaving impressions behind him that bore testi- 
mony to his skill, to the marvellous art which he 
so well knew how to employ to disarm the most 
prejudiced minds. The charmer did not inherit 
this precioua virtue from his ancestors, who 
had been distinguished rather by the coarse- 
ness of their manners. But he had taken 
from them all the gifts and all the aptitudes 
that have so prodigiously assisted the Hohen- 
zollerns in attaining greatness : firmness in 
their designs, opportuneness in forming resolu- 
tions, unlimited prudence, distrustfulness always 
on the alert, and when necessary dissimulation. 
"If it be a matter of duping, let us be knaves," 
wrote Frederick the Great. King William, having 
signed the treaty with Italy, forgot its existence ; 
and he authorised the dowager Queen, sister of 
the mother of the Emperor of Austria, to convey 
to Vienna the assurance that his enea^ements had 
not the character attributed to them. 

Fearing neither trouble nor work, he displayed 
incessant and untiring activity. No department 



6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

of the public service escaped his supervision. 
Bearing in mind that good polity necessitates 
good finances, his anxiety for the prudent ad- 
ministration of the resources of the State never 
on any occasion relapsed. Not one single outlay 
of an extravagant nature was incurred during his 
reign. But his first thought was for the army. 
He knew that diplomacy was fatally powerless, 
however able its agents might be, if it were not 
supported by a soundly organised military force, 
ever ready to second it. He brought into play 
all the resources of his mind to ensure the 
development of such a force and maintain it on a 
proper footing. His foresight served him well, 
for there is no disguising the fact, that all Prince 
Bismarck's skill would have led Prussia to ruin 
without the victories of Sadowa and Sedan. 

During- the long" time he remained Prince 
Royal, he had as commander of a Rhenish Army 
Corps, made Coblenz his chief residence. He 
lived there surrounded by a few devoted friends, 
men of enlightened intellect, who deplored the 
failings of his brother as he did, and meditated 
with him on the destiny of Prussia, so seriously 
exposed by a sovereign and advisers who were 
both opposed to the sound and brilliant traditions 
of his family. 

On his accession, he dismissed every one. He 
formed a Ministry composed of those same men 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 7 

who had participated, more or less assiduously, in 
the confabulations of the little court at Coblenz ; 
men of liberal aspirations whose advent to power 
could not fail to be welcomed by the majority in 
the Chamber of Deputies at Berlin, who were 
imbued with the same principles, or rather the 
same velleity. It was, as it was qualified at its 
origin, the Cabinet of the New Era. But the 
King, Prince by Divine Right, issue of a family 
that had formed the kingdom by conquest and 
without restraint, meant to retain the supreme, if 
not the exclusive direction of State affairs in his 
own hands. ^ Feeling that, to raise Prussia from 
the abasement into which it had fallen during the 
previous reign, he must, first of all, increase the 
military strength of the country, he announced at 
the opening of Parliament, that his first duty com- 
manded him to re-model the army, and the new 
Cabinet introduced a bill according the Govern- 
ment considerable additional supplies. This 

^ " If we have been allowed," William II. recently said at Bremen, 
^'to do what has been done, it is, above all, because there is a tradition 
in our house in virtue of which we consider ourselves appointed by 
God to preserve and direct the people over whom we reign for their 
^ood, and to protect our moral and material interests. It was by 
following this tradition that my grandfather accomplished the 
great deeds he did and succeeded in establishing the unity of the 
Empire. . . ." The young Emperor correctly expressed the ruling 
thought of his race, and he shows himself no less disposed than his 
grandsire to allow obstacles to be placed in the way of it, or his 
personal action to be interfered with. Prince Bismarck, as a case 
in point, has just had the experience of this. 



8 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

proposal caused a first disagreement to break 
out between the Sovereign and the representa- 
tives of the country. The principles and ideas 
sown in Germany by France had germinated. 
They had exploded in 1848 ; they had met with 
adherents everywhere, especially in Prussia ; the 
Chamber of Deputies at Berlin did not conceal 
its intention to insist on the chief of the State 
granting a reform in the Constitution and giving" 
guarantees that it should participate more directly 
and efficaciously in the government of the king- 
dom. The King's advisers, inclining themselves 
towards parliamentary doctrines, considered that 
the moment had come to associate the Chamber 
more intimately with sovereign authority. These 
views shocked the King's dynastic feelings, the 
idea he had formed of the power and rights 
inherent in the crown ; they threatened the work 
he wished to prepare and the success of which 
could only be ensured, he thought, by unity in 
its direction and by clever and particularly cau- 
tious guidance. He soon came to a decision. 
This sovereign, reputed devoid of initiative and 
firmness, dismissed his first Ministry, which was 
nevertheless formed of tried statesmen who were 
devoted to him. 

Among the most frequent defenders of the 
throne and altar, amongst those who had battled 
so valiantly during the storm of 1848, a country 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 9 

squire, Herr von Bismarck,^ had shown himself 
the firmest and most vehement. His audacious 
language and the absoluteness of his doctrines 
had won his name a renown that placed him in 
the first rank. All has been said that could be 
said regarding his entrance into public life. His 
correspondence, including his most intimate 
letters written at that time, has been published 
with his consent ; one w^ould be tempted to think 
that he did not wish posterity to be left in 
ignorance of any of the political errors of his 
youth. It is therefore superfluous for us to pause 
at that. Let us note, however, that his feudal 
fervour won him the oroodwill of Kino- Frederick 
William, who appointed him Prussian delegate 
to the Frankfort Diet. This was the turnino- 
point in his career. A mind like his, enlight- 
ened by ardent patriotism, could not waste time 
in the wrangling of parties and castes. He 
understood, from the first day at the Federal 
Assembly, that he was on his right ground ; that 
he was in presence of Prussia's most redoubtable 
adversaries ; that there was the obstacle to her 
aggrandisement, to the influence her German 
quintessence gave her the right to claim in 
Germany. The attitude of the Austrian repre- 

^ Otto von Bismarck Schoenhausen, created Count Bismarck 
i6th September, 1865, and Prince on the 21st March, 1871.— 
Translator's Note. 



lo STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

sentative, the privilege he enjoyed of presiding 
over the Diet to the exclusion of all the other 
delegates, even him of the Prussian Government, 
the tendencies of the representatives of second- 
rate Courts, who had nothing to fear from 
Vienna and everything to apprehend from 
Berlin, revealed to him that the pact of 1815 
condemned the Government of his country to 
impotence, and he felt convinced that this 
pact must be rent asunder if Prussia wished 
to resume her interrupted ascent. From that 
moment he resfarded the doctrines he had so 
violently opposed with less repugnance. He had 
bitterly blamed what he termed the heresies of 
the Court at Coblenz ; he now showed himself 
disposed to accept them in a certain measure. 
He slipped among the little congregation without 
having been invited. As deputy at the Berlin 
Chamber he had defended the alliance with 
Austria before and after Olmlitz ; as the King's 
representative at Frankfort he opposed it with, all 
the violence of his nature. He had no hope ot 
influencing Frederick William and his advisers, 
whom it would have been impossible to persuade 
to modify their views ; but he had the presenti- 
ment that a new reign would shortly permit of a 
new policy being introduced. He looked upon 
the Diet as a hot-bed of dissimulation ; he caused 
profound uneasiness in it by his outbursts of 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK ii 

frankness. He pronounced aloud, and in no 
measured terms, what his colleagues thought and 
did in the dark. This Assembly was in reality 
a gathering of adversaries in disguise. Austria 
and Prussia were like two china dogs. To the 
secondary States this threatening attitude was a 
precious guarantee of independence and security ; 
they supported first one, then the other, of the 
two great Powers in accordance with their private 
interests, paralysing alternately the action of the 
Vienna Cabinet and the Berlin Cabinet when either 
displayed a tendency to become dangerously pre- 
ponderant. Count Bismarck tore away the masks. 
With an inexhaustible flow of spirits he turned 
into ridicule the complicated, tumble-down organ- 
ism of the Confederation, elaborated with foreign 
aid to render Germany powerless, and all for 
want of one sole, manly management. With 
the same unreserve and equal daring, after 
having pointed out the complaint, he prescribed 
the remedy. " The Austrian Empire," he said, 
in his private conversations, " is not a German 
State it is cosmopolitan ; without the arch- 
duchy it would be a stranger in Germany, it has 
no right to a seat in the Diet ; it should retire," 
he added in intimacy. " Every Prussian is a 
German," he said again, forgetting the Poles ; 
" Prussia is the real Great German Power." 
This singular talk, so undiplomatic, so rarely heard 



12 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

at the seat of the Diet, disturbed the tranquillity 
of no one because it was so strange. No one 
suspected Count Bismarck of being a prophet. 

What he said at Frankfort, he wrote to Berlin, 
arranging his remarks to suit the King's tempera- 
ment and that of his Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Herr Von Manteuffel, This attitude, rash thouQ-h 
it were, did not cause displeasure. The bold lan- 
guage of the representative of the monarchy 
flattered the monarch's pride. The sovereign 
knew his emissary : he had seen him at Berlin 
displaying a warmth sometimes unruly, but always 
devoted to his service, to the interests of the 
dynasty. He had, however, hesitated in dele- 
gating him to the Confederation, " Let his 
Majesty make the trial," Count Bismarck had said 
to him ; " and if it does not do, he will recall me," 
The trial was to his advantage ; he was main- 
tained at his post in spite of his errors, in spite 
of the representations of the Courts of the Con- 
federation and the efforts of the Prussian nobility, 
who solicited his recall, as he writes himself to his 
sister, Frau von Arnim,^ Appointed to Frankfort 
in 1 85 1, he was still there as Prussian representa- 
tive in 1857, when the King's health compelled 
him to retire in favour of the Prince Royal, who 
became Regent, The new reign was imminent. 
Count Bismarck did not lose a moment in takino- 

o 

1 Letter of November I2tli, 1858. 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 13 

Up his position. He published a pamphlet in 
which, ceasing to conceal his conversion, he 
publicly paid homage to the patriotic efforts of 
the National Parliament of 1848. One read 
therein notably as follows : " Prussia should no 
longer remain with Austria in the German Con- 
federation, such as the Federal Act of 181 5 and 
the final act of 1820 have made it; she should 
never have tolerated its reconstruction in 1850, 
and her interest is to urge dissolution." 

The new Government had been hardly formed 
when Count Bismarck, in November, 1858, was 
despatched to St. Petersburg as Ambassador. 
What was the Prince Reo^ent's idea on this oc- 
casion ? Did he remove him from Frankfort 
under the impression that his presence there 
might endanger Prussia's relations with Austria, 
and with no other thought? He certainly did 
not consider it expedient to alarm the Vienna 
Cabinet ; he wished on the contrary to give a 
pledge of his desire to act in all loyalty as a 
member of the Confederation ; he wanted the 
displacement of the disturber of the sittings of 
the Federal Assembly to be understood in that 
sense by the Austrian Government. But he had 
other views in accrediting him to a family Court, 
to the Emperor Alexander, whose kindly feelings 
It was necessary to captivate. He thus gave him 
a mark of his confidence, foreseeing, no doubt. 



14 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

that he would need before long-, and in a more 
direct way, to have recourse to his services. 
Every one at Berlin felt this, from the particular 
kindness the Emperor showed him.. If Count 
Bismarck had not received the assurance, he had 
the presentiment of what was to happen, as his 
correspondence shows. 

Be that as it may, his mission to Russia was to 
him an exile. He took his opinions along with 
him, disavowing none of them. The remembrance 
of Austria's attitude during the Crimean War 
encouraged feelings of resentment in Russia that 
have not entirely died out even at the present 
day : Count Bismarck met with sympathizers 
who were disposed to listen to him. Prince 
Gortchakoff, who had become Chancellor of the 
Empire, after having represented his sovereign 
at the Diet, shared all his hostile views : he had 
encouraged them at Frankfort, he did not oppose 
them at St. Petersburg. The Prince Regent's 
ambassador, on his side, exerted himself to 
animate and above all to irritate those feelings, 
from which he was to reap such precious ad- 
vantages later on. He did not, however, want 
them to forget him at Berlin, and he devoted 
his spare moments to converting his new Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Baron Schleinitz ; to proving 
to him that the policy of Prussia should have 
but one aim, the transformation of Germany 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 15 

to her advantage. It was thus that, on May 12th, 
1859, on the eve of the Italian campaign, fearing 
a reconciliation with Austria, he entreated him to 
take advantage of this propitious opportunity to 
break off all connection with her and boldly 
repudiate a solidarity disastrous to the interests 
of the King and country. The letters he wrote 
from St. Petersburg are known, like those which 
he sent to his family from Frankfort ; they have 
been printed on several occasions. We will 
only cull from them one thought which resumes 
them all : "I see in our federal situation," he 
says, "a flaw from which Prussia suffers, and 
which must, sooner or later, be extirpated ferro 
et igneT "In a word, all this," he writes again, 
in that flowery language peculiar to him, this 
diplomatist doubled occasionally with a poet, 
"is but a question of time ; nations and indi- 
viduals, folly and wisdom, peace and war, all 
come and go, like a wave, and the sea remains 
. . ." It was at that moment that this ardent 
champion of absolutism revealed himself as an 
apologist of the Frankfort parliament, of universal 
suffrage, of all the principles which he had, until 
then, so disdainfully outraged. The future will 
show whether he was wisely advised by his genius 
on every point : universal suffrage has already 
contributed, not a little, towards hurling him from 
that lofty position whence, in the enjoyment of his 



i6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

immense power, he considered himself inexpug- 
nable. But, however this may be, we can already 
examine Prince Bismarck's long career from the 
day he left Berlin to represent King Frederick 
William at Frankfort. 

The letters he wrote to Baron Schleinitz were 
certainly placed before King William who had 
succeeded his brother. They were penned with 
that idea, and to flatter the master whose thoughts 
the future Minister had penetrated. And so the 
new Sovereign, far from taking offence, recalled 
him from St. Petersburg to despatch him to 
Paris : after having placed him in a position to 
approach the Emperor Alexander, he accredited 
him to the Emperor Napoleon. He thus pre- 
pared him for the task he was to perform and 
which it became urgent to entrust to him. At 
this moment, indeed, the conflict between the 
Government and the Chamber of Deputies had 
become more pronounced. The majority had 
refused the supplies for the reorganisation of the 
army and the Cabinet was divided as to the best 
course to follow ; some of its members were 
disposed to advise that certain concessions should 
be granted. The King felt convinced that he 
was placed in the alternative of renouncing his 
plans or of placing power in firmer hands, in those 
of a statesman resolved to second his policy in 
face of all the difficulties which would spring up 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 17 

from the commencement and which it would be 
necessary to overcome at any cost. He resolved, 
as we have said, to accept the resignation of the 
Ministry of the New Era, or rather he brought it 
about. To whom was the duty of forming the 
new Cabinet entrusted? To Count Bismarck. 
Still the King knew his opinions thoroughly, 
the policy he had not ceased to advise, his 
hostility to Austria, to the Diet, his ardent desire 
to break up the federal pact and to embark on a 
diplomatic campaign, a military one if necessary, 
to place Prussian power in Germany on a new 
footing-. What conclusion must one draw ? 
That the Sovereign's views were evidently those 
that the representative of Prussia at Frankfort,, 
St. Petersburg, and Paris had not ceased to^ 
suggest and uphold. 

The characters, however, of Sovereign and 
Minister bore no resemblance to each other. 
Count Bismarck, with his stubborn mind, must 
have displayed both his qualities and defects in the 
performance of his new duties : resolution, rash- 
ness, want of due restraint. His energetic and 
passionate nature made him refractory to the laws 
of prudence. Diplomatic and professional secrecy 
appeared to him no longer efficacious in this age 
of universal publicity. Disguise seemed neither 
useful nor profitable. Acting as at Frankfort, he 
dissembled neither his plans nor hopes. He un- 

c 



i8 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

bosomed himself to the Austrian representative 
in person, Count Karolyi, at one of their first 
interviews. Was this skill or weakness? Was 
he acting in accordance with wise calculation 
or involuntary impulse ? People had become 
familiar with the diplomatist's liberty of speech, 
they were bewildered at the Minister's effusive- 
ness. There was the King's will, however, 
always on the alert, always imperious, which had 
to be taken into account, and which had asserted 
itself on many occasions. We shall see the 
Sovereign authorising things to be done, giving 
assurances in contradiction to the declarations and 
confidences of Prince Bismarck. We shall see 
these masters, both equally well advised, often 
contradicting one another, but always faithful to 
the thought that was common to both of them. 
It was at once a peculiar and exceedingly 
interesting sight to watch these two gladiators 
both pursuing the same end by very different 
roads. 

What was the share of each of them in the 
glorious result that has crowned their mutual 
efforts ? The legend exists : Prince Bismarck 
directed Prussia's policy alone, with his iron 
hand ; he caused all its evolutions. Thanks to 
his vehement firmness, he vanquished at Berlin 
as well as at Vienna and Paris ; he dispelled the 
King's weakness and triumphed over his hesita- 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 19 

tion. Future historians will have much to do to 
alter this judgment. It is nevertheless erroneous. 
It would assuredly be childish to deny or even 
to contest, in any measure, Prince Bismarck's 
political genius. He gave many striking proofs 
of it previous to the two wars that produced 
the German Empire ; he has given more mar- 
vellous examples of it still, since the re-establish- 
ment of peace. Whilst the Army General Staff 
was busy with the consolidation and development 
of the military strength of the new Empire, he 
devoted all the resources of his intellect to 
guarantee the work accomplished against every 
contingency. He has concluded alliances that 
no one else would have foreseen or attempted. 
He has riveted to the fortunes of his country 
the two Powers whom recent events would have 
seemed to have destined to other arrangements. 
Austria, resigned, has driven the remembrance of 
her defeats and her resentment from her mind ; 
forgetful Italy has ruptured all the bonds binding 
her to France ; both have accepted the yoke of 
Germany and are at her mercy. After having 
secured the neutrality of the Emperor Napoleon 
in 1866, the friendly abstention of the Emperor 
Alexander in 1870, Prince Bismarck, with the aid 
of England, was able, at the Berlin Congress, to 
tear to shreds the treaty of San Stefano and 
vanquish Russia without having recourse to arms, 

c 2 



20 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

by snatching from her the concessions she had 
wrung from Turkey, after a sanguinary but 
glorious war. He did more ; by means of a 
subterfuge he placed Austria in possession of two 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia and Her- 
zegovina, and gave a proper tone to the policy of 
the Austro- Hungarian Cabinet on the Bosphorus. 
He has thus succeeded not only in sheltering the 
past, the advantages already acquired, so far as 
human foresight can do, but also in preparing for 
his successors the task of the future, the crowning 
of the work he has so potently contributed towards 
building-up. At the same time he has rendered 
the hostility, which was already so profound in 
the Balkan Peninsula between Russia and 
Austria, less curable and perhaps more bitter. 
By what means has he won over Italy, persuaded 
her to renounce her national and patriotic tradi- 
tions, and follow him along a path where, hitherto 
at least, she has encountered naught but dis- 
appointments and painful trials ? We will not 
attempt to penetrate this mystery. What we 
wished to establish was that Prince Bismarck's 
foresight and skill have secured Germany a 
treaty which places at her disposal the united 
forces of Austria and Italy, under relative con- 
ditions that guarantee neither of these Powers 
absolute reciprocity. What we also desired to 
establish was, that Austria has accepted or sub- 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 21 

mitted to a situation that will be a lasting obstacle 
to any reconciliation with Russia ; that Italy will 
not for long be able to renew entirely cordial 
relations with France. And this is in some 
measure Prince Bismarck's personal work. In 
peace as in war, he has thus marked his place in 
history at an altitude unattainable by his contem- 
poraries. Germany rightly pays him the same 
homage as France has been doing to Richelieu 
for nearly three centuries. But it would be an 
injustice if, in giving the Minister his due, the 
King- were refused what belong-s to him. It would 
be iniquitous if, obedient to a popular idea, one 
were to couple William I. with Louis XIII., who, 
indeed, was an eminent prince in the measure 
and with the aptitude of his character. The 
future German Emperor, like the son of Henri 
IV., possessed, but in a higher degree, a merit that 
is always precious in a ruler, that of giving his 
confidence to none but men worthy of it. The 
Generals von Moltke and von Roon, previous to his 
time, were distinguished officers, but were in the 
ranks, if we may so express it : the King, under- 
standing the immense value of their respective 
qualities, of his own personal initiative and pre- 
vious to having: summoned Count Bismarck, 
placed one at the head of the Great General Staff 
and made the other Minister of War. We are 
all familiar with the glorious services they have 



22 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

rendered. These selections show more posi- 
tively than we could do, with what marvellous 
penetration the Sovereign was gifted. 

We have seen when and under the empire with 
what anxiety the King entrusted Count Bismarck 
with the presidency of the Council. We have 
expressed the opinion that this step should be 
attributed to the existence of absolute concordance 
in the views of King and Minister, and to their 
perfect understanding as to the best way to ensure 
the triumph of them. The King, in fact, did not 
abdicate into the hands of his new adviser, as is 
generally thought, and it would be out of all 
reason to claim exclusively for Count Bismarck 
the glory of the success that has been attained. 
Diplomatists who followed the events of this 
period on the spot are aware that the King never 
ceased, at any moment, to direct the acts of his 
Government. Never was a resolution taken, never 
was a diplomatic communication made, without his 
order and without his supervision. Important 
despatches were never sent away without being 
submitted to him, and it often happened that they 
only left after he had amended them. Count 
Bismarck, one may say, was the originator of 
hardy resolutions, the King was always the 
modifier of them. One trusted in his daring, the 
other sought counsel in prudence. These differ- 
ences of opinion continued until the war of 1866, 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 23 

and during that long- period Europe heard naught 
but the voice of Count Bismarck. The break, 
which the King put on, when needful, profoundly 
irritated the Minister, and his anger found relief 
in violent explosions. He expounded his schemes, 
and explained the reasons that commanded prompt 
and rapid action, without troubling to confine him- 
self to the limits of an intimate circle ; he dis- 
played entire confidence in a success that Europe 
would submit to as soon as it had been achieved. 
He did not spare his master, reproaching him 
with timidness, which was in reality but wise and 
skilful cautiousness, and distinctly a matter of 
policy. The King, in fact, lent himself to all the 
strataoems destined to make war with Austria 
inevitable ; but he wished hostilities to break out 
at the right time and when he would be able to 
cast the responsibility, if not the initiative of 
them, on the Court of Vienna, when he would no 
lono-er have to fear the ill-will of the Powers and 
the expression of public opinion. Consequently 
he took care to keep in the background, to detach 
his personality from all the complications of which 
his Minister willingly assumed the responsibility. 
He preserved impenetrable silence. When he 
broke it, in his rare interviews with the diplo- 
matists accredited to his Court, he repudiated, 
with his gentle affability, all warlike thought, any 
intention of troubling European peace. 



24 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Thus, whilst the Sovereign affected to have 
horror of a rupture, making nevertheless no con- 
cession to avert it, authorising, on the contrary, 
his Minister to multiply his efforts to bring it on, 
Count Bismarck concealed from no one that he 
wished to engage in the armed struggle without 
any other thought than that of fighting and con- 
quering, without troubling about the attitude of 
the Powers or public opinion. The rumour thus 
gained credit that the King was peacefully dis- 
posed, whilst the Minister, only, was warlike. 
This belief, propagated by the press, which 
gathered all its information from Count Bismarck, 
and none from the King, was spread all over 
Europe, and when the events occurred the hand 
of the Minister, only, was seen in connection with 
them ; the Sovereign, clothed in his apparent 
moderation, appeared to have acted merely an in- 
voluntary part. We ought to add that William I. 
never once showed himself jealous at the renown 
clinging to the President of the Council. It 
suited his nature and was part of his calculations 
to leave the initiative and responsibility of violent 
resolutions to his Minister ; he could thus dis- 
approve if circumstances required it ; he was 
contented at having the certitude that the advan- 
tages derived from what occurred belongred to his 
reign and dynasty. But let us examine the facts 
and see what they teach. 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 25 

We have said that the King whilst as yet 
exercising the power of Prince Regent, on open- 
ing the parliamentary session on January 12th, 
1859, had announced it to be his firm will, that 
the army should be reorganised, or rather its 
strength increased. In the same speech, he ex- 
pressed his sympathy for the German population 
in the duchies of the Elbe, and his words were 
greeted with the applause of the whole Assembly. 
From that moment he conveyed an idea of the 
principle and tendency of the policy that dis- 
tinguished his reign. Therefore, when Count 
Bismarck came to power in 1862, he had neither 
to submit a line of conduct, nor new views, to his 
Sovereign's approbation. The master's thoughts 
were exactly the same as those which haunted 
the mind of the minister. An understanding 
already existed between them, both in regard to 
the object to be attained, and the means to be 
employed to reach it. The King could have no 
doubt on that point, and the conviction he had 
formed influenced him in his choice of the new 
President of the Council. Are we to suppose then, 
that at that period they had, in their mutual 
ambition, perceived the final limit of the horizon 
which was opening radiant before them ? There 
is nothing to authorise such a presumption. To 
men whom fate has singled out for mighty 
destinies, one willingly attributes, when great 



26 • STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

deeds are accomplished, a boundless prescience, 
and schemes that embrace, with absolute certainty, 
the future of nations during a long period. This 
is attributing too much to human genius. Prince 
Bismarck himself has never claimed such glory. 
No statesman has ever taken such little care to 
conceal his inner mind ; and when one studies his 
correspondence, when one evokes the confidences 
of which he was so prodigal during the early 
years of his long ministry, one is easily convinced 
that his prevision, like his hopes, extended neither 
so far, nor so high as has been imagined. In 
diplomacy as in warfare, as in all things in this 
world, the errors of your adversaries are more 
profitable to you than the best strategy. They 
are what is commonly called good luck. Prussia 
has been overwhelmed by the caprice of fortune. 
Let us be just, however, and hasten to say that 
it was to a prince and advisers worthy of all his 
favour, that the interests of Prussia were confided 
during the period anent which we are rapidly 
jotting down a few details history will retain. 
Morality, in truth, has not always been respected ; 
but in the conflicts of nations, morality and politics 
rarely go hand in hand. 

Two questions occupied more particularly the 
attention of the diplomatic world at the time when 
Count Bismarck, in response to his sovereign's 
call, formed his first Ministry. Poland had taken 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 27 

up arms again, and claimed the autonomy which 
had been guaranteed to her by the treaties of 
1 8 1 5 ; she had engaged in a supreme and san- 
guinary struggle which provoked the diplomatic 
intervention of the Powers. On the other hand 
the German States, yielding to the pressure of 
public feeling, had resumed, through the inter- 
mediary of the Diet, the iniquitous quarrel thrust 
on Denmark in regard to Schleswig-Holstein, and 
threatened her with another execution. At the 
commencement of the outbreak in Poland, King 
William had entreated his nephew, the Emperor 
Alexander, not to make any concessions to his 
revolted subjects, to neglect nothing, on the 
contrary, to repress the rebellion, declaring him- 
self, in his quality of co-divider, jointly responsible 
with Russia in the present as his predecessors had 
been in the past. Count Bismarck, sharing the 
views and feelings of his sovereign, was no sooner 
in power, than he offered the St. Petersburg 
Cabinet Prussia's armed co-operation. This was 
his commencement, his first diplomatic step. 
Russia declined the offer ; it would have wounded 
her dignity had it been supposed that she needed 
the assistance of a neighbouring State to struggle 
victoriously with the Polish insurrection. Count 
Bismarck, however, insisted and succeeded in 
persuading Russia to consent to a convention, or 
what is termed a cartel to lessen its importance, in 



28 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

virtue of which Prussia was to hand over any 
insurgents, who might seek refuge on her territory, 
to the Russian authorities. The aim of the 
President of the Council at Berlin was to place 
Russia under an obligation, foreseeing that he 
would soon have to ask her for the value of his 
services in the matter of the duchies. It was, 
indeed, in the duchies of the Elbe that the new- 
monarch proposed to strike his first blow, as he 
had foreshadowed in his maiden speech to the 
Chamber of Deputies. We know how fearlessly 
Count Bismarck seized upon this question. He 
rapidly succeeded in solving it by war. Austria, 
aware of Prussia's real intentions, was obliged, in 
order to oppose them, to take part in the aggression 
directed against the Danish possessions. I n spite of 
the treaty signed at London in 1852, guaranteeing 
Denmark the integrity of her frontiers, and thanks 
to the abstention, if not to the connivance of 
Russia, Holstein and Schleswig were succes- 
sively invaded and occupied. The other Powers 
were alarmed, and made repeated representations 
at Berlin. Writers deserving of consideration ^ 
aroused the attention of the press and public 
opinion, by denouncing the Prussian Government 
as the sole disturber of European peace. In 

1 See particularly two volunies by M. Deschamps, Belgian 
Minister of State and formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Brussels, 1865. 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 29 

presence of these manifestations, and contrary to 
the advice of his Prime Minister, the King con- 
sidered he would be exposing- Prussia to perilous 
isolation by giving any further indication of his 
ambitious views. Count Bismarck had to resign 
himself to negotiating, in concert with the Austrian 
Cabinet, and they signed at Vienna the conven- 
tion of October 30th, 1864, by which Denmark 
ceded the duchies to Prussia and Austria, who 
jointly became the legitimate possessors of them. 
Community of possession, a fruitful source of 
conflicts easy to produce, suited Count Bismarck, 
who had suggested the idea. The danger was 
soon perceived at Vienna, and further negotiations 
resulted in the conclusion of the treaty of Gastein 
on August 4th, 1865. This act did not seriously 
modify the respective positions of the two Powers ; 
it merely stipulated that Austria should occupy 
Holstein exclusively, and Prussia Schleswig. The 
sovereignty remained undivided. King William 
and Count Bismarck held the Viennese Court at 
their mercy. It only remained for them to be 
patient, or rather to cause circumstances more 
suitable to the accomplishment of their designs 
to occur at the right time. 

With these intentions, and so as to be ready 
at the supreme moment, the King pushed on the 
reorganisation of the army, without paying any 
attention to the protestations, noisy and persistent 



30 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

though they were, that arose in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Count Bismarck seconded him with all 
his energy ; he did not hesitate to make himself 
the firm champion of the prerogatives claimed by 
the sovereign. Assailed by the entire Assembly, 
he resisted the onslaught, often provoking it, 
without ever giving way. They had recourse to 
dissolution, and the country, several times con- 
sulted, maintained its confidence in its repre- 
sentatives. This conflict lasted for nearly four 
years, until the war of 1866. During that long 
period no budget ever obtained the sanction of 
the Assembly. This peculiar situation in no way 
embarrassed the President of the Council ; he 
became quite accustomed to it. Interpreting one 
of the clauses of the Constitution in his own way, 
notwithstanding the most lively protestations, he 
pointed out that as there was no budget, he was 
justified in conforming to the last financial vote 
recorded previous to his coming into office. He 
thus ensured, as was his duty, he said, the working 
of all the departments of the State in perfect ac- 
cordance with the law. The receipts of each 
financial year exceeded the outlay ; he devoted 
the surplus to the additional expenditure at the 
War Office in virtue of the sovereig-n's decrees. 
The King's will was respected, the object in view 
attained, and the Minister rose in the monarch's 
confidence. 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 31 

But the Liberal party, having an immense 
majority in the Chamber, protested against the 
expedients resorted to by the Prime Minister. 
United to the Progressists, the National Liberals, 
Schwerin, Benningsen, Sybel, Virchow, Richter, 
all the leaders of those two great parties de- 
nounced the measure both in their speeches and 
in the press, as a permanent violation of the 
constitutional pact, and, whilst claiming the right 
of the Assembly to control the outlay of the 
revenue, contested the legality of any unauthorised 
expenditure. Vain efforts : Count Bismarck made 
no concession ; the struggle continued, assuming 
every day a more bitter character. The arbitrary 
form of government that the Minister so obstin- 
ately maintained, wounded the feelings of the 
middle classes. It became evident, moreover, 
that the King and his adviser intended to settle 
the destinies of Prussia without the assistance of 
her representatives. The country became alarmed, 
and newspapers of every shade of liberal opinion 
kept up a violently impassioned agitation which, 
on the eve of war, led to an attempt on the Prime 
Minister's life. 

Whilst men of enlightened intellect, politicians 
particularly, struggled for parliamentary institu- 
tions, supported by the unanimous feeling of the 
country, the aristocratic class, without concealing 
its anxiety, apprehended a conflict with Austria. 



32 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

The union of the two o-reat German Powers, 
founded by their victories over the hereditary foe, 
and dating back to 1815, was regarded in the 
ranks of the nobiHty as a most precious guarantee 
for the whole of Germany. It preserved her 
from all invasion, whether of new ideas and the 
revolution, or an attempt on the part of some 
ambitious neig"hbour covetino; the banks of the 
Rhine, They were convinced that war with 
Austria would be the opening of an era of all 
kinds of peril. 

Under the influence of these different con- 
victions, a sort of involuntary alliance was 
established among people of all opinions, between 
all parties, at court as in the city, in the press as 
in the drawing-room, to avert the misfortunes 
they imagined they perceived threatening them. 
Count Bismarck was reviled everywhere, in 
society and at the palace as well as in parliament. 
People did not confine themselves to denouncing 
him as a public danger, to looking upon a 
struggle with Austria as a fratricidal war that 
would place all German countries at the 
foreigner's mercy, the King was besieged in the 
view of persuading him to part with a Minister 
who was leading the Kingdom to certain ruin. 
He was assailed with the most urgent suggestions 
on all sides ; he found an echo of them in the 
bosom of his family. Most of the Princes, the 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 33 

Queen herself, became the mouthpiece of the 
alarm that resounded everywhere : at Berlin, in 
the provinces, at all the German Courts. 

A spirit less firm, an ambition less sound, would 
have yielded to the general uproar. The King 
remained unmoved. Neither internal danger, 
nor the peril far more serious to which it 
was imagined he was exposing the integrity of 
the kingdom, affected him. He paid no attention 
either to the terror displayed by the population, or 
to the incriminations that were the result, how- 
ever lively or general they might be. He 
imposed silence around him ; ^ he exerted himself 
to tranquillize some, to charm others, never 
acknowledging that his policy could or must lead 
to an armed struggle. Count Bismarck served 
him to his satisfaction with the vigour and 
ingenuity the task he had confided to him re- 
quired, personally assuming the responsibility of 
all the complications. If, during this long and 
anxious struggle, destiny had forced King William 
to renounce his maturely premeditated schemes, he 
would have dismissed Count Bismarck and have 
issued from this difficult position with the renown 
of a sovereign wisely advised at the proper 

1 Notably on the Queen, who ostensibly avoided meeting Count 
Bismarck, and above all conversing with him, had to modify her 
demeanour and to refrain henceforth from expressing her private 
opinions. 

D 



34 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

moment. The Minister alone would have carried 
along with him into retirement the severe judg- 
ment of his contemporaries. But such a thought 
never entered the King's mind. Appreciating 
events with defiant perspicacity, he refused to 
listen to advice of any kind, no matter whence it 
came or the competency of the persons offering it, 
and firmly left the reins of his government in 
Count Bismarck's hands. 

These facts are beyond discussion. They refute 
the legend. The obstinacy displayed by the King 
in repelling the importunity he was beset with, is 
not characteristic of a prince who would have 
obeyed a minister's impulsion with blind and un- 
conscious submission. We have shown how the 
King understood the exercise of his rights, how 
he insisted on having the tacit, but always vigilant 
direction of everything. He did not cease doing 
so after the Empire was established. Count 
Bismarck bears testimony to this himself: "I 
have great respect for," he says, in that proud and 
haughty language which has given such powerful 
relief to his personality, " I am very much at- 
tached to the Emperor William, and I think 
I have given him proof of my devotedness 
more frequently than he has shown me his grati- 
tude ; but I must say that if I have expended my 
strength, my health, my life in his service, he does 
not spare me shocks and causes for irritation. My 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 35 

health would be much better without the little 
letters with which his hand honours me." If it 
were thus when Count Bismarck had shown his 
precious aptitude, when success had responded to 
the mutual efforts of the King and himself in a 
measure beyond all prevision, when the Minister 
could justly claim a considerable share in the 
achievement and greater liberty of action, how 
can one hesitate to recognise that royal super- 
vision must have been exercised much more 
rigorously, actively, and imperiously, during the 
period of preparation, when the destinies of the 
country were about to be left to the fate of arms 
and the caprice of fortune? The King was 
risking the glory, if not the existence, of his 
dynasty. Count Bismarck his reputation as a 
statesman and his own future. One stake was 
infinitely more precious than the other, and it is 
easy to understand that the Sovereign should 
have applied himself to watching over and often 
restraining the impetuous action of his Minister, 
with whose temperament he was familiar. 

Thus the two wars, that of 1866 like that of 
1870, both desired, both prepared a long time 
in advance by staff-officers and diplomacy, only 
actually broke out at the date fixed by the King. 
The generals told him from the commencement 
of 1866, that the reorganisation of the Prussian 
army was complete ; that every measure had 

D 2 



36 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

been taken to ensure prompt mobilisation, whereas 
the Austrian forces were still in course of form- 
ation ; and that a prompt resolution would 
ensure victory. Count Bismarck, on his side, 
seconded General von Moltke's solicitations with 
all possible warmth ; and urged the King to 
authorise him to hasten the rupture. His Majesty 
would not be influenced by these preconcerted 
entreaties. He displayed as much firmness in his 
resistance, in his determination to await the 
favourable moment, as he had done when the 
friends of peace implored him to renounce a policy 
which they considered fatal to his house and 
country. He wished it to appear that war was 
forced on him by circumstances and was in no 
way due to his own initiative. Was this pusillan- 
imity or wisdom ? Was it a timid calculation 
or a happy inspiration ? Events have shown 
him right in contradiction to all his advisers. 
Indeed, Austria's mistakes, particularly her deter- 
mination to decline the Congress, which the 
Powers had suggested and to which Prussia, 
by the King's commands, had hastened to adhere, 
created a new situation. "In face of Austria's 
answer," Commander Nigra telegraphed from 
Paris to General La Marmora, " Prince Gortcha- 
koff and Lord Clarendon have pronounced the 
Congress impossible. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has 
just done the same . . . He renders justice to the 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 2>7 

Spirit of conciliation and earnestness of the other 
Powers (Prussia and Italy) ..." This was exactly 
what the King was waiting for — the precise mo- 
ment to strike, the opportunity so much desired. 
War became inevitable by the action of the Vienna 
Cabinet, and it was permissible to saddle it with 
a good share of the wrongs the Berlin Govern- 
ment had at the origin, exclusively assumed. And 
so William I., on setting out to take command of 
his armies, was able to say to the Italian Minister : 
'' They have long accused me of wishing for war 
to satisfy ambitious aims, but now, after Austria's 
refusal to attend the Congress, her unworthy 
violation of the treaty of Gastein . . . the whole 
world knows who is the aggressor." ^ Thus the 
Emperor Francis Joseph, so outrageously pro- 
voked, with a display of dissimulation and per- 
severance that nothing had discouraged, became 
the originator of the war. The King of Prussia 
had attained his end, that which he had been 
pursuing, personally, contrary to the liking and 
contrary to the reiterated advice of his generals 
and his Prime Minister. He threw his armies 
into Saxony and Bohemia, at a propitious and 
opportune moment, whilst declining the responsi- 

1 The King, on his return to Berlin, in his speech at the com- 
mencement of the parliamentary session, thought he could openly 
thank Providence, without departing from truth, "for the grace 
that had assisted Prussia in diverting a hostile mvasion from 
her frontiers . . ." 



38 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

bility of this redoubtable conflict. He was no 
longer the sole disturber of peace ; he could, under 
such circumstances, face the disapprobation of 
other Courts and the discontent of public opinion. 
We shall find him followino- this same line of 

o 

conduct, with the same anxiety, the same calcula- 
tions, during the period preceding the war of 
1870. The conquest of the countries united to 
his kingdom in 1866 had not satisfied his ambition. 
The easy and brilliant achievements against 
Austria had, on the contrary, considerably sharp- 
ened it. The Confederation of Northern Germany, 
the outcome of the treaty of Prague, was already 
nothing more than a pledge of what was to follow ; 
it must be completed by the addition of the 
Southern States, and the German Empire must be 
re-established to the advantage of the House of 
Hohenzollern. The obstacle to this was not on 
the Main, that artificial and manifestly temporary 
limit ; it was at iParis. It did not take longf to 
understand this,/ and to become convinced that 
another war must be undertaken to complete the 
the edifice. The Kino- looked on this from the 
commencement as an inevitable contingency, and 
with greater jr'esolution than Count Bismarck him- 
self.^ Difflgrent incidents that we could recall 

1 Notwithst/anding the King's never-failing guardedness, he more 
than once, at [the opening of parHamentary sessions, let fall allusions, 
addressed to Germany^ to ihe fraternal nations^ to the land boimded 
by the Alps aiid Baltic^ which according to the semi-official news- 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 39 

justify US in thinking so. Limiting ourselves, for 
the moment, to determining the part of two men 
in the preparation of the great things they accom- 
pHshed, we will merely remind our readers here, 
that under the King's personal impulse, and before 
peace with Austria was definitely concluded, the 
reorganisation of the army was commenced and 
persevered in without pause ; in future it was to 
comprise the effectives of the annexed countries 
and of those States recently confederated with 
Prussia, The number of army corps was increased 
from nine to twelve, and it was established by 
official documents that the Confederation of 
Northern Germany could place more than a 
million soldiers in the field. The King intended 
taking the supreme command of these forces and 
doing what he pleased with them. 

It was necessary, however, to concert with the 
Confederate States, to stipulate the clauses of the 
new association with them. Resolutely unyielding, 
always rebellious to any intervention of the 
legislative power in the domain which he 
reserved exclusively to his sovereign authority, 
the Kine consented to no sacrifice in the elabora- 
tion of the federal pact. He would not grant 
Parliament any rights likely to limit his personal 
action, as he had understood and practised it 

papers made the hearts of all patriots leap ift expectation of coming 
events. 



40 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

during his reign. Parliament, sprung from uni- 
versal suffrage, became, on its side, exacting 
and refractory. The conflict between regal power 
and the Prussian Chamber of Deputies threatened 
to be renewed with the representatives of the 
Northern Confederation ; Count Bismarck wished 
to prevent it. He advised a conciliative attitude ; 
the little letters, with which the master's hand 
too frequently honoured him, were an obstacle to 
his views. These letters exasperated him ; he 
nevertheless exerted all his skill to protect and 
impose the monarch's claims. The task was 
difficult and often painful. He succeeded, how- 
ever, after long and laborious efforts, in satisfying 
the King without discontenting Parliament beyond 
measure, so that the Constitution was voted and 
objectionable discussions avoided. In the mean- 
while his health was put to a severe test, and it 
was from that time that he often, as we know, 
pleaded his enervated condition, from which he 
has sometimes seriously suffered, to escape, by 
absenting himself, from the difficulties of his 
position and more particularly from the exactions 
of his Sovereign. It must be admitted that again, 
on this occasion, the will stated to be vacillating 
and submissive, far from showing restraint or a 
disposition to yield, was firmly asserted, and 
triumphed over all obstacles. Count Bismarck 
did not regret this himself, later on, in the dis- 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 41 

cusslons he had to engage in before Parliament : 
he made large use of the immense power that had 
devolved on him thanks to the King's invincible 
resistance. 

We know what authority the federal pact con- 
ferred on the President of the Northern Con- 
federation and his Chancellor. In regard to 
military matters, the King of Prussia was invested 
with absolute power ; and so that no obstacle 
might be thrown in his way for a long time, it was 
required, by an innovation that seems strange in 
our age, that the arrangements connected with the 
war department, both respecting levies of men 
and expenditure, should be voted for several 
years. He could also declare war and make 
peace without having recourse to Parliament. In 
a political sense the Chancellor, who alone ex- 
ercised executive power, was amenable to the 
President of the Confederation — now German 
Emperor — only; and, by an inversion of all the 
principles in like matter, he presided over the 
Btmdesratk, the second Chamber of the federal 
association, which shared the legislative power 
with Parliament, and was an Assembly composed 
entirely of revocable functionaries delegated by 
the Confederate States. Thus whilst the Chan- 
cellor alone grasped the reins of the Federal 
Government, he participated at the same time, in 
legislation, not as a simple member of one of the 



42 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

two Chambers, but as President of that which, by 
its organisation, was dependent on his all-powerful 
direction. These arransfements have been taken 
as a pattern by the German Empire, 

The foreofoino" brief indications suffice to ex- 
plain in what spirit the federal institutions were 
conceived and drafted, and in what aim they were 
imposed. The King remained the independent 
master of his own resolutions, and was more 
powerful and better armed for future contingencies. 
Not having conceded to the Parliament of the 
North any right to supervise or circumscribe his 
action, he had full liberty to make his preparations 
for the new war he had in contemplation. He 
o-ave this matter all his care, devoting- his attention 
particularly to the army, whilst leaving the choice 
and arrangement of the expedients destined to 
provoke the conflict, to the skill and fertile imagi- 
nation of his Minister. But he was thoroughly 
determined not to engage in hostilities prematurely, 
and there was again witnessed between the Sove- 
reign on the one hand and the Generals ^ and 
Count Bismarck on the other, the same dissent as 
had marked the preparation of war with Austria. 

^ A work, attributed to a superior officer, which has just appeared 
at Cassel, and from which the Berliner Tageblatt has published 
long extracts, reveals all the efforts made by the military party 
to prevail on the King to go to war at this time. General Count 
Waldersee, according to the author, particularly exerted himself in 
that direction. 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 43 

On this occasion again, they in vain called the 
King's attention to the military measures the Im- 
perial Government was taking, and the activity 
displayed by Marshal Niel ; they pointed out to 
him in vain that time was to the advantage of 
France and to the prejudice of Prussia, and that 
at this moment they could surprise the French 
army which was in course of reorganisation both 
in regard to its effective and its appliances. At 
the commencement of 1869, Count Bismarck put 
forward the candidature of Prince Leopold of 
Hohenzollern to the Spanish crown. The King first 
of all considered this combination ill-timed ; he re- 
fused his assent. He thought on the one hand, that 
his new troops and those of his German allies did not 
yet possess the necessary coherence and solidity. 
He had, on the other, a moral reason for not 
hurrying ; it was always the same and was always 
present in his mind : he took into consideration, 
as matters of first importance, the feeling of the 
Great Powers and the state of public opinion in 
Europe. He desired, as in 1866, to await events, 
the faults or errors of his adversary, the propi- 
tious moment when he could repudiate all idea of 
aggression on his own part, and attribute the 
initiative of it to him. He knew that his own 
pacific declarations deceived neither the Govern- 
ments nor the public mind, that since Sadowa he 
was the object of legitimate and general suspicion : 



44 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

there was, in fact, no longer the least doubt for 
any one, that the aim of his ambition was the 
Imperial Crown, and he did not conceal from 
himself that he would only be able to grasp it 
after a new victory and the defeat of France. 
" The more I observe the line of conduct of the 
Prussian Government," wrote our Ambassador on 
January 5th, 1868, "the more I am persuaded 
that all its efforts tend to establish its power over 
the whole of Germany, and each day I receive fresh 
proof that it pursues this aim with the conviction 
that it will not be able to attain it without placing 
France in the impossiblity of putting an obstacle 
in its way. ..." And after having examined 
the whole position he concludes thus : " It is con- 
sequently a formidable w^ar that we shall have 
to carry on, in which a whole people will take 
part against us. The Emperor's Government 
cannot, therefore, weigh all the chances before- 
hand with too great care, or too maturely re- 
flect, before coming to the decision they may 
consider best for the interests and salvation of 
the country." 

The French Government, however, carefully 
avoided supplying the Berlin Cabinet with any 
subject for serious discontent. France had offered 
the belligerents the preliminaries of peace at 
Nikolsburg ; she had inserted a provision in them 
stipulating that the population of Northern Schles- 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 45 

wig should be consulted before being annexed to 
Prussia. After the conclusion of peace, Count 
Bismarck informed our Ambassador that he firmly 
intended to conform to this ; but, questioned on 
the subject in 1867, he declared at the tribune of 
the Parliament, in terms that might have caused 
excitement at Paris, that the two Powers who 
signed the treaty of Prague were alone qualified 
to watch over its execution. The French Govern 
ment did not accept this first challenge. On the 
contrary, it took advantage of every opportunity 
that occurred to establish loyal and sincere inter- 
course with the Berlin Cabinet. It proposed a 
good and disinterested understanding, in regard 
to both the Eastern and Italian questions with a 
view to solving them peacefully. It could suit 
neither the King nor Count Bismarck, who were 
bent on other solutions, to assist us in effecting a 
reconciliation between the Italian Government 
and the Pope, and help us to put an end to a 
state of things in the peninsula that impeded 
our freedom of action. Nor did it suit them any 
better to associate themselves with France in the 
discussions that were being renewed without end 
on the Bosphorus. If they had not entered into 
formal engagements, they had at all events en- 
couraged hopes at St. Petersburg, and they were 
particularly careful to keep on the right side of 
Russia, in order to oppose her to Austria, at the 



46 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

price it might be necessary to give, when the 
time came to fight on the Rhine. Influenced by 
this twofold anxiety, the Cabinet of Beriin accepted 
none of the suggestions made by that of Paris ; 
it was courteous, but resolved not to form amicable 
and intimate relations with France ; on the con- 
trary, it exerted all its credit with other Powers 
to dissuade them from joining in the views of the 
Imperial Government ; sometimes using influence 
with the Pontifical Court, sometimes with that of 
Florence, to prevent a reconciliation ; finally, ex- 
changing communications with Garibaldi himself, 
in order to provoke manifestations or encourage 
attempts destined to more completely divide Italy 
and France at the proper moment.^ In January, 
1870, the French Government made a last and 
supreme effort. Desiring to give striking proof 
of its pacific intentions, it raised the question of 
disarmament. So as not to expose itself to a 
direct refusal, which might have caused offence, 
it solicited the assistance of Great Britain. At 
its request, the English Cabinet consented to 
become the intermediary between France and 
Prussia; Lord Clarendon, the principal Secretary 
of State, instructed the English Ambassador at 
Berlin to ascertain the views of Count Bismarck, 

^ See Ma Mission en Prusse. See also the Correspondance de 
Mazzifii avec M. de Bismarck en 1868 et 1869, published since the 
death of the Italian agitator, proposing to overthrow Victor 
Emmanuel if he formed an alliance with Napoleon III. 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 47 

This measure was not attended by any good 
result. The Chancellor, after taking the King's 
commands, declared that Prussia could not 
acquiesce in such a proposal, he considered it 
useless to discuss the principle and the issues it 
might raise. 

These various incidents placed the Berlin Cab- 
inet in a delicate position. They brought the 
respective views of France and Prussia into evi- 
dence and opposition. It therefore became every 
day more urgent for the King and Count Bismarck 
to come to a decision. They knew, besides, that 
the armament in France was proceeding ; she had 
made her new rifle, renewed her artillery, increased 
her effective ; they thought her better equipped 
and more redoubtable than she was, unfortunately, 
in reality. They persuaded themselves that her 
strength would be greater before long ; and they 
saw increasing peril in further adjournment of the 
conflict for which both were making ready. Pre- 
parations at Berlin had reached their height : they 
were in a position to face the struggle, and could 
not hope to be in a better one at any other mo- 
ment. The Great General Staff called attention 
to the state of matters in its daily reports, which 
were supported by Count Bismarck ; the King 
permitted in 1870 what he had forbidden in the 
preceding year : he authorised Prince Leopold 
of HohenzoUern to accept the Spanish crown. 



48 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Regardless of diplomatic decorum and of the sound 
traditions always observed among the Powers, the 
Berlin Cabinet abstained from communicating what 
had taken place to the Imperial Government, not- 
withstanding that the latter had officially requested 
information from Count Bismarck as to the King's 
real intentions when the subject was under con- 
sideration at Berlin on the first occasion, whilst at 
the same time expressing the natural anxiety that 
was felt in regard to it. Everything had been 
arranged so that the surprise should be keen and 
penetrating, so that it might be deeply felt. They 
were in hopes France would bound at the insult, 
and that war would break out without having been 
declared. This conjecture met with disappoint- 
ment. The excitement was intense and general ; 
the Imperial Government became its mouthpiece 
in language that was dignified and firm, but in no 
way offensive ; it confined itself to stating that it 
would ask for an explanation, and in fact instructed 
our Charge d' Affaires to do so. At Berlin they 
had recourse to the system that has always been 
in practice at the Prussian Court : our represent- 
ative adinteriin could only see an Under Secretary 
of State ; Count Bismarck had sought rest in the 
shade of the trees at Varzin, where he awaited 
events ; the Kino- had left for Ems. The Under 
Secretary of State affirmed that "the Prussian 
Government was an absolute stranger to this affair. 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 49 

and had nothing whatever to do with it.^ The 
King might have been associated with the matter 
as head of the Hohenzollern family, but he had in no 
way intervened in his quahty of King of Prussia." 
The representatives of the BerHn Cabinet 
abroad, in accordance with their instructions, 
held the same language: The Government of 
Northern Germany, said the Prussian Ambassador 
to Lord Granville, has no intention of meddling 
in this matter ; the French are at liberty to do as 
they please. My colleague at Paris, he added, 
has received instructions to avoid the subject, and 
to consent to no discussion in reg-ard to it. . . . 
Moreover, he continued, it would be premature 
to discuss this question before the Cortes have 
ratified the choice of Prince Leopold.^ The blow 
had been struck and the hand that had dealt it 
withdrawn. King and Minister were equally inno- 
cent, and free of any insidious thought. When 
this position had been taken up, they awaited the 
assembling of the Cortes ; they expected Prince 
Leopold to be elected by acclamation. They 
relied on Spanish pride to cause the French 
Government fresh difficulties, which they hoped 

^ In the preceding year, the French Ambassador, In the absence 
of Count Bismarck, and previous to having an explanation with 
him, had had an interview with this same functionary, who assured 
him, on his word of honour, that he had received no information 
on this subject. The Chancellor, as will have been seen, was less 
discreet a few days later. 

2 See the Blue-Book of 1870, p. 13. 

E 



50 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

would lead it to extreme measures. It ^vas in this 
view that the King gave his consent to his 
nephew's candidature. But as there was no possi- 
bility of having an explanation with the Berlin 
Cabinet, that of Paris, to which every other channel 
had been closed, gave orders to its Ambassador to 
repair to Ems, .to lay the matter before the King 
himself and to submit to him the reasons that 
made it a duty for him to be opposed to the 
accession of a German Prince to the throne of 
Charles V. 

From this moment, we see the King, and after 
him Count Bismarck, during the few days that 
preceded the outbreak of war, each displaying 
more distinctly and with greater emphasis, their re- 
spective qualities and personalities. The occasion 
is a solemn one, and we have all the more reason 
for pausing at it, as by doing so we shall be able 
to express an opinion on the parts played by the 
Sovereign and Minister respectively. 

What was the aim in raising the Spanish 
question ? It was certainly not to enthrone a 
Hohenzollern at Madrid. "The sovereignty 
offered to Prince Leopold," said Count Bismarck 
to the French Ambassador on May nth, 1869, 
when he questioned him on the subject, "could 
only be of ephemeral duration and would expose 
him to more personal danger than mistakes." 
There was therefore another object, that of caus- 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 51 

ing a disagreement with France. This, indeed, 
was the general feeHng in Europe. The Powers 
and pubHc opinion did not take any other view of 
the matter. In fact, as soon as the candidature 
of Prince Leopold was avowed and became 
imminent, the various Cabinets and even the 
Sovereigns themselves interposed without seeking 
to dissemble their surprise and alarm. The Queen 
of England, and more particularly the Emperor 
of Russia, sent conciliatory messages to Ems, 
advisinor moderation and uro-ino- the King- to lend 
himself to an arrangement.^ The press in all 
parts, that of London especially, protested against 
an enterprise that it commented on with extreme 
severity. " The transaction," said the Times, 
"has the air of a vulgar and impudent coup 
d'etat of a kind that is sure not to be successful. 
The election of a sovereign to such a throne as 
that of Spain should be a solemn and dignified 
proceeding, conducted openly in the face of the 
world, and accompanied by a frank communica- 
tion with friendly Powers. ... If there was 
nothing hostile to France in this negotiation, 
why conceal it from her? Thus will argue 
thousands of Frenchmen, and it will not be 
easy to dispel the prejudice thus produced. . . . 
It is not in human nature to avoid feeling some 

1 See particularly a despatch from Lord Lyons to Lord Granville 
of July 13th. {Bine-Book, 1870.) 

E 2 



52 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

resentment at being tricked ; and the present 
arrangement has to Frenchmen a most un- 
pleasant look of trickery."^ 

The King, in presence of this universal re- 
probation, was not long in arriving at the con- 
clusion that by persisting in the line of conduct 
he had been led to follow, war would certainly 
be the result, but that it would be difficult for 
him to decline the responsibility of having 
brought it on. The attitude of France was not 
what he had anticipated ; she had felt the injury, 
she had intimated what her intentions were ; but 
she had stated them without resorting to any 
extreme measures or wounding Prussia, and her 
attitude had been approved by the various 
Governments. The provocation not having given 
the results expected, the King altered his mind. 
He received the French Ambassador, and contrary 
to his usual habit, contrary to all the traditions of 
his house, consented to come to an explanation, 
and to endeavour, with him, to find the means of 
putting an end to this serious difference. He 
consulted no one but himself, and was only 
influenced by the warnings that had been sent to 
him in a friendly way from London, and particu- 
larly from St. Petersburg. Count Bismarck had 
hastened from Varzin to Berlin and wished to 
come to Ems ; he was not authorised to do so. 

^ The Times^ July 8th, 1870. — Translate}'. 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 53 

The King feared his interference at this juncture ; 
he kept him at a distance from the scene of the 
negotiations, wishing to have them in his own 
hands, and feehng, no doubt, that he had been ill- 
advised in bringing matters to a climax, or had 
done so prematurely. 

However, he did not despair of setting things 
right again, by causing difficulties and complica- 
tions to arise from the discussions in which he 
was about to engage, that would produce what 
he desired. He conceded Prince Leopold's de- 
sistance, or rather he promised to approve of it 
as soon as it was made known, but he refused to 
undertake to exact it. He arranged with Prince 
Anthony for his son's renunciation to take place 
in a way and under circumstances that would be 
disobliging to France. Whilst sacrificing the prin- 
ciple, he applied himself with immense skill, we 
should say with monstrous treachery, to discover- 
ing a way to entangle the Imperial Government in 
the form. We know how well he succeeded. 

Prince Leopold's desistance was signified by his 
father to General Prim, by an unciphered telegram 
sent through Paris, and conceived in terms calcu- 
lated to irritate the French Cabinet ; and this was 
done before the King had communicated the 
information to the French Ambassador. It was 
thus established to the satisfaction of persons of no 
very great discernment, that the concession had 



54 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

been spontaneously made by the candidate to the 
Spanish crown without the King having had any- 
thing to do with it, and that he, on his side, had 
made no concession to France. Every one, how- 
ever, was aware that the HohenzoUern Princes 
could not come to a decision of such serious im- 
portance, of such great interest at that particular 
moment, without the consent of the head of their 
family, and the expedient could deceive nobody. 
But it was known that the feeling of exasperation 
at Paris was keen and general, and it was hoped 
that this would lead both Government and popu- 
lation astray. Did these calculations enter into the 
King's mind ? Everything tends to give one that 
impression ; what, unfortunately, is only too cer- 
tain, is that Prince Leopold's renunciation, which 
was made public before having been notified to 
the French Cabinet, was not considered by the 
latter to be sufficient satisfaction. It was thought 
necessary, the past being over, to obtain assur- 
ances for the future, and the King was asked to 
promise, through the intermediary of the French 
Ambassador, that he would not, on any other 
occasion, authorise a prince of his house to be- 
come a candidate to the throne of Spain. The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs esteemed it, moreover, 
opportune and proper to request the King to 
write a letter to the Emperor, for publication, in 
which he would repudiate any evil intention. He 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 55 

expressed that desire to the Prussian Ambassador 
at Paris, who was obHged to transmit it to Ems.^ 

Prince Leopold's retirement was welcomed by 
the foreign Cabinets and press as a guarantee for 
the maintenance of peace : they believed this 
henceforth ensured. Without troubling about the 
question of form, they accorded the conqueror of 
Sadowa credit for the proof he had given, under 
difficult circumstances, of his personal feelings. 
The new departure of the French Cabinet was, 
on the contrary, regarded as a fresh and un- 
fortunate obstacle to the resumption of a good 
understanding between France and Prussia. The 
King perceived the parts were reversed : he broke 
off the negotiations, feeling convinced that he 
could now accuse the Imperial Government of 
having obstinately desired war ; he authorised 
Count Bismarck to neglect nothing to make it 
inevitable at an early date. This happened on 
the morning of July 13th ; on the 14th, he left for 
Berlin, where he went to preside over the mobili- 
sation of the army in person. 

We have described what the King did in this 
oTeat crisis ; let us see how the Minister acted. 
The details will not be out of place here : it is, 
indeed, indispensable to sketch the most essential 
of them, in order to throw light on events and give 
them their proper colour. Count Bismarck, reduced 

1 See Baron Werther's despatch, dated July 12th, 1870. 



56 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

to abstention and silence, was fuming at Berlin. In 
his familiar circle, he had naught but bitter words 
for his master. He reproached him with en- 
dangering the dignity and interests of Germany 
by his attitude and concessions. He obeyed, 
however, observing a reserve that weighed upon 
him cruelly. As soon as he received orders to 
bestir himself, as soon as he was placed in pos- 
session of his freedom of action again, he appeared 
like a bomb upon the scene ; and before that 1 3th 
of July was over, there remained not a vestige 
of the hopes the friends of peace had been 
nursing on the previous eve. It was particularly 
on this occasion that Count Bismarck displayed 
all the resources of his brain and his marvellous 
activity : he instantly finds more expedients than 
he requires to hurry on a rupture, and he uses 
them with equal precision and rapidity. He re- 
calls the Prussian Ambassador accredited to the 
French Government, by telegraph ; he enjoins 
him to leave Paris within forty-eight hours, re- 
proaching him with having listened to, without 
protestation, and with having transmitted a pro- 
posal to Ems that was an outrage for the King. 
He does not break off relations with France — he 
wishes to force the Imperial Government to make 
the rupture — but he declares it to be his de- 
termined intention not to renew any negotiations, 
and not to lend himself to any conciliatory measure 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 57 

or any agreement. At the same instant he in- 
forms the various European Governments, by 
means of a circular-despatch sent by telegraph to 
all his diplomatic agents, of the incidents of the 
morning at Ems, giving an inexact and perfidious 
account of them. "The French Ambassador, 
having insisted," he says, "on guarantees for the 
future, after Prince Leopold's desistance, his 
Majesty refused to receive him any more, and 
sent word to him, by the aide-de-camp on duty, 
that he had nothino- further to communicate to 
him." ^ 

This was announcing to Europe, contrary to 
truth, that the King had forbidden the Ambas- 
sador to present himself at his residence. It is 
not our intention to dwell on the significance and 
bearing of such treatment inflicted on a diplomatist 
invested with a dignity which, by a fiction accepted 
in all times, makes him the representative of his 
sovereign in person. Count Bismarck affirmed 
therefore simultaneously, that whilst at Paris the 
King's majesty had been offended, at Ems the 
French Ambassador had been shown the door. 
After having done what was necessary abroad, he 
turns his attention to public opinion in Germany, 
with a view to exciting and embittering it. The 

^ The assertion was entirely inexact. The Ambassador had seen 
the King and had communicated the proposal to him. The King 
had declined to accede to it, but only after having discussed it with 
him. 



58 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

famous depa7'-tment of the public mind whispers 
arroo-ant and offensive lano-uao-e to all the news- 
papers. "The King and nation," they say, "have 
been outraged ; the whole country must rise and 
wreak vengeance for such a grave offence." All 
through the evening the boys who cry out the 
newspapers sell sheets containing- pretended tele- 
grams o-ivino- accounts of the insult to the Kino- 
and the insult to the Ambassador ; whereas, in 
reality, the Ambassador is taking leave of the 
Prussian monarch, who welcomes him at this last 
meeting as at the others, with his usual courtesy, 
from which he has never had any reason to depart. 
Count Bismarck thus closes — and he has no other 
aim — all channels to any possible arrangement. 

He did not, indeed, attempt to conceal his real 
intentions. Since his return from Varzin, his door 
had not opened to a single diplomatist : he was 
fretting and fuming-, and did not wish to make an 
exhibition of himself. On the 13th, he received the 
British Ambassador. According to the Chancellor, 
there was only one guilty party in the whole affair : 
France. She was not satisfied with the solution 
of the Spanish question, he said to Lord Augustus 
Loftus ; other demands were made ; it was evident 
that she was seeking- her revenge for Konigorratz. 
Public feeling in Prussia, in Germany, would not 
submit to humiliation ; he disapproved of the 
King's conciliatory attitude at Ems : Count 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 59 

Bismarck, continues the British Ambassador in 
reporting this interview, then declared that unless 
France gave assurances, made an official declar- 
ation to the European Powers, recognising that 
the existing solution of the Spanish question satis- 
fied her and that no other contention would be 
raised later on ; and that if, moreover, she did not 
retract or explain the Due de Gramont's threat- 
ening language, the Prussian Government would 
be compelled to demand satisfaction. It is impos- 
sible for Prussia to keep quiet and peaceful after 
the affi-ont given to the King and country by the 
menacing tone of the French Government. And 
the Ambassador concluded his despatch by ex- 
pressing the conviction, after listening to Count 
Bismarck, that unless some mediating influence 
succeeded in exercising pressure on the Fi^ench 
Government, in appeasing the feeling of irritation 
against Prussia and in causing moderation to pre- 
vail, war was inevitable. 

Count Bismarck was of the same opinion as his 
master ; he thought as did the latter that the parts 
were reversed. Henceforth it was France that 
owed satisfaction to Prussia, and Prussia meant to 
have it, or she would be neither qtdet nor peaceful. 
It must, however, be pointed out that the Imperial 
Government, in answer to an interpellation from 
the Left, had given explanations on Prince 
Leopold's candidature in the sitting of July 



6o STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

6th. Up to the 13th, neither the King nor 
his Government saw any outrage in the state- 
ment made on that occasion, by the Due de 
Gramont ; negotiations were opened at Ems, they 
were pursued, without any intention being ex- 
pressed of demanding redress. On the 13th 
there is a complete change : the offence exists ; it 
has attained the King and country, and satisfaction 
is loudly called for ; it must be exemplary, public, 
submitted to all the Powers. France must form- 
ally retract, and in language that has not hitherto 
been used in similar circumstances, or else 
Germany will be under the necessity of consider- 
ing what steps she must take. Count Bismarck 
correctly presumed that France would not bend to 
such humiliation, that she would prefer appealing 
to arms, and he would have been greatly dis- 
appointed, as would also the King, had she con- 
sented to the expiation he contemplated imposing 
on her for her so-called misdeeds. Events were 
not in accordance with his previsions. France, in 
answer to the Prussian insults and pretensions, 
declared war without waiting, like Austria in 1866, 
for her territory to be invaded by the German 
armies which were being mobilised with all speed. 
But it is beyond argument that Prussia rendered 
war inevitable, and that her resolution to engage 
in it was at this moment irrevocably formed. We 
shall find conclusive proof of this in the diplomatic 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 6i 

despatches published In London at the time. On 
July 14th England made a proposal which would 
have been perfectly satisfactory to Prussia. The 
King, it was suggested, having authorised Prince 
Leopold to accept the Spanish crown, had made 
himself in a certain sense a party to the arrange- 
ment ; he could in the same way and with perfect 
dignity, communicate to the French Government 
his consent to the withdrawal of the acceptance, 
and France would renounce her demand for 
an undertakinor o-uaranteeino- the future. -"^ How 
did Count Bismarck receive this overture, which 
was certainly of a nature to settle everything? 
His reply was haughty and laconic. He tele- 
graphed to the Prussian Ambassador at London to 
express his regret that the Government of her 
Britannic Majesty had thought proper to make a 
suggestion which he could not recommend the 
King to adopt. ^ He had assuredly already 
regretted not having been authorised to sever all 
connection with France as far back as July 6th, 
by taking as a pretext the language used by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Corps Legis- 
latif He had endeavoured to persuade the King 
to adopt that course ; everything tends to show it. 
But the King, influenced by the solicitations 

^ Despatch from Lord Granville to Lord Augustus Loftus, at 
Berlin, dated July 14th. (Bhie Book, 1870.) 

2 Despatch from Lord Granville to Lord Lyons, at Paris, dated 
July 15th. \Id.) 



62 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

addressed direct to him at Ems, by the feeHng 
of irritation displayed on all sides, and of which 
the press became the mouthpiece in unmeasured 
terms, had absolutely refused. This opportunity 
being lost, the Chancellor discovered another, that 
which the King had so skilfully prepared for him ; 
and we have just shown how eagerly he grasped 
it, and the use he made of the liberty of action 
restored to him. 

It has been asserted that the candidature of 
Prince Leopold was never, in the minds of those 
who prepared it, aught but a snare set for our 
pride and national susceptibility, ever ready to 
be led astray. This conjecture is certainly not 
without foundation. What Count Bismarck said 
on the subject of that candidature to the French 
Ambassador in 1869, the habit they had at 
Berlin of resorting to expedients that cannot be 
qualified as diplomatic measures, gives one 
authority to think so. But if the trap was set 
by the Minister with his sovereign's consent, who 
was it held the string at the decisive moment ? 
Who adroitly concealed the snare ? Who had the 
wit to entice France into it ? The King, the King 
only, and without his Minister's assistance. 

Could so firm a will, such lucid foresight, such 
patient perseverance have been the inheritance of 
a prince who had ever been irresolute and timid ? 
There is not a writer, who, in giving an account 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 63 

of these events which are so near at hand, has 
not attributed the initiative and direction in all 
things and on all occasions to Count Bismarck ; 
who has not shown himself convinced, and sought 
to persuade his readers, that the Minister con- 
ceived all and did all ; who has not affirmed that 
he made greater efforts to obtain his master's 
adhesion to his policy, than he took trouble to 
ensure its success. It is true that the irascible 
President of the Council's complaints, or rather 
lamentations, have been noted by diplomacy as 
well as by the press. The correspondence of 
agents residing at Berlin at that period, which has 
been published and can be consulted,^ forms in a 
measure their daily echo. It reveals the mon- 
arch's resistance to the minister, the difficulties 
the latter encountered in leading him on, in over- 
coming his scrziples and sziperstitioits. These 
complaints, these affirmations of Count Bismarck, 
exact in the sense that the King refused to hurry, 
erroneous in reality, which are met with in all the 
official documents, have certainly contributed not 
a little to lead public opinion astray, and along 
with it the publicists who, in all conscientiousness, 
have engaged in the task of sketching out the 
history of our times. 

^ See particularly the reports of General Govone, who negotiated 
the Prusso-Italian Treaty in Ufz po piit di luce, by General La 
Marmora. 



64 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

The King assuredly wished to be led on, but by 
the occasional factitious force of circumstances, 
and not by pressure on the part of his advisers. 
He desired to show that he had not forgotten 
either his ideas or scruples ; he wished to keep 
his aureola of prince by divine right intact and 
pure from all stain ; he aimed especially at appear- 
ing respectful of the sovereign rights of the princes 
confederated with him ; whilst he premeditated 
stripping them ; and all Count Bismarck's art, let us, 
if you will, say all his artifices, could not make him 
go to war until he considered hostilities authorised 
by circumstances. William I. wished to affirm 
openly in 1870, as he had done in 1866, that he 
was not the aggressor, that he took up arms for 
the purpose only of defending his country against 
foreign invasion ; and we have just seen that, by 
his personal action, he succeeded better on the 
second occasion than on the first. 

How is it possible that this King, who resisted, 
without ever yielding, the entreaties of his family, 
of his most devoted servants, of all the German 
princes, how could this monarch who had heard 
the principal cities of his kingdom. Parliament, the 
press, the whole country, protest against a policy 
which was denounced as perilous and senseless, 
how could this sovereign, so tenacious and obsti- 
nate, have submitted blindly and with such great 
servility to the direction of an imperious minister ? 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 65 

Had it been so, history would have to deal with a 
psychological problem which modern science, not- 
withstanding all its investigations, would have 
difficulty in explaining. The King denied the 
existence of the treaty with Italy, and we have 
mentioned with what object ; but he signed it, he 
ratified it with a perfect knowledge of what he was 
doing ; and it would really be imposing on the 
credulity of the public to pretend that he failed to 
perceive all its importance, that he was persuaded 
or deceived by Count Bismarck, who had ex- 
plained to him that its sole purport was to make 
Austria reflect. He had no more hope than had 
the man of iron of expelling Austria from Ger- 
many by intimidation and without having recourse 
to force ; and this monarch, who is represented as 
wavering and uncertain, ignoring to what ex- 
tremities he was being led, was nevertheless 
preparing for those extremities without pause, 
notwithstanding the efforts made on every side to 
stop him in the line of conduct he was pursuing. 
He knew the connection Count Bismarck had 
formed in Italy, at Bucharest, at Pesth, with the 
revolutionary party and all the enemies of Austria 
— General La Marmora's work is edifying in that 
respect — and he permitted it, Count Bismarck had 
all his confidence. We iterate that he affirmed on 
every occasion that he had no aggressive or war- 
like thoughts. He even repeatedly employed 



66 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

confidential agents to negotiate, or at least to 
prepare, an arrangement with the Cabinet of 
Vienna without Count Bismarck's knowledge ; ^ but 
nothing turned him from the path he had traced 
out for himself, nor did he make the least effort to 
turn his Minister away from it, and yet he could 
have revoked him, to the general satisfaction of his 
subjects and the whole of Europe. His conscience 
was quite at ease, and all these contradictory acts 
were reconciled by his idea of political morality. 

It is therefore permissible to say that William I., 
from the commencement of his reign, when he 
dismissed the Ministry of the New Era, until the 
woeful year, followed a policy of his own without 
ever departing from it ; that he had marked out 
and defined its aim before Count Bismarck ever 
came to power ; that, finally, he took an active and 
always preponderant part in the direction that was 
given to it. He retired into the background, cer- 
tainly, when he considered such a step would 
be advantageous to State affairs, and he fre- 
quently acted thus to avoid pledging himself 
personally or compromising the dignity of his 
crown ; he had recourse to practices that were 
only justifiable by the aim he had in view. To 
that end he did homage himself to the capacity of 
the men he had gathered round him, and to the 
services they rendered him. Count Moltke com- 

' ■ ^ See Un po pin di luce,^. 2%%. 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 67 

manded his armies, Count Bismarck appeared to 
direct his poHcy with absolute independence ; both 
distinguished themselves without his ever having 
shown the least jealousy, without his ever having 
attempted to turn any part of the glory they con- 
quered to his own account. But he was constantly 
interfering, and when necessary imposed his will. 
He never divested himself of any part of his 
authority, and great resolutions were never taken 
but when he considered them well conceived, well 
prepared, and the moment favourable for them to 
be put into action. 

Assuredly, war could have been engaged in 
against either Austria or France at times that 
were particularly advantageous, from a strictly 
military point of view, as the generals wished ; 
but it would have been necessary to have had the 
audacity to acknowledge that he was actuated by 
a thirst for conquest, as Frederick II. did when 
he invaded Silesia. Such temerity is not suit- 
able to our age, and the King acted as a skilful 
politician in waiting for the opportunity when he 
could make war without too openly offending the 
public sense of right, without exposing himself to 
an understanding, if not a coalition, of the Powers. 
He was therefore well advised in restraining 
Count Bismarck's impatience, and there was all 
the more merit in his having done so, as he alone 
was of that opinion in the Council. One cannot 

F 2 



68 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

say at the present day what would have happened, 
to what complications and dangers Prussia might 
have been exposed, had she taken up arms pre- 
maturely and without having a plausible pretext, 
whereas, thanks to the invincible prudence of her 
monarch, she was able to engage in the struggle, 
on both occasions, without placing her relations 
with other Courts in jeopardy, without submitting 
to their mediation, without dreading their resent- 
ment. All was over before it was perceived what 
a preponderant influence the House of Hohen- 
zollern would exert in Europe ; and this, in truth, 
is personally due to the King. 

What must be recognised is, that these two 
prodigious labourers at Germany's greatness. King 
William and Prince Bismarck, were gifted with 
various and mighty qualities, and that one was 
the complement to the other. The first had pru- 
dence and, let us say it, duplicity ; the second, 
daring and resolution. What was excessive in 
these very contrary dispositions was neutralised 
in an even measure by the action of one upon the 
other ; let us add this providential amendment, 
that the master, who could impose his will always, 
displayed as much reserve as skill in doing so. 
What must also be noted, is that the Kino- 
assumed an open air of non-interference that was 
deceiving; he affected to aspire to "moral con- 
quests " only, whilst never ceasing to lay claim to 



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 69 

such as were of a more substantial nature, and, 
when necessary, upheld his pretensions sword in 
hand ; the Minister, on the contrary, tired out all 
the echoes in Europe with his plans of aggression 
and threats. " Every one sees what you appear 
to be ; few know what you really are," said the 
Florentine master ; ^ and it is thus that Prince 
Bismarck has been acclaimed as the restorer of 
the German Empire, whilst the King seems to 
have been only the beneficiary. Have not con- 
temporaries been deceived by the clangorous 
clatter of the one, by the impenetrable silence of 
the other, and will not impartial history reform 
their judgment by meting out to each of these 
two great figures the justice which is due to him ? 
Will it not give the Sovereign a share equal to 
that of the Chancellor, if not greater ? We ven- 
ture to think so, and express our opinion without 
fear, however paradoxical such a conjecture may 
seem at this time. 

^ The Prince, ch. xvii 
July is^/i, 1890. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 

Germany in 1879 concluded a treaty of defen- 
sive alliance with Austria ; Italy joined this 
alliance in 1882. Is this three-fold agreement 
a pact of peace, as is affirmed, a diplomatic notion, 
having no other object than to guarantee this 
blessing to Europe, which assuredly desires to 
preserve it ? Will not this praiseworthy idea, and 
the arrangements it has given rise to, be followed 
by unforeseen consequences far different to those 
hoped for? This question is forced on all who 
desire the public weal : it troubles them and, we 
might add, causes them anxiety. We will en- 
deavour to inquire into it without pretending to 
solve it. We will do our best to discover under 
the influence of what circumstances, in view of 
what necessities, and by what foresight the three 
Powers entered into this agreement. We will 
investigate the situation they have produced, and 
the obligations it imposes on them and on the 
other Powers, in order to show, in addition to 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 71 

what is generally known, the true character of 
the conventions which unite them, as well as to 
forecast ultimate results. The task is a difficult 
one ; we are well aware that it is rash to 
attempt it. We undertake it, however, with 
no other design than to assist in elucidating 
a state of affairs that has its perils ; perils 
that can be easily perceived if one chooses to 
be sincere. It is, in fact, armed peace that the 
three Powers have organised, and can peace under 
arms be lasting ? Are not the treaties that were 
signed at Vienna and Berlin rather a portent of 
war ? Will they preserve the Continent from fresh 
calamities ? It is particularly from this point of 
view that we propose to consider them. 

All shows that Count Bismarck was the origin- 
ator of these conventional stipulations. They 
were conceived and drawn up to the advantage 
of the German Empire, which reaps the most 
benefit from them. One can easily see that the 
German Chancellor was the first to entertain the 
idea of this agreement, and that he bestowed all 
his care on its realisation. But at what time and 
under what circumstances did his active mind 
conceive this scheme ? how is it that he came to 
suggest it to Austria ? It is known now that 
during the negotiations opened at Nikolsburg in 
1866, there arose a serious difference of opinion 
b^etween King Williani and his Prime Minister. 



72 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

The monarch sought to impose sacrifices on 
Austria which Count Bismarck considered too 
heavy and also impoHtlc. When the Minister left 
the ground clear of any insurmountable obstacle to 
an ulterior agreement between the Courts of 
Berlin and Vienna, was he Influenced by the 
necessity of coming rapidly to an understanding 
with the enemy of yesterday in order to have a 
free hand to fight the foe of to-morrow? His 
flatterers accord him all these calculations, all 
these previsions, the wisdom of which a near 
future was to demonstrate to the world. If one 
Is to credit them, his sagacious foresight led him 
to embody in the treaty of peace the germ of the 
agreement which now secures Austria's armed 
co-operation to Germany. To men to whom fate 
has predestined great achievements, it is easy to 
attribute the virtue of foreseeing events and of 
being prepared for them in advance. Genius 
certainly has, at times, these visions of the re- 
mote hereafter. But, be that as it may. It Is 
unquestionable that the founder of the future 
German Empire overcame the King's cupidity at 
Nikolsburg. In spite of the efforts of the Great 
General Staff he persuaded the sovereign to 
forego his intention of wresting territory from 
the Emperor Francis Joseph. Peace concluded 
under these conditions respected the integrity of 
the Empire of the Habsburgs, and did not leave 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 73 

any incurable wound behind it. The future remained 
open for a reconciliation, for any arrangements 
that new and mutual interests might dictate. 

Similar thoughts, it would appear, filled Count 
Bismarck's mind at Versailles. He is understood 
to have had the same visions. He has himself 
stated that, after the first successes of the German 
arms, he considered the double mutilation in- 
flicted on France at the conclusion of peace an 
ill-advised exaction full of peril for the future. 
Strassburg is the door of our house, he is reported 
to have said, and we are bound to claim Alsace, 
which is German land. But, if his opinion had 
prevailed, France would have retained Lorraine. 
After succeeding at Nikolsburg, Count Bismarck, 
in his turn, appears to have succumbed at Ver- 
sailles. Twenty years have come and gone since 
then, and events have not yet shown that he 
was not on each occasion the wisest and most 
circumspect of King William's counsellors. 

It may therefore be admitted that, whilst 
negotiating peace at Nikolsburg, Count Bismarck 
had a presentiment that it would one day be 
possible, and even expedient, to renew friendly 
relations with Austria by reconstituting the 
solidarity of former times ; and it is permissible 
to believe that, with this object in view, he wisely 
curbed his master's ambition. In fact it has come 
to pass that Germany, under the influence of 



74 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

fresh complications, has found it necessary to 
change her Hne of poHcy, and to seek at Vienna 
the co-operation, the sympathies, and, in a word, 
the support which she had hitherto always found 
at St. Petersburg. To fully appreciate this 
serious evolution, to determine its causes and 
character, it is necessary to go back to the 
origin of the events that have made Prussia's 
greatness, to the genesis of the work undertaken 
by the King and his Prime Minister. 

I. 

The result of the Crimean war was not only 
the disarmament of Russia in the East ; it had 
another and far more durable consequence, that 
of destroying the union of the three Northern 
powers — the Holy Alliance. When Herr von 
Bismarck made his commencement at Frankfort, 
he must have been convinced that Prussia was 
isolated in Europe, and that in Germany she had 
to resign herself to submitting to the humiliating 
domination of Austria who "alone," according to 
Count Buol, her Prime Minister, " had a right to an 
independent policy in the Confederation." Herr 
vpn Bismarck's patriotism was roused. Anxious 
and vigilant, he carefully observed the attitude of 
the Powers from the post in which he had been 
placed. He drew attention to the rumours of a 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 75 

reconciliation, of an understanding between the 
Emperor Alexander and the Emperor Napoleon, 
and of an interview which was shortly to unite 
these two Sovereigns at Stuttgart. He entreated 
his Government to act. And what was it that this 
bold man suggested ? To join France in an 
intimate alliance.^ 

When one glances back to that year 1857, 
when one recalls how long they hesitated at 
Berlin before recognising the restoration of the 
Empire with the third Napoleon, and when one 
considers that Herr von Bismarck himself was 
only just emerging from the sacred phalanx of the 
most obdurate feudalism, all the errors of which 
he had shared, one is amazed at the boldness and 
the novelty of the conception. And indeed it 

^ In two reports of the months of May and June 1857, wherein 
he enters fully into his reasons for the conclusion he has arrived at, 
" Russia is drawing visibly closer to France," he wrote ; "we must 
be beforehand with her. If we are late in joining this league, 
Prussia will only occupy a secondary position in it." But to enter 
into an alliance with France, would it not be compounding with the 
revolution ? Herr von Bismarck foresees the objection, and reso- 
lutely combats it. " If the Bonapartes," he said, " are the result 
of the revolution, they have bridled it. The Bourbon dynasty, 
even without Philippe Egalite, has done more for the revolution 
than the Bonapartes." And, invoking all the interests, all the pre- 
, cedents which justified Prussia in forgetting the past, and thinking 
only of the future, he added : " ' Your shirt is nearer to you than 
yoxliir doublet,' and it is urgent, if one has the least ambition, to come 
,to an understanding with Paris so as to secure a suitable place in a 
Franco-Russian alliance and guarantees against the domination of 
Austria." {Lettres Politiqiies de M. de Bismarck, pp. 279 and 
following. Ollendorf, Paris.) . i. ; 



76 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

deeply offended the Court of Sans-Souci. Censured 
by General von Gerlach, the confidant and in- 
timate adviser of Frederick William IV., Herr 
von Bismarck reserved himself for the new reign. 

We know with what plans William I, ascended 
the throne. " Before engaging in a war to the 
south or the east of the kingdom," had written 
Frederick the Great, "every Prussian Prince 
should secure the neutrality of Russia, cost what 
it might, if he were unable to obtain her 
support." The future Emperor remembered his 
glorious ancestor's warning, and, soon after his 
accession, he entrusted to Herr von Bismarck the 
task of assisting him in carrying out this first 
part of his programme. Thoroughly appreciating 
this underrated servant's devotedness and the 
merit of this quarrelsome and decried diplomatist, 
he appointed him his ambassador at the Court of 
the Emperor Alexander. 

People were acquainted, at that time, with but 
one feature of Herr von Bismarck's character, the 
most prominent one, that which made him con- 
spicuous the moment he entered public life : smart 
activity in fault-finding, dissembling neither the 
object in view nor the means by which it was to 
be attained, notorious examples of which he had 
given both at Berlin and Frankfort. The warmth 
of his constant verbosity, the intemperance of his 
language, did not seem to have designated him 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE -j^ 

for a delicate mission which required, above all, 
moderation, discretion, tact in speech as well as 
in acts and manner, in short, all those acquirements 
which Herr von Bismarck seemed to lack. He 
was, nevertheless, able to justify his Sovereign's 
confidence. This violent, imperious personage 
became converted ; he revealed himself at St. 
Petersburg a gentle charmer, an alluring dreamer ; 
he found favour with the Emperor Alexander. 
This monarch, who was of an unconfiding and 
thoughtful mind, could only be won over slowly, 
by the aid of patient insinuations : Herr von 
Bismarck took the necessary time and succeeded. 

At St. Petersburg he met Prince Gortchakoff 
again, then recently appointed Chancellor of the 
Empire. He had known him and studied him at 
Frankfort. The same ideas and a deep animosity 
towards Austria had drawn them together. The 
one did not forgive that country the share it had 
taken in humbling Russia in the East ; the other 
was already meditating its expulsion from Germany. 
The understanding between them arose as much 
from their respective dispositions as from the inter- 
ests entrusted to their charge. Herr von Bismarck 
nursed it assiduously. He knew that the Russian 
Chancellor had a great idea of his own personal 
value ; he flattered him, and dazzled him with the 
glory that would be attached to his name, the 
brilliant services he would be rendering his country 



78 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

by undertaking to efface the trace of its recent 
disasters. The obstacle was at Vienna ; in the 
ambition of Austria who, dreading Russian influ- 
ence on the Danube and in the Balkans, would 
never cease to make every effort to impede it. 
She had had no other object during the Eastern 
war; as had been amply shown by the hostile and 
cavilling attitude of her representatives at the 
Paris Congress. Herr von Bismarck pointed out 
to him that this was the policy he had to resist, 
whilst offering him Prussia's co-operation whenever 
it might be needed. 

Varying his words and displaying equal ability, 
at one time with the sovereign, at another 
with the minister, he succeeded in dispelling the 
mistrust which the ambiguous behaviour of the 
Berlin Cabinet and its illogical abstention during 
the Eastern war had created in their minds. King 
William, moreover, seconded his efforts by repu- . 
diating a policy with which he personally had had 
nothing to do and which he entirely disavowed. 
He brought into play that gentle and insinuating 
amenity of which he possessed the secret, and 
which enabled him to exercise over his nephew, at 
the most solemn and decisive moments of his 
reign, an influence which has proved so disastrous 
to Russia. When Herr von Bismarck was recalled 
from St. Petersburg in the spring of 1862 his task 
had been performed : he left the Russian Court in 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 79 

a cordial and kindly mood, which he and his 
Sovereign intended to take good atdvantage of 
at the first opportunity. 

This opportunity was not long in coming 
forward. Herr von Bismarck, despatched from St. 
Petersburg to Paris in 1862, only remained a short 
time in France. A few months after his arrival, 
he was recalled to Berlin, and, in September of 
the same year, the King appointed him President 
of his Council with the portfolio for Foreign Affairs. 
At that moment Poland was stirring ; she demanded 
the national institutions confirmed by the treaties of 
18 1 5. Disturbances soon broke out, and the Prus- 
sian Government, faithful to the promises of which 
Herr von Bismarck had been so prodigal during 
his stay at St. Petersburg and anxious to secure the 
sympathies of the Emperor Alexander, offered 
Russia its armed assistance. On February 8th 
1863, the two Powers signed a secret treaty having 
for object the prompt suppression of the Polish 
movement. This first negotiation was Herr von 
Bismarck's Initial success ; he consolidated the 
interests of the two Powers both for the time being 
and in the future. He had set all the more value 
on this achievement as Austria was following a 
very different line of conduct. She had, in fact, 
allowed one of her provinces, Galicia, to become 
the arsenal of the revolution. This understanding 
which had been so much desired and the founda- 



8o STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

tions of which Herr von Bismarck had been en- 
trusted to lay at St. Petersburg, was now secured 
and firmly established. Prussia had resumed her in- 
timate relations with Russia. Austria, on the other 
hand, had added to her errors, and had more deeply 
displeased the Court of St. Petersburg. This was 
soon seen in the matter of the Duchies, and later 
on during the war which the Berlin Cabinet 
was already planning against the Empire of the 
Habsburgs. 



11. 



Prussia, taking advantage of the disturbances 
which convulsed Europe in 1848, and of the diffi- 
culties into which the revolution plunged Austria, 
had occupied Holstein and invaded Schleswig. 
The Emperor Nicholas, allied to the house of Hol- 
stein-Gottorp, after overcoming the Hungarian in- 
surrection, and possessing contingent rights to a 
portion of the Danish territory, summoned his 
brother-in-law Frederick William IV. to recall his 
troops ; and a treaty guaranteeing the King of 
Denmark the integrity of his dominions was signed 
in London in 1852. But the spirit of conquest, far 
from disarming at Berlin, was destined, on the con- 
trary, to become more firmly established with the 
new reign. William I., on ascending the throne, 
gave startling testimony, at the opening of the 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 8i 

Chambers, of his sympathy with the Germans of 
the Duchies. The Danish question, in spite of the 
treaty of 1852, was still under consideration by the 
Diet. Count Bismarck, certain now of meeting 
with no hostility from Russia, seized upon it. We 
Icnow how he dealt with it. The history of the 
negotiations which preceded the conquest of the 
Elbe provinces is a most strange but scarcely an 
•edifying one. It has been written ^ and deserves to 
be pondered over by whosoever is desirous of 
learning how the destinies of nations are accom- 
plished. Therein we behold Count Bismarck in- 
augurating his work with all the audacity of a daring 
statesman. We will only avail ourselves here of 
the part bearing on our subject. 

Russia, grateful for the military and diplomatic ^ 
assistance Prussia had rendered her in regard to 
Poland, whilst England, France, and Austria were 

^ Etude de Diplomatic coiitemporaine^ by M. L. Klaczko. Paris : 
Furne, Jouvet, and Co. 

2 In the month of October 1863, the British Government deter- 
mined to declare that Russia had forfeited her rights over Poland, 
rights which had been conceded to her in 1815 upon conditions 
which, so the English Government claimed, she had ceased to fulfil. 
The Berlin Cabinet intervened and caused its Ambassador at 
London to represent to the authorities that, if they desired the 
maintenance of European peace, they must abandon an attitude 
which, attributing impliedly to Poland the quality of a belligerent 
State, would be considered by the King's Government as an " aggres- 
sion against the rights of Prussia." This was tantamount to a 
threat of war. The messenger bearing the English communication 
was on the road to St. Petersburg : Lord John Russell recalled him 
by telegraph. 

G 



82 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

seeking to unite together — in vain by the way — so 
as to fetter her Hberty, yielded to all the covetous- 
ness of the Berlin Cabinet. To please Prussia, she 
consented to forget the contingent rights of the 
Romanoffs, at one time so forcibly laid claim to by 
the Emperor Nicholas. She went further than 
mere abstention ; she supported all the claims 
Prussia put forward, first to occupy Holstein and 
then to invade Schleswig, thereby neutralising the 
efforts of the Cabinets of Paris and London in 
defence of Denmark. 

These facts are henceforth a matter of history,, 
and they show that King William owed the first 
successes of his arms and diplomacy to the good- 
will of the St. Petersburg Cabinet. It was the 
duty of England and France to see that the Court 
of Berlin respected the Treaty of London : it was 
equally Russia's duty to do so. The interests of 
the three Powers were identical. Their union, a 
loyal understanding, would have sufficed to stay 
Prussia's ambition in its first flight. But the 
Cabinets of London and Paris did not succeed in 
devising measures, in adopting a common policy, 
separated as they were by disagreements that had 
arisen out of the Italian war and by the cession 
of Savoy and Nice to France. Russia, on her 
side, deluded by misleading assurances, borne 
away by the resentment she entertained against 
Austria, offended at the intimations of France 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 83 

and England, and at the agreement they were 
negotiating between themselves and the Court of 
Vienna in order to extort from her certain con- 
cessions in Poland which wounded her pride, 
Russia, we say, only intervened in the matter of 
the Duchies for the purpose of facilitating the task 
undertaken by Count Bismarck and his Sovereign. 

In truth, Count Bismarck was reaping the 
harvest of the marvellous ability he had displayed 
at the time of his mission to St. Petersburg and 
of the wise resolution with which he had directed 
Prussia's attitude at the time of the Polish in- 
surrection. Under the reign of the Emperor 
Nicholas, and with his faithful Chancellor Count 
Nesselrode, would the Government of the King 
of Prussia have been so well favoured ? In 1832 
Russia had overcome, on the banks of the Vistula, 
a far more serious revolt than that of 1863 with- 
out the assistance of her neighbour ; and we 
have seen with what haughtiness the Muscovite 
Emperor, determined to restrain German covetous- 
ness and to protect the interests of his empire on 
the Baltic, forced the Prussians to evacuate the 
Duchies which they had seized whilst his armies 
were preserving the Habsburg monarchy on the 
plains of Hungary. 

But how was it, one may ask, that Austria sub- 
mitted to the pressure of Berlin ? Her docility 
may be easily explained and understood. The 

G 2 



84 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Austrian statesman who had forced the act of peni- 
tence from Prussia which her Prime Minister had 
performed at Olmlitz, Prince Schwarzenberg, was 
dead. He had had several successors, but had 
never been replaced. He alone could have 
measured swords with the Brandenburg squire, 
and it would have been an interesting spectacle 
to have seen these two valiant gladiators, equally 
energetic, equally audacious, and fired by the 
same patriotism, struggling for supremacy in 
Germany. But, since the restorer of the Austrian 
monarchy had quitted the scene, the Emperor 
Francis Joseph had lost Lombardy, and he was 
full of anxiety with reference to Venetia, which 
was claimed by the Italians. Under these con- 
ditions Russia's hostility compelled him to nurse 
the sympathies of his confederates, his allies in a 
fresh conflict. The whole of Germany, princes 
and people alike, had passionately espoused the 
cause of the Duchies. Austria could not therefore 
desert it. She was forced to follow Prussia in the 
campaign undertaken against Denmark. She 
imagined, moreover, that her participation would 
enable her to direct, to restrain, the plans of the 
Court of Berlin. She was mistaken. She had 
to follow Prussia even to the dismemberment of 
Denmark. Declaring valueless the titles of the 
pretenders, whom nevertheless they had professed 
to defend, and without troubling about the 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 85 

autonomy of the Duchies, which was originally the 
bone of contention between the Danish Govern- 
ment and Germany, the two Powers forced King 
Christian IX. to abandon to them his rights over 
Schleswig and Holstein by threatening Jutland. 
They despoiled him. 

The joint sovereignty over these territories, and 
their simultaneous occupation by the troops of the 
two nations, upset Count Bismarck's calculations. 
In 1865, he arranged with, or rather forced upon, 
the Vienna Cabinet an agreement which was 
drawn up and signed at Gastein, in virtue of 
which each of the two Powers should separately 
administer one of the Duchies without prejudice 
to their respective and sovereign rights over the 
whole of the conquered territory. This under- 
standing was severely judged at London and 
Paris. " On what principles," inquired M. Drouyn 
de Lhuys, in a circular that has been made public, 
"does the Austro- Prussian combination rest? 
We regret to find no other foundation than force, 
no other justification than the reciprocal con- 
venience of the two copartners." Prince Gor- 
tchakoff showed no sign. This silence on the 
part of the St. Petersburg Cabinet was signi- 
ficant. France and England had assuredly a 
manifest interest in the maintenance of the in- 
tegrity of the Danish Kingdom, but Russia's in- 
terest was paramount to theirs ; it was directly 



86 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

connected with the security of the Empire, and at 
present she no doubt regrets having sacrificed It, 
having surrendered the port of Kiel to Germany. 
We have dwelt perhaps overlong on this Initial 
exploit of Prussian policy. But it was the first 
link In the chain that bound Russia to Prussia 
until It broke, when the friends became adversaries 
to such a point that Prince Bismarck conceived 
the triple alliance which Is the subject of our study. 
It was necessary, therefore, in order to deduce 
effects from their causes, to recall precisely the 
circumstances which united the two Courts. 



III. 

In the plans of the Prussian Government the 
affair of the Duchies was merely the prologue of 
the drama brought to a climax In Germany. The 
moment was drawing nigh for engaging on the 
supreme solution Imagined at Berlin, of dispos- 
sessing Austria of the ancient Influence she ex- 
ercised over her confederates. The King under- 
took to sharpen the sword that was to secure 
victory, the Minister to bring about the occasion 
for a conflict. The Gastein agreement had been 
scarcely signed when they entered a kind of suit 
against the Cabinet of Vienna. Finding fault 
with all Its acts in Holstein which It was admin- 
istering, with the attitude and even the words of 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 87 

Its agents, Count Bismarck accused it of com- 
pounding now with the inhabitants, now with the 
pretenders, to the detriment of the rights secured 
to Prussia. He originated a diplomatic corre- 
spondence calculated to irritate Austria and provoke 
a quarrel. To render her the more uneasy he did 
not disguise his intentions. The Emperor Francis 
Joseph's Government was warned, and it opposed 
prudent reserve to the vehemence of the Prussian 
Minister's reproaches. "Austria does not wish 
for war," said a diplomatist to Count Bismarck, 
^'and she will be careful not to give you a pretext 
for it," " I have a whole bagful of pretexts," 
replied the future Chancellor, "and even of plau- 
sible reasons. When the time comes war will break 
out without even surprising any one." This was 
the state of affairs in the early part of 1866. The 
rifles failing to go off in the Duchies, notwith- 
standing a great desire to create some incident. 
Count Bismarck raised the question of Federal 
reform at Frankfort. Of all the pretexts that he 
had in reserve, he selected the one which was the 
most certain to bring the two Powers to a prompt 
rupture, and war, as he had predicted, followed as 
an inevitable result. 

One must not imagine, however, that William I. 
and his Minister entered upon such a formidable 
struggle without having weighed its chances and 
g'uarded against its perils. " God is never with 



88 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

the aggressor," was the utterance of the Emperor 
Alexander in 1812, at the moment when Napoleon 
was about to invade Russia. The King, recalling 
those words which he had learnt in his early- 
youth and deeply pondered over, had embodied 
their principle in his programme. He desired war 
as ardently as his counsellors, he had prepared for 
it by devoting all his time and all his care to the 
powerful organisation of his army, but he was un- 
willing either to openly take the initiative or 
assume the responsibility : he declined to appear 
aggressor. His Minister neglected no means by 
which to appease his alarmed conscience, and 
Austria herself assisted thereat by declining a 
Congress. And when, after Sadowa, the King 
victoriously re-entered his Capital, he considered 
himself justified, at the opening of the Chambers,, 
in returnino- thanks to Providence for the grrace 
which had enabled Prussia to ward off a hostile 
invasion from the frontiers. 

Was it really to Providence that he should have 
expressed his gratitude ? Was it not rather tO' 
France and Russia ? Either of these Powers 
might equally well, and without drawing the sword 
from the scabbard, have placed obstacles in the 
way of the realisation of the plans conceived at 
Berlin. The concentration of an army corps on 
the Rhine or on the Vistula would have disarmed 
Prussia and averted hostilities. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 89 

All has been said upon French policy at that 
period, and we could neither examine it nor de- 
fend it here without wandering from our subject. 
What can we say regarding the policy of the 
Russian Empire? The Prussian Government had 
given her precious assistance in the Polish matter ;. 
but she had more than discharged the debt in the 
affair of the Duchies ; she had in a great measure 
sacrificed her interests in the Baltic to Prussia- 
How is it, therefore, that she tolerated the un- 
justifiable aggression against Austria ? Why did 
she permit Prussia to upset for her own benefit 
an order of things established by the unanimous 
agreement of the Powers at the Vienna Con- 
gress, thanks to which the St. Petersburg 
Cabinet was enabled to exercise a preponderat- 
ing influence In the affairs of Germany for half 
a century ? We must believe that nothing could 
turn the Russian Government from the course it 
had adopted since the Western Powers, in agree- 
ment with Austria, had threatened to declare the 
Czar deprived of his sovereign rights in Poland : 
his attitude at the outbreak of the war was the 
guarantee of the approaching success of the Prus- 
sian arms. When fortune had loaded King William 
and Count Bismarck with her favours did they re- 
member this ? Did they in their turn show them- 
selves as grateful as the Emperor Alexander and 
Prince Gortchakoff were after the suppression of 



90 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

the Polish insurrection? We shall inquire into 
this later on. For the moment we will bear in 
mind that it was owing to Russia's goodwill that 
Prussia was enabled to contend with Austria for 
the sceptre of absolutism over the Teutonic lands 
and secure it. 

In truth the ouns at Sadowa resounded at 
St. Petersburg as at Paris. It was well under- 
stood at both Capitals that the monarchy of the 
Habsburgs, driven from Germany, would leave 
an immense void to be filled by Prussia's insati- 
able ambition. Public opinion was nowhere de- 
ceived. France and Russia had been overcome, 
the same as Austria in the plains of Bohemia. 
The Government of the Emperor Napoleon 
sought, but too late, to obtain the compensations 
promised it. On the other hand, the Govern- 
ment of the Emperor Alexander proposed to 
have the conditions of peace settled by a Con- 
gress. We shall see Prince Bismarck, in presence 
of the treaty of San Stefano, availing himself of 
this diplomatic expedient to curtail the con- 
cessions which victorious Russia had wrested 
from the Government of the Sultan. But if it 
suited him to invoke it in 1877, he had every 
interest to decline it in 1866. The peril however 
was great. Austria had been laid low, but she 
could still furnish allies with a powerful contingent 
formed of the victors of Custozza. France, uneasy 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 91 

and anxious, was inclined to be exacting. If 
Russia, undeceived, became hostile, Prussia might 
have to face a formidable coalition ; she might be 
forced, under any circumstances, to appear before 
a gathering of the Powers, who would have kept 
her pretensions within the bounds dictated by the 
requirements of their own safety. What were the 
steps taken by the Cabinet of Berlin to avoid such 
serious difficulties? It manoeuvred to prevent the 
Powers coming to an understanding, and whilst, 
in order to gain time, Count Bismarck was 
dilatorily negotiating with France, as he himself 
has stated, it made every effort to disarm Russia, 
to win back her goodwill, and strengthen rela- 
tions which threatened to be severed. Russia 
once regained, Prussia, it was thought, would 
have not a single competitor left worth fearing. 

General von Manteuffel, the man of confidential 
missions, was despatched to St. Petersburg. This 
breast-plated pietist, who possessed a shrewd and 
insinuating mind, a sympathetic and honourable 
character, had never stooped to an unworthy 
action. Though he had never publicly disavowed 
the systems resorted to by the Berlin Cabinet 
since Prince Bismarck had presided over it, he 
had never compounded with them. His upright 
nature had indeed made him the Prime Minister's 
rival. He had deserved and won his Sovereign's 

o 

confidence and the esteem of the Emperor 



92 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Alexander, whom he had often had opportunities 
of approaching-. It would have been impossible 
to have selected an emissary better prepared and 
more apt to win over and appease the Russian 
Court. Little inclined as Count Bismarck has 
invariably been to master his personal animosities,, 
he himself suggested the General to the King- for 
this extra delicate and highly momentous under- 
taking. So General von Manteuffel, handing over 
his command of an army in the field to resume 
his diplomatic career, set out furnished with an 
autograph letter from the King and the instruc- 
tions of the President of the Council. 

It is known that he acquitted himself to his. 
master's entire satisfaction. Indeed, before his 
return to Berlin, Russia had withdrawn her pro- 
posal to unite the Powers in a Congress, and the 
diplomatic world perceived that the relations be- 
tween the two Courts had resumed their character 
of complete intimacy. It was particularly observed 
that the Czar's representative at Berlin, alarmed 
by the success of the Prussian arms, was hastily 
summoned to St. Petersburg, and that he returned 
to his post completely reassured, and professing a 
peace of mind which neither the reverses of the 
German Princes allied to the Russian dynasty nor 
the development which Prussia, after the conclu- 
sion of hostilities, hastened to give to her military^ 
power, have since succeeded in disturbing. All 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 93 

these circumstances showed even those the least 
gifted with discernment that' a complete under- 
standing was again established between the two 
Governments. Moreover, from this period they 
were seen to indicate their policy more plainly, 
Prussia in Germany and Russia in the East. " I 
never read the correspondence of the King's 
Minister at Constantinople," Count Bismarck 
would say, whenever his attention was called to 
any impending contingency in Turkey. 

It was a fatal and decisive moment when Gen- 
eral von Manteuffel overcame Russia's hesitation. 
A quarter of a century has since elapsed, and now, 
as on the first day, Europe is perturbed and ever 
dreading the most serious complications. How is 
it that the Emperor Alexander and Prince Gor- 
tchakoff, having for a time had a clear impression 
•of the dangers to which exalted Prussia was already 
exposing the peace and equilibrium of Europe — 
how is it that they decided to resume and continue 
a. policy that was none the less regrettable for 
Russia herself than for the other Continental 
States ? Had not Prussia shown the measure 
of her military power and her ambition ? Must 
one suppose that General von Manteuffel was au- 
thorised to open up fresh horizons, to promise 
compensations, to renew more precisely the assur- 
ances of a mutual understanding in the East ? 
Has not Prince Bismarck shown himself on many 



94 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

occasions profuse in aleatory promises ? How is 
it possible, moreover, to understand and justify 
Russia's behaviour otherwise ? What is certain is 
that from that time, the Prussian Government was 
able to follow the course of its success in all se- 
curity. Very soon, indeed, it ceased to disguise 
its intentions. The treaty of Prague had brought 
it many important annexations ; it had also enabled 
it to extend its influence over all the North German 
States, and to add their military contingents to its 
armies. It wanted still more ; it was scheming to 
place the Southern States under its control, and 
to hold the whole of Germany from the Alps to 
the Baltic in its power. 

The King and his Prime Minister, however, did 
not conceal from themselves that by crossing the 
Main in defiance of the preliminaries of Nikolsburg, 
Prussia would come into collision with France; 
that, to crown the work begun, another war would 
be inevitable. They took the necessary steps for 
waging it, and when they were fully prepared, 
when the opportune moment appeared to have 
arrived, they brought it about very cleverly, cer- 
tain that Russia would keep Austria in check and 
maintain a friendly attitude. 

In 1870, as in 1866, the Emperor Alexander 
was arbiter between peace and war. He desired 
peace ; we owe this testimony to the monarch's 
memory. He sought to preserve it with complete 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 95 

loyalty at the commencement of the negotiations 
occasioned by the candidature of a Hohenzollern 
Prince to the throne of Spain. The corre- 
spondence of General Fleury, our Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg, leaves no doubt on that point. 
We must admit, however, that the Czar, deceived 
by the subtleties of the King, his uncle, and 
bewildered by Prince Gortchakoff's counsels, did 
not persevere in this feeling. " Russia could not 
feel the slightest alarm at Prussia's power," the 
Russian Chancellor had said to the English repre- 
sentative before the outbreak of hostilities. That 
was his programme throughout the war, and he 
obtained his sovereign's approval of it. War 
therefore broke out, and Prussia was able to 
engage in it and carry it through, in full possession 
of Russia's sympathies. Either before or during 
the siege of Paris, Prince Gortchakoff might 
have called a Congress. He was timidly invited 
to do so by England, and more firmly by Austria, 
who suo-aested to him the idea of converting- the 
neutrals into mediators. He repelled these over- 
tures. By a contradiction familiar to the human 
mind, he nevertheless had a presentiment of the 
pitfalls to which his policy was exposing his 
master's interests. He souo"ht to obtain g-uaran- 
tees. Russia and the Porte, in a convention joined 
to the treaty concluded at Paris in 1856, had under- 
taken, under the supervision of the other Powers, 



96 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

to maintain only a limited number of vessels of 
war on the Black Sea. After the first reverses 
of the French arms, the Russian Chancellor de- 
clared, without previous understanding and in 
contempt of public rights, that Russia was 
exempted from this obligation and free to re- 
store her maritime power in those waters. 

Prussia supported and upheld Prince Gortcha- 
koff's decision. Her armies were engaged in 
fighting from the Rhine to the Loire. It was 
the moment when Russia's sympathetic abstention 
was the most needful. Prince Bismarck would 
have purchased it with far more important con- 
cessions. Had Count Nesselrode's successor been 
-endowed with more audacity and foresight he 
would have exacted other compensations and 
other pledges. He would have been seconded 
by the various Governments, and, in concert with 
them, he might, without violence, without over- 
riding treaties, have relieved Russia from all 
restrictions placed upon her development in the 
East, and have obtained more precious advantages 
still, by compelling Prussia to sign a peace accept- 
able to France, compatible with the independence 
of Austria, and without danger for the legitimate 
influence of her Court in Europe. He had given 
all his confidence to his colleague at Berlin ; he 
preferred to continue it and secure signal claims 
on his gratitude. From all this, in order to keep 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 97 

within the scope of our inquiry, we propose for 
the time being- to draw only one conclusion, 
which is that, without the moral and diplomatic 
support of Russia, Prussia, during the reign of a 
prince whose prudence was stronger than his 
ambition, would not have dared embark on 
three wars with the confidence of overcoming her 
enemies ; that it is therefore to Russia that she 
owes all her successes. King William himself 
recognised this. The preliminaries of peace were 
signed at Versailles on February 27th, 1871, and 
on the same day he acquainted the Emperor 
Alexander with the , fact in a letter which ended 
with these words : — " Prussia will never forget 
that it is to you she owes the fact that the war 
was not allowed to assume greater proportions. 
May God take this into account and bless you. 
Your ever grateful, William." 

We shall see if Prussia, whilst William was still 
reigning, was mindful of the services she had 
received. 



IV. 



It was at this time that the long period of unity 
which had bound the Court of St. Petersburg to 
that of Berlin came to an end. Prussia had 
vanquished France ; she had deprived her of two 
provinces and five milliards, and she imagined she 

H 



98 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

had crippled her resources for long and rendered 
her renovation distant and difficult. On the other 
hand she held sway over the whole of Germany, 
now freed from the domination of the Czars. She 
felt herself capable, if necessary, of restraining 
Russia. This double result was sufficient for 
the patriotism of Bismarck and his sovereign, 
and for the consolidation of the scheme they had 
at heart. Neither Chancellor nor master had any 
intention of exposing it by assisting the plans of 
the Russian Cabinet which the former had fre- 
quently encouraged, both during his embassy 
to St. Petersburg and at the time of General von 
Manteuffel's mission there. He had eiven ex- 
pression to his whole thought, in his own way, 
on his return to Germany from France. " The 
preliminaries signed at Versailles," he said, 
"guarantee us fifty years' quietude." It was as 
much as to say that, Prussia being triumphant and 
satisfied, the peace of the world should not be 
disturbed, that Russia's assistance was no longer 
necessary, and that their friendship having become 
a burden it was time to put it to an end. This 
was the King's new programme, and he relied for 
its execution on his Chancellor's genius. Did the 
latter fulfil his task according to his master's 
wishes and to the advantage of his country ? 
All we can say here is that the actual state of 
Europe is the result. History will pronounce 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 99 

judgment on the work and workman. We will 
insist no further on this point. We should be 
anticipating events. 

Yet what were the respective positions of Prussia 
and Russia at that time ? The campaign in the 
Duchies had given the Hohenzollerns Holstein and 
Schleswig. Together with these provinces, the 
port of Kiel, the key to the Baltic, passed from 
the hands of a friendly or neutral Nation into 
those of an encroaching Power, faithful to her 
principle, that of all her ancestors : Ubi bene, ibi 
patria, who would be enabled in future to make a 
northern Bosphorus of the Sound and close the 
Atlantic to the Russian navy. The war against 
Austria had brought her other and more notable 
advantages ; she had annexed kingdoms, duchies, 
and free-towns. Leaving a semblance of autonomy 
and independence to the other States of North 
Germany, she had forced a federative position on 
them, reserving the lion's share to herself. .Under 
threat of her anger she had extorted treaties from 
the Southern States which placed them at her 
mercy. Then came the war with France, and 
Germany added Alsace and Lorraine to her 
possessions. To crown the work so well com- 
pleted, the German Empire was restored the 
better to ensure the dominion of the de- 
scendants of Frederick the Great, and care was 
taken to impose a war indemnity on the con- 

H 2 



loo STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

quered nation beneath the weight of which she 
mio-ht succumb. Such was Prussia's share. What 
advantages did Russia reap ? Prince Gortchakoffs 
wish was gratified. Austria had been vanquished 
and humbled. He had had the satisfaction of 
drawing his pen through the treaty clause, sub- 
mitted to in 1856, which purported to make the 
Black Sea neutral, but which in reality neutralised 
nothing, as he has stated himself. Vain and 
barren successes, which brought neither satisfaction 
nor oruarantees. What was thouoht of them on 
the banks of the Neva? Whilst Prince Bismarck 
judged the moment opportune for closing the era 
of conquests, the Russians, on the contrary, con- 
sidered the time had come for settling accounts 
and balancing up the profits. What did Prussia 
do ? She held aloof with honeyed words and 
dilatory methods, in order to delay any fresh 
resolution or agreement. The fidelity of the 
Russian Government to the policy that had so long- 
united it to Prussia, the communications publicly 
exchanged, the toasts drunk at the banquets 
had misled public opinion throughout the Musco- 
vite Empire. Every one was persuaded .that the 
Emperor Alexander would receive the price of the 
assistance he had rendered King William, and it 
was thought that Russia, with the aid of this 
grateful sovereign, would find legitimate com- 
pensation on the Danube and Bosphorus. The 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE loi 

public, in their enthusiasm, sincerely believed 
that the time had arrived to give effect to the 
testament of Peter the Great. This conviction 
was universal. The surprise therefore was pain- 
ful and the discontent great, when it was felt that 
Russia would be victimised at Berlin just as France 
had been in 1866, and that the European equi- 
librium would remain upset to the exclusive 
benefit of Prussia. By the light of accomplished 
facts, Germany was thus beheld to rise up like 
a colossus with nothing- to counterbalance her 
power, France and Austria being reduced for 
a long time to come to dressing their wounds. 
The illusions that had been so universally nursed 
were dispelled, and Prince Gortchakoff, sick at 
heart, had to admit to himself that his policy 
had been wanting- in shrewdness. He collected 
himself again, this time to meditate on the 
faults committed and the means of averting the 
consequences. 

The two parties were content to observe one an- 
other for some time after the restoration of peace. 
The one showed itself reserved, the other caressing 
and even obsequious. Their relations remained 
courteous, but were ever pervaded with intense 
mistrust. To dispel this feeling, now become general 
and even tangible throug"hout the whole Russian 
Empire, King William visited St. Petersburg in 
April, 1873, anxious to express to his august 



I02 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

nephew, in his own capital, the gratitude with 
which his heart was so profoundly penetrated, at 
least so he said. He remained there two weeks, 
and was brilliantly welcomed and feted. But he 
returned to Berlin convinced that, this time, he 
had hoodwinked nobody, and that he had left be- 
hind him a feeling of resentment that was not to be 
overcome. He soon had a positive proof of it. 

France had discharged her debt, had paid five 
milliards with an ease that upset all calculations, 
and disconcerted Prince Bismarck himself The 
first attempts of the Republic to adjust the budget 
and restore the country's military strength had, 
indeed, yielded unhoped-for results. The Govern- 
ment at Berlin took alarm, and soon, in 1875, it 
was asking itself if the interest and security of the 
new Empire did not necessitate an obstacle being 
placed in the way of the revival of the hereditary 
enemy who, it was thought, had been crushed for 
years to come, by an appeal to arms. This was 
Count Moltke's opinion even more than the Chan- 
cellor's. " We cannot better our means of attack," 
the celebrated marshal is reported to have said, 
" and France is every day improving her system 
of defence. The decisive moment has arrived. 
Later on, war will cost the two nations a hundred 
thousand men more. To prevent its becoming a 
war of extermination we must have it at once. It is 
not only as a commander and a German that I say 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 103 

this, it is also as a man and a Christian." This 
relentless warrior requires war to excess when he 
directs it. He showed as much at Sedan. He 
demands it with no less violence when peace has 
intervened and nations breathe again ; ^ he advises 
it as a believer, and in a feeling" of solicitude for 
two countries whose blood he has caused to flow 
in torrents, A strange nature his, recalling that 
of the invaders, his ancestors. His contempor- 
aries will not only owe past wars to him ; they will 
also be his debtors for future campaigns. We have 
mentioned the struofsfles Count Bismarck had to 
engaore in with him at Nikolsburq- and Versailles. 
However, it may be, the French Government was 
warned by the St. Petersburg Cabinet of the fresh 
peril threatening it. Russia, undeceived and 
anxious, was, on this occasion, firmly resolved not 
to permit another invasion of France. The 
Emperor Alexander himself so assured our Am- 
bassador, General Le Flo.^ Prussia brought face 
to face with this attitude of the Czar and his 
Government, relinquished her aggressive schemes. 
Whosoever has studied the history of these recent 
times will not be surprised at this result. William I., 

^ In 1867, a year after the war against Austria, Count Moltke 
wished to direct Prussia's victorious arms against France, ui'ging, 
with all the authority he had acquired, that a pretext should be 
found in the Luxemburg question. — M. Henri des Houx chez M. de 
Bismarck. 

^ See, in the newspapers of May, 1887, the account of this incident 
published by General Le Flo himself 



104 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

who was then approaching the last limits of old 
age, could not bring himself to undertake a war in 
the course of which he would have had to reckon 
with Russia's hostility. Any attempt to lead him 
into it would have been in vain. Prince Bismarck 
hastened to disavow the intentions attributed to 
Prussia. He did so haughtily and with emphasis, 
like a statesman whose secrets have been revealed, 
and in a manner calculated to wound the feelino-s 
of Prince Gortchakoff, who wished, he pretended, 
to assume the merit of having saved France from 
great danger. " I have never turned aside from 
Russia," he said; " it was she who repelled me 
and at times placed me in such a position that I 
was forced to modify my attitude to preserve my 
own dignity and that of Germany. This began in 
1875, when Prince Gortchakoff gave me to under- 
stand how much his pride was nettled at the posi- 
tion I had attained to, in the political world." 

It is certain that these regrettable sentiments, 
which statesmen should ever be careful to avoid, 
have played a lamentable part in the struggles 
which, in our time, have devastated Europe. But 
it must be recog-nised that Russia was not actinpf 
at that moment under the influence of any such 
feelings as these. She had other matters in view, 
other anxieties, caused by Prussia's aggrandise- 
ment, by the fixed intention of the Berlin Cabinet 
not to assist her to any compensation nor to give 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 105 

her any pledges. Prince Bismarck, nevertheless, 
deeply felt the denunciation of which he had 
been made the object. His heart has never been 
open to the forgiveness of offences ; genius itself 
has to pay its tribute to human weakness, we 
have seen this in the trial of Count Arnim, in 
that of Doctor Geffcken ; but we have seen it 
more clearly still since he has been deposed from 
power, and one has been able to form an opinion 
on the subject by the vivacity and intemperance 
of his language, which has been such as to 
surprise even his adversaries and distress his 
most enthusiastic admirers. Did his irritation, in 
1875, conform to the requirements of the object 
he had in view ? Was it useful or opportune to 
break with Russia? It is impossible to say as 
yet. What is certain is that he showed he felt 
the wound inflicted on his vanity, and resolved to 
seek friendships elsewhere. The two Chancellors, 
repudiating the long past during which they had 
conspired together, thus ended in severing the 
ties that had united them, and henceforth we 
find them in a constant state of hostility. Prussia 
indeed, from the date of this incident, modified 
her policy, followed fresh combinations, and, after 
long efforts, succeeded in founding the Triple 
Alliance. The idea of this agreement took root 
in Prince Bismarck's mind in 1875. Its realiza- 
tion' was difficult ; Austria, under the weight of her 



io6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

disasters, rebelled against her conqueror's smooth- 
tongued suggestions. The resistance Prince 
Bismarck met with at Vienna did not turn him 
from his purpose ; he waited and found the means 
of overcoming it. Let us see how he proceeded. 



V. 



In the course of this same year an insurrection 
broke out in Herzegovina. The movement soon 
spread to Bosnia and from there, later on, to 
Bulgaria. It has been pretended that the agita- 
tion was supported if not provoked by the secret 
service funds of the " reptiles " ; nothing has proved 
this, and we only mention the rumour as an 
indication of the proclivities attributed to Prince 
Bismarck, who delighted, so it was believed, to 
create difficulties in the East for his colleague at 
St. Petersburg. The Turkish Government vainly 
endeavoured to restore order in its revolted 
provinces. Its troops not succeeding, it had 
recourse to a pitiless repression which raised a 
feeling of indignation among the populations and 
Cabinets of Europe. The Powers were roused. 
Long and laborious negotiations ensued, which 
brought Russia and England face to face, the 
one following ancient traditions which bade her 
defend her co-religionists, the other alarmed at 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 107 

the dangers which again menaced the integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire. 

Whilst they thus took up positions in presence 
of these fresh compHcations, Prussia kept in the 
background. In December, 1876, a Conference 
assembled at Constantinople. Its deliberations 
came to nauoht owino- to the refusal of the Porte 
to permit the participation of the Powers in 
carrying out the measures destined to secure 
solid guarantees to the Christians. In March, 
1877, a protocol, which remained a dead letter, 
was signed at London ; the Turkish Government, 
not having been invited to participate in framing 
it, refused to accept its provisions. Yet matters 
were going from bad to worse : Montenegro and 
Servia had intervened in the struggle by allying 
themselves to the insurgents. In this state of 
affairs Russia took up arms. In the month of 
April her troops invaded Turkish territory. It is 
not our purpose to relate the struggle between the 
two Empires ; we will merely recall that it ended 
in the treaty signed at San Stefano in the presence 
of the Enelish fleet which had hastened to Con- 
stantinople and was at anchor in the Sea of 
Marmora. Prussia was more reserved ; she 
indulged in no manifestation. Prince Bismarck 
knew that Great Britain had interests in the East 
identical with those of Turkey, so he willingly left 
it to her to give the first warnings which he 



io8 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

considered it needful Russia should receive. He 
knew above all, that nothing could be definitively 
accomplished, either in the Ottoman Empire or 
elsewhere, without the co-operation or adhesion of 
powerful Germany, especially if allied to England. 
In this double belief, he placed no obstacle in the 
way of either war or peace. He, of all Prime 
Ministers, was the one who maintained the most 
absolute reserve. Prussia, appealed to by the 
Porte, as it had appealed to the other Powers, when 
the struggle was at its height, to intervene as 
mediator, hastened to reject the Sultan's entreaties. 
England alone, showing day by day greater and 
greater solicitude for Turkey, ventured to offer her 
good services, thus assuming the part the German 
Chancellor had assig-ned her in his desig^ns. 

What were the terms of the treaty of San 
Stefano ? It stipulated for new and precious 
advantages on behalf of all the Christian races of 
the Ottoman Empire : the independence of some 
and autonomy or solemn guarantees for the others. 
Besides a double rectification of frontiers, Russia 
obtained, in addition to a war indemnity, the right 
to superintend the execution of the concessions 
granted to her co-religionists. By these arrange- 
ments she recovered her freedon of action and 
influence which had been curtailed by the treaty 
of 1856, after the Crimean war. The English 
Government hastened to point out that these 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 109 

advantaofes were inconsistent with the eneao-e- 
ments which Russia had accepted at the Congress 
of Paris ; it declared therefore that it could only 
recognise the terms agreed to at San Stefano on 
the conditions that they were submitted, without a 
single exception, to the examination and approval 
of all the Powers concerned therein. The moment 
had arrived for Germany to side either with or 
ao-ainst the Court of St. Petersburg-, to renew the 
cordiality of their relations now seriously com- 
promised, to strengthen afresh their respective 
interests, or to definitively adopt another course 
and form other agreements. Russia, with the 
assistance of King William and his able Chancellor, 
might have refused to appear before the Powers 
assembled in congress, and have claimed in her turn 
the integrity of the concessions she had obtained 
from the Porte at the cost of most pfrievous 
sacrifices and after a long and ruthless war, just as 
Prussia had done on two occasions thanks to the 
Emperor Alexander and Prince Gortchakoff 
The German Empire on its side allied to that of 
the Czars would have had no occasion to fear the 
wrath of Great Britain ; but resolutions had been 
formed at Berlin, and they remained immutable. 
The King had forgotten the debt he owed his 
august nephew and which was still undischarged ; 
the Chancellor thought only of the recent attitude 
and behaviour of his colleague at St. Petersburg. 

o o 



no STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

They preferred the Congress, being perfectly well 
aware of the claims England would make there. 
Russia had to submit and accept the proposal. 
Forsaken by Prussia, she could not set the 
hostility of the British Cabinet at defiance, in face 
of Austria laid low, and Italy disposed to submit 
to the impulse it would receive either from London 
or Berlin. 

The Congress assembled under the presidency 
of Prince Bismarck. The Chancellor performed 
his task like an honest broker, as he has himself 
stated, giving each Power a share to the prejudice 
of Russia, and without forgetting France, in a 
design useful to the evolution he had given to his 
policy, and to which we will return later on. The 
stipulations of the treaty of San Stefano were 
altered as a whole, whilst others were added which 
upset the position guaranteed to the St. Peters- 
burg Cabinet by the arrangements it had directly 
concluded with the Porte. To the superintend- 
ence it had reserved to itself over the execution 
of the concessions granted to the Christians, was 
especially substituted that of Europe. Commis- 
sions were formed which assumed these duties, 
thus dispossessing Russia of the position of guar- 
dian power she thought she had regained by her 
victory. The better to attain this result, the 
speedy evacuation of the Turkish provinces occu- 
pied by the armies of the Czar was insisted upon. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE in 

But the chief and unexpected clause, which 
nothing authorised nor anticipated, the one it is 
important to dwell upon because it has given rise 
to difficulties which will for a long time greatly 
trouble the political state of Europe, was a clause 
drawn up in a couple of lines and thus worded : 
" The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina will 
be occupied and administered by Austria- Hun- 
gary." (Art. 25.) The form of this arrangement 
was nothing but an astute euphemism. In reality, 
the Sultan was divested by his friends of these 
provinces which had certainly taken up arms to 
win their autonomy but in nowise to change their 
master. Austria- Hungary, on the other hand, 
without having drawn the sword or made the 
slightest sacrifice, was placed in possession of 
territories destined to give a new prominence to 
her influence in the East. This scheme con- 
ceived by Prince Bismarck, ever fertile in unfore- 
seen and ingenious expedients, was proposed to 
the Assembly by Lord Salisbury, one of the 
British Plenipotentiaries. 

Nothing could show the understanding arrived 
at between the Cabinets of Berlin and London 
more clearly. No further illusion was now possible 
to the Emperor Alexander's representatives. It 
was, indeed, with the sole object of striking 
a blow at every interest Russia possessed, that 
the pretended protectors of Turkey conceived 



112 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

the notion of inflicting this mutilation upon 
her for the benefit of Austria, the real com- 
petitor of the Russian Empire in the Balkan 
peninsula. This measure promised England a 
more powerful and efficacious co-operation against 
any fresh attempt on the part of the St. Peters- 
burg- Government in the East. It o-uaranteed 
to Germany the free passage of the Danube, her 
most direct route for her trade with the Black Sea 
and Asia. But Prince Bismarck had other views 
besides : he wished to render service to the Power 
vanquished at Sadowa, to cause her to forget her 
disasters by making up for them in part, and also 
to force her to ally herself closely to Germany. 
He was making the movement which would re- 
move the foundation and support of his policy 
from St. Petersburg to Vienna. The stipulation 
which had emanated from him procured him the 
most certain and most rapid means of accomplish- 
ing this. He placed Austria- Hungary at his 
mercy. This Power, in possession of Bosnia, 
became the neighbour of Bulgaria ; she was 
already In a similar situation as regards Servia 
and Montenegro : she was therefore In a position 
to exercise a preponderant influence over all the 
new States created out of the partition of the 
Ottoman Empire between the Danube and the 
yEgean Sea. She was henceforth the advance 
guard of Germany and England ; but, by that 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 113 

very fact, she agreed to constitute herself Russia's 
irreconcilable adversary. The state of affairs at 
the moment of writing, proves how well founded 
were the German Chancellor's previsions and 
with what sagacity he made use of England and 
Austria herself in the course of the negotiations 
over which he presided at Berlin. 

Prince Bismarck, therefore, at the conclusion of 
the Congress, found himself absolute and in- 
dependent master of the situation he had created. 
He could, as he willed, either become reconciled 
to Russia by means of concessions which his 
ingenuity would easily have discovered if neces- 
sary,^ or he could enf^ff Austria- Hungary to his 
policy. One knows the course he adopted. To 
disguise nothing let us also mention that England, 
in her mistrust, had been careful, before proceeding 
to Berlin and in the intention of not returning 
empty-handed, to take the security that most 
suited her interests. She had extorted from the 
Porte the cession of Cyprus, which gave her on 
the one side access to Syria, and, on the other, to 
the entrance of the Suez Canal in the Mediter- 
ranean. The fact of this acquisition was dis- 
sembled in a treaty of defensive alliance which 

^ The St. Petersburg Cabinet gave him an opportunity. Count 
Schouvaloff invited him to conclude a formal treaty of alliance. 
He declined the proposal. At least, that is what he himself revealed 
to one of the numerous interviewers whom he received at Fried- 
richsruh. 



114 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

deceived no one. Great Britain promised, and it 
was really an illusory obligation, to guarantee to 
Turkey her Asiatic possessions, and, hi order to 
place her in a position to ensure the necessary 
Tfieans for the execution of this engagement, the 
Stiltan assigned this island to be occtipied and 
administered by her. It was in a similar way, as 
one has seen, that Austria acquired Herzegovina 
and Bosnia. Diplomacy possesses formulas which 
enable it to disguise, under the appearance of a 
temporary occupation, definitive and unjustifiable 
acts of spoliation. The British Government had 
not ventured on this neo^otiation without havingr 
taken the Cabinet at Berlin, who alone was aware 
of it, into its confidence. So soon as the matter 
began to be talked of, Prince Bismarck, not wish- 
ing it to be thought that he had been caught 
napping, caused his official organ, the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung to say that: "one 
is constrained to consent to this measure from the 
point of view of progress and general civilisation. 
We do not think we are mistaken in admitting that 
our Government was informed beforehand oi the 
agreement, though without being asked to express 
an opinion on it." It was sufficient for the 
Prussian statesman to establish the fact that his 
vigilance had not been at fault. He considered 
it superfluous to acknowledge that he had 
authorised everything. It remained none the 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 115 

less certain that the Plenipotentiaries of Queen 
Victoria and those of the Emperor William ar- 
rived at the Congress, after having come to a 
decision respecting the weighty problems It was 
their mission to solve. Russia had been con- 
demned before she had been heard. 

The relentless German Chancellor, who had not 
ceased to be, nor ever will cease to be, the resolute 
and vehement lordling of his early years, took a 
signal revenge for the suspicious position in which 
the temerity of the St. Petersburg Cabinet had 
placed him In 1875. He has vanquished Russia 
without fighting her, has humiliated Prince 
Gortchakoff before an European areopagus, has 
tasted the pleasure of the gods, ever so dear to his 
ardent and impassioned soul ; sweet and supreme 
satisfaction which he has constantly sought for 
during his long and glorious career. But did he 
on this occasion, render good service to his King 
and country ? One is justified in expressing doubt 
on the subject In the presence of the incessant 
efforts attempted by the new Emperor, on the very 
morrow of his accession, to appease Russia and 
arrange a reconciliation between the two Courts, 
so nearly related. Besides, it does not appear 
to be the general opinion in Germany that he 
did. Under the government, we might say the 
reign, of Prince Bismarck, if there were still law- 
courts at Berlin, there were no longer any judges 

I 2 



ii6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

in a certain sense. Whoever dared blame his 
foreign policy risked being prosecuted for offences 
against his person or for the crime of high treason. 
Writers who attempted it found themselves in 
prison and sometimes confined in a fortress. He 
succeeded, thus, in inculcating prudence, if not 
absolute silence. Since his fall, tongues and pens 
have been more free ; his underlings on the press 
have themselves forsaken him, and one knows 
how haughtily he has loaded them with his con- 
tempt. A pamphlet which appeared at Leipsic 
expressed the feelings of the malcontents in no 
measured terms. ^ " Prince Bismarck," it says, 
"tries in vain to impose on the public; ... he 
is the author of an irremediable rupture between 
Russia and Germany. ... It was Russia that 
made Prussia's greatness. ... In 1870, whilst 
under arms on the Vistula, she protected the 
frontier of the Rhine. . . . By the treaty of San 
Stefano, Russia flattered herself she would reap 
the advantages which a sanguinary and successful 
war gave her the right to claim : the Berlin treaty 
annulled its provisions almost entirely. . . . If, at 
the time of the Congress, Gortchakoff asked but 
little, if he resigned himself to seeing Austria- 
Hungary, Russia's adversary, take the leading 

^ If bears the title " How the Duke of Lauenburg (Prince Bis- 
marck) brought about the understanding between the Russian 
Empire and the French Republic." 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 117 

position in the Balkan Peninsula, it was because 
he found himself contending against a coalition 
whilst the only powerftd friend upon whom he 
thought he could rely kept out of the way. . . . 
She (Russia) is peaceful, but she commands our 
respect. . . . She knows that in the hour of 
danger she can rely on a friendly power whose 
alliance has no need to be ratified by a written 
convention. . . . Russia, moreover, will never 
again play the part she did in 1870; she will 
not assist at the dismemberment of France with 
folded arms. . . ." That is what is thought and 
written to-day in Germany. We have said the 
same. Was this publication, which created con- 
siderable stir in public opinion and in the press, 
inspired '^. Nothing goes to prove it ; but its 
circulation was not prohibited, and most of the 
newspapers gave long extracts from it. This 
twofold circumstance displays a symptom that one 
may certainly make note of by the way. 

These same truths that are now being so 
lavishly bestowed, from the banks of the Spree, 
on the restorer of the German Empire in retire- 
ment at his country seat, the Russian press, 
interpreting the national feeling, had imparted to 
him during the last years of his government. He 
had their exactitude disputed by the powerful 
organs of publicity in his pay. He has taken 
advantage of every opportunity to deny or correct 



ii8 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

them himself, to show that he had on every 
occasion been Russia's best friend, and notably at 
the Berlin Congress. He has averred everything ; 
he has proved nothing. The established facts 
did not allow of his doing so. Indeed, with the 
exception of Montenegro, who, in spite of every- 
thing, has remained faithful to the Czars her 
benefactors, the provinces watered by the Danube 
— two of which have been raised into independent 
kingdoms, whilst the third has been made an 
autonomous principality — these provinces, we can 
say, which owed everything for years to the blood 
of Russian armies, shed in abundance to release 
them from bondage, were already, through the 
resistless result of the resolutions formed at the 
Berlin Congress, the one, Servia, under the yoke 
of Austria, and the other, Roumania, manifestly 
rebellious to all connection with the St. Petersburg 
Cabinet : as for the third, Bulgaria, which has 
been loaded with benefits of every description, 
she employs, or rather her rulers do not cease to 
employ, every means to avoid recognising them. 
And thus it is that Russia, their emancipator, is 
to-day robbed of all influence in those countries 
to the advantage of Austria, or, as would be more 
correct to say, of Germany. If things are thus — 
and we venture to think nobody will contradict us 
— is Prince Bismarck entitled to claim the benefit of 
his watchfulness over the interests of the Russian 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 119 

Empire ? Is this not adding mockery to hostility ? 
But a statesman of his stamp, who has attained 
the zenith of power, may give utterance to rash 
words with impunity ; public credulity listens to 
them unmoved, when it does not applaud them. 



VI. 

There is one acknowledgment due to Prince 
Bismarck which costs us nothing to render him. 
The work formed by his hands established with 
mathematical precision, we may say, the respec- 
tive positions of the contracting parties. It was 
thus that matters were judged at St. Petersburg 
and elsewhere. It was thus that he understood 
them himself Each power knew who were and 
who might eventually become its friends or 
adversaries, as well as the line of action to be 
followed henceforth. By a strange freak of fate, 
Russia after her victories, the same as France 
after her defeats, had to fortify herself in her 
isolation, and, like the conquered nation, provide 
for her security by reorganising her military forces, 
by giving them all the development they were 
capable of Her confidence having been de- 
stroyed, she hastened to guard her frontiers 
against surprise by covering them with strong 
contingents of troops drawn from the armies then 
evacuating Turkey. It was sought to show, 



< 



I20 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

especially at Vienna, that this proceeding was 
far from being a peaceful demonstration. One 
can recall the recriminations of the Austrian 
press, and, if we mention them, it is because 
they show the origin of the armaments which 
became, from that time, the general law of all 
European States. Germany herself took the 
first step under the pretext that her neighbours 
on the north and west of the Empire were arming 
beyond measure. 

Whilst the military authorities were bestirring 
themselves, the Chancellor was not dozing. He 
was hastening to put his projects of alliance 
into execution. At the time when he made an 
understanding between the Russian Empire and 
the French Republic inevitable, he had, as we 
have said, thought of and prepared for this con- 
tingency. Skilful and far-seeing as he was, he 
had irremissibly parted Austria and Russia, and 
placed the first-named of these Powers in the 
urgent necessity of uniting herself to Germany 
and in a measure belonging to her. He de- 
manded at Vienna the price of the acquisitions 
that was his due, and offered the Austro-Hun- 
oarian Government to arrang-e a defensive alliance. 
The Vienna Cabinet was not in a position to 
decline. It is probable also that it welcomed 
the offer in order to shield itself behind Germany 
from the wrath of Russia. The clauses of this 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 121 

agreement were, however, under discussion for 
a long time. At Berlin, they required an under- 
standing binding the parties for every contin- 
gency, both as regards Russia and France. Any 
conflict between Germany or Austria and one or 
the other of these two Powers was to be con- 
sidered as creating the casus fcederis. We had 
in our mind, the Vienna Cabinet replied, a state 
of affairs which bound us to protect ourselves 
against an aggression on the part of Russia. 
Public opinion throughout the Austro- Hungarian 
Empire would understand, as would all the Cabi- 
nets of Europe, that we were joining Germany with 
this object, and no one would consider it more 
than a purely defensive measure. The treaty 
would, in that case have every appearance of 
a pacific arrangement. On the other hand, there 
is nothing to place us at variance with France ; 
we have no plausible reason for adopting a 
distrustful attitude towards her ; by pointing her 
out, we should be rendering ourselves guilty of 
an unjustifiable act of ill-will, if not of hostility. 
Prince Bismarck went to Vienna, intervening 
in person to overcome the resistance opposed 
to him. Count Andrassy maintained his point 
of view, and offered to resign. The German 
Chancellor had to be satisfied with making the 
treaty dated October 7, 1879.^ 

^ See a recent article in the German Review, Nord und Slid. 



122 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

What does it covenant ? The name of France 
is not mentioned. The first clause says that, if 
one of the two Empires is attacked by Russia, they 
will owe reciprocally to each other the assistance 
of the whole of their military forces. If it is 
attacked by some other Power (clause 2), the other 
contracting party undertakes to observe a friendly 
neutrality. If the attacking Power were supported 
by Russia (clause 3), the obligation to render 
reciprocal assistance, dealt with in the first clause, 
would immediately come into force. The treaty 
as it is seen, is explicitly conceived and framed 
against Russia ; she is named in it twice, whilst 
France is never mentioned. Russia is provided 
against ; and the two Empires of Germany and 
Austria are to take up arms and fight her, whether 
she becomes the aororessor or whether she assists 
in no matter what degree the efforts of another 
Power. Nothing indicates this Power ; it was un- 
necessary to do so. But this voluntary omission, 
undoubtedly insisted on by the Vienna Cabinet, is 
none the less worthy of remark. What is even 
more so, what it is important to bear in mind, is 
the distinction drawn between the contingency of 
war with Russia and that of the outbreak of hos- 
tilities with France. In the first, the two allies 
owe each other reciprocal and absolute assistance, 
no matter which may be attacked. In the second, 
the contracting party who is not directly engaged 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 123 

in the struggle at the outbreak, would not have to 
join in it so long as Russia abstained from doing 
so. Its sole duty would consist in adopting and 
maintaining a friendly attitude. Does this mean 
that if a fresh struogrle arose between France and 
Germany, we might reckon on Austria's neu- 
trality ? Such is not our feeling. The spirit and 
bearing of conventional clauses, no matter what 
their terms, become modified by circumstances, 
and no one is ignorant of the fact that, in our 
times, they are susceptible of every interpretation. 
The faith of treaties, that highly respectable prin- 
ciple of the soundness of international relations, of 
the security of nations and general peace, has 
received some very serious onslaughts since might 
dispossessed right, and the Government that would 
now make it the invariable rule of its conduct and 
decisions would find itself exposed to most 
terrible disappointments. ^ 

1 The preamble of the Austro-German treaty says : " Consider- 
ing that the two monarchs will be able, by a firm alliance of the two 
Empires similar to ^Aai which existed before, to accomplish this 
undertaking " (that of watching over the security of their States). 
Did this firm alliance, which existed before, deter Prussia from 
declaring war against Austria without cause and without provo- 
cation, and solely to gratify her cupidity ? " The two Sovereigns," 
the preamble adds, " promising solemnly never to give the slightest 
aggressive character to their purely defensive agreement, have 
resolved to conclude a treaty of peace and reciprocal protection." 
Whilst Count Bismarck was Prime Minister, Prussia violated the 
treaty of 1852 which guaranteed the integrity of the Danish domin- 
ions ; the treaty of 1856, by encouraging (he has admitted it) 



124 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

The treaty signed at Vienna, in 1879, remained 
secret in this sense, that, whilst its object was 
known, its purport and conditions were ignored. 
On February 4th, 1888, it is suddenly made 
public. It had been renewed in 1883 and 1887 ; 
it had received the adhesion of Italy. But the 
text revealed is the early one, drawn up by Prince 
Bismarck and Count Andrassy, the only one we 
know at present, without any mention of the sig- 
natures exchanged since its date either with the 
Cabinet of Vienna or that of Rome. What was 
the necessity for this ? What was the German 
Chancellor's motive ? Only one explanation has 
been forthcoming. It is this : At the opening of 
the session of the Reichstag he had introduced a 
bill providing for a supplementary credit of 280 
million marks for the military department. Public 
opinion and the Federal Assembly alike received 

Russia in ignoring the clause which made the Black Sea neutral ; 
the Prusso- Italian treaty of 1866, by concluding peace with Austria 
at Nikolsburg without the participation and in spite of the protests 
of his ally ; the treaty of Prague of the same year, by imposing on 
the States of Southern Germany, to which he had promised ?i.free 
and mdepeftdejtf position, by imposing on them, we say, conventions 
which placed all their military forces, without distinction, under the 
direct and absolute command of the King. Who henceforth would 
guarantee to Europe that Prussia would abstain from forcing 
Austria, if it were her interest to do so and she judged the moment 
opportune, to change their /(?<3:f^z^/ understanding into an offensive 
alliance ? After having witnessed the violence used, the engage- 
ments ignored, might we not, on the contrary, say with Hamlet : 
" Words / Words ! Words ! " if such things, thus written, did not 
command respect, even when they inspire mistrust ? 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 125 

this demand with feelings of surprise and mistrust. 
The German army, it was said, is the most power- 
ful of all European armies, as much by numbers 
and armament as by organisation ; it must, 
therefore, be war that is foreseen, and which will 
be brought on at an early date ! The Chancellor 
would not have been believed if, after our 
disasters, he had again evoked the spectre of the 
hereditary enemy. He decided to show the 
country and its representatives that what he 
wished for was peace and not war, and he placed 
the treaty concluded with Austria before them. 
But to ensure peace, he intended to put Germany 
in such a position that she would not have to fear 
war, and to neglect nothing, should it occur, to 
render it disastrous to her adversaries. A few 
days afterwards, February 6th, the bill came on 
for discussion, and he spoke with the view of 
unfolding this double theme. He was courteous 
towards the Czar : "I have been able to convince 
myself," he said at the outset, "that the Emperor 
Alexander has no bellicose feeling towards us, no 
intention of attacking us, nor any leaning towards 
aggresive wars in general. I have no faith in 
the press. I rely on, and believe in, the Czar's 

word Prussia owes a debt of gratitude to 

Russia since 181 3. A great deal was made of 
this during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas, 
and I may say that the debt was wiped out at 



126 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Olmlitz ; but we have continued our friendship 
to Russia and we are grateful to her for her 
attitude in 1866 and 1870. On this last occasion, 
we were again able to render her a service by 
procuring for her, through our victories, a free 

hand in the Black Sea We endeavour to 

respect the rights which Russia obtains by treaties. 
.... and if she asks us to support her applications 
to the Sultan to bring the Bulgarians to the 
position arranged by the understanding of the 

Powers, I should not hesitate to do so " 

Parallel to this thesis, and entangling the two 
tOQ^ether, the Chancellor dwelt at leng-th on that 
of peace : ". . . .We desire its continuance," he 
declared. " We wish to preserve it with all our 

neighbours, especially with Russia We are 

not obtruding ourselves ; we are merely seeking 

to renew the former friendly relations If 

war breaks out, the powder will have to be fired 

by others ; we shall not set it alight " But, 

according to him, there is an imperious necessity 
which Germany cannot shirk ; she must be as 
strong as her interest demands and her power 
admits of, ever ready and prepared to defend the 
Empire on all sides at the same moment. " The 
bill," he added, "brings us a considerable increase 
of trained troops ; it strengthens the league of 
peace the same as if a fourth Power, with 700,000 
men, had joined it. Public opinion will become 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 127 

easy when it considers that, if we are simul- 
taneously attacked on two sides, we shall be able 
to march a million men to each frontier whilst 

keeping a third million in reserve If we 

have no need of them, so much the better. We 
shall do our best that this may be the case. We 
Germans," he said, in conclusion, "fear God, but 
nothing else in the world, and this fear of the 
Almighty causes us to love and cultivate peace. 
Whosoever violates it will be able to convince 
himself that the whole German nation is animated 
by that same fondness for the fatherland as, in 
181 3, called the entire population of diminished 
and enfeebled Prussia to arms ; and he who 
attacks her will find her united and armed, and 
will see that every warrior carries in his heart 
the firm belief that God is with us." Proud and 
noble words, with a Christian and patriotic accent 
that it is impossible not to recognise, but which 
nevertheless cause great surprise when one re- 
members that the statesman who uttered them 
desired and brought about three wars in six years, 
that he set Europe ablaze from the Baltic to the 
Danube and from the Danube to the Loire : the 
language of a neophyte, will be the verdict of 
history, of a neophyte converted to God and 
peace after having gathered a rich harvest of 
success and glory on the battlefield. 

The Chancellor's speech so impressed the As- 



128 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

sembly that It put an end to the discussion ; the 
bill was carried by acclamation. He had triumphed 
over the hesitation of parliament and obtained 
the grants asked for by the Minister of War. Was 
this the sole object he had in view ? Did he not 
also aim at endeavouring to improve his relations 
with Russia, and at the same time warn his allies 
that there were still contingencies which would 
enable him to become reconciled with the 
Northern Empire, if they, on their part, did not 
make the sacrifices necessitated by common 
interest as Germany was doing? With such 
a fertile mind, everything is possible. It is to be 
remarked further that Italy's most serious efforts 
to improve the condition of her military power 
date from this time, as does also the obtrusion of 
the German Great General Staff in the important 
measures adopted at Rome. 

But if the German Chancellor's declarations, 
pacific and arrogant in turn, were heard and un- 
derstood in Italy, and even in Austria, what was 
thought of them, what value was set on them at St. 
Petersburg ? Did they move public opinion, did 
they change the attitude of the Russian Cabinet ? 
Not in the slightest degree. The press, in a 
certain measure under the control of the ad- 
ministrative authority, persisted in the judgment 
it had passed on the conduct of the former and 
ungrateful ally at the Berlin Congress. The Czar's 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 129 

Government did not change its programme in the 
least. Clothing itself in its dignity, it noiselessly 
and unostentatiously increased its efforts to place 
its frontiers in a state of defence and improve its 
military appliances. The publication of the treaty 
of alliance, the trouble Prince Bismarck gave him- 
self to bring out its pacific character, did not 
modify the state of affairs, nor alter the position 
taken up by each of the interested Powers in the 
least. 



VII. 



We have mentioned under what circumstances 
and by the force of what necessities the Vienna 
Cabinet came to sign the treaty of alliance. 
Repulsed, as one knows, by Russia, who could not 
forget her ingratitude, vanquished by Prussia, 
shorn of the high position she had so long 
occupied in Germany, Austria was dispossessed 
of her sphere of action in the West. She was 
therefore necessarily obliged to direct her policy 
and her efforts to the East of her dominions 
in order to strengthen and extend her influence 
over the Slavs of her Empire and the adjacent 
•countries. Prince Bismarck furnished her the 
means of doing so by inviting her to occupy two 
provinces of the Turkish Empire. She could not 
decline a proposal which, in a certain measure, 

K 



130 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

was calculated to repair her recent disasters. 
The difficulties of her position, therefore, explain 
and justify, if one will, both her behaviour and 
the agreement she entered into with Germany. 
But Prince Bismarck had no intention of being 
satisfied with her co-operation only ; he wished 
also to ensure that of a Power whose every 
interest made her the foe of Austria and ally of 
France. We have named Italy. 

Events of immense import had seriously troubled 
the harmony of four of the greatest Powers of the 
Continent, and had imposed on them the obligation 
of keeping watch over their security. The war 
had not only mutilated France ; it had left her 
defenceless. The first duty of her Government 
was to reorganise her army, and to place it on a 
firm footing in order to avert fresh perils. Russia,, 
though issuing victorious from the war against 
Turkey, abandoned by her friends of Berlin, was 
herself obliged to provide for her own defence. 
We have exposed the difficulties of Austria, placed 
between the animosity of the St. Petersburg 
Cabinet and the exactions of the Government of 
the German Empire. Germany, on her side, 
meant to preserve the preponderating position 
she had conquered after two great wars from all 
attack, and to fortify its stability at any cost. 
These Powers had all equally, though in diverse 
degrees, an important interest in protecting them- 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 131 

selves against any contingencies for which the 
new balance of power in Europe did not offer 
them sufficient guarantees. Was Italy troubled 
by similar necessities ? Was her unity threatened ? 
Had she even any adversaries who might be 
nursing the design of imperilling her independence, 
of refusing her the legitimate share of influence 
she had henceforth the right to claim in the 
councils of the Powers? One can understand 
Prince Bismarck's policy ; it is simple and clear ; 
one can see its idea and aim. One can also 
conceive and easily interpret the policy of the 
Vienna Cabinet. But one cannot conceive, and 
one seeks in vain to discover the motives or con- 
siderations that sufficed to determine Italy to 
abandon her liberty of action. Yet she has 
allied herself to Germany and Austria, who are 
themselves united against France and Russia. 
Let us examine under what circumstances she 
came to take so serious a step. 

We have seen in the course of the foregoing 
remarks that gratitude weighs heavily on the 
consciences of nations as well as of Governments.^ 
The recollection of the services rendered by France 
worried the Italians. The prestige of the victories 
gained over the Austrians by the united armies 

1 One remembers Prince Schwarzenberg's prophetic words. 
Rebellious Hungary had been subdued, thanks to Russia's armed 
assistance : " Austria," said he, " will astound the world by her 
ingratitude." 

K 2 



132 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

was ours. There was, on this account, through- 
out the peninsula, a feeling of humiliation which 
wounded the national pride. This state of mind 
was intensified by other causes. It was not suffi- 
cient for the Italians to have formed a united 
kingdom ; they had a final ambition, that of 
making Rome their capital. France, until the fall 
of the Empire, placed an obstacle in their way, 
and so yesterday's ally became the adversary of 
the morrow. The French press dwelt only the 
more strongly and in less measured terms on the 
debt incurred by Italy, and, without consideration 
for the vanity of a young and susceptible nation, 
spared it neither remonstrances nor warnings. 
Then came the war of 1866, and the Italians, 
wounded in their pride by the defeat of Custozza, 
had, besides, to resign themselves, after barren 
negotiations, to receive Venetia from the hands of 
France, to whom Austria had ceded it before the 
outbreak of hostilities. Under the influence of 
these various incidents, Italy came to forget her 
most precious interests and her true friends. 
Taking advantage of our reverses, she seized upon 
Rome, and, convinced that she owed this to the 
victories of the German armies, she was the 
originator, in 1870, of the league of neutrals, which 
isolated France in Europe throughout the whole 
war. She had thus rid herself of the burden of 
her gratitude and misplaced her sympathies. One 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 135 

then beheld political men, who had hitherto known 
only the road to Paris, journeying to Berlin. 

It was not long before other plans were formed. 
It was considered that Italy, having reached the 
rank of Great Power, ought to support all the 
burden of her position and partake of all its ambi- 
tions. To acquit herself of her new duties, she 
was bound to place her military power on a firmer 
footing, to possess a strong naval armament which 
would give her the standing and enable her to 
exercise the power which were her right in the 
Mediterranean. She was to extend her efforts 
abroad, to protect her commerce and navigation, 
to secure for them fresh openings, and to found 
colonies. Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Florence had, in 
turn, possessed the monopoly of trading with the 
ports of the Levant ; they had established houses 
there and ruled as sovereigns. This glorious past, 
justly recalled, opened unexpected horizons to the 
minds of the people. They wished to do great 
things like all nations awaking from a long sleep, 
the result of years of servitude. 

Such were the desires expressed by public 
opinion and the feelings of the Italian Govern- 
ment when the Congress assembled at Berlin. 
Prince Bismarck, on opening the proceedings, 
was not only imbued with the fixed intention of 
altering the treaty of San Stefano, and endowing 
Austria, his necessary ally, with two provinces ; 



134 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

he also wished to win over Italy and separate her 
for ever from France by offering her Tunis. Herr 
von Billow, the Foreign Minister at that period, 
was instructed to sound Count Corti, the principal 
Italian plenipotentiary. This step did not meet 
with the success anticipated. The representative 
from Rome, after taking the instructions of his 
Government, declined to consider the suggestion. 
" You must be very anxious to embroil us with 
France," he said to the Chancellor's mouthpiece on 
closing the interview. Cairoli, that sagacious and 
indomitable patriot, was then President of the 
Council. It was repugnant to all his past life to 
serve the views of Germany, against whom he 
had always so nobly contended. He saw the 
snare and avoided it.^ This repulse was not 
sufficient to rebuff such a strong will as Prince 
Bismarck's. And in fact he was not disheartened. 
Receiving the cold shoulder from Italy, he turned 
to France. What did he tell our plenipotentiaries ? 
We cannot say, but it is known that our resolution 
to occupy the regency met with the Chancellor's 

^ During the course of the preliminary negotiations which pre- 
ceded the meeting of the Congress at Berhn, Baron Haymerle, 
representing the Vienna Cabinet at Rome, was instructed to propose 
to Cairoli that they should concert together with the view to enable 
Italy and Austria to mutually secure certain advantages, and he 
made an allusion to Tunis. " Italy," he was told in reply, " will 
enter the Congress with free hands, intending to retire from it with 
them clean." This diplomatic incident clearly proves that an 
understanding already existed between Vienna and Berlin, and 
that they sought the adhesion of Italy to the detriment of France. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 135 

adhesion and encouragement. The treaty signed at 
the Bardo raised the Hveliest irritation throughout 
Italy. Had we seized on a portion of Italian 
territory we could not have been the object of 
harsher recriminations. No account was taken of 
a single one of the considerations which made it 
our duty to prevent all contiguity with a Euro- 
pean Power on our Algerian frontiers, which would 
have been a source of perpetual conflicts. Insti- 
gated by the Italian colony in Tunis, which was 
deceived in its hopes and injured in its interests, 
this agitation was kept up and envenomed by the 
adversaries of the Cabinet. Cairoli had to retire 
from office, and Depretis was entrusted with the 
duty of forming a new Ministry. The circum- 
stances which had brought about the fall of the 
former Cabinet, and the accession of the new one, 
were created by Prince Bismarck, and procured 
him the opportunity and means of accomplish- 
ing the object he had been aiming at. Italy 
acceded to the treaty of Vienna in 1882. The 
triple alliance was accomplished. What the Chan- 
cellor had been unable to obtain by exciting 
Italian covetousness, he secured by rousing its 
jealousy. This was not accomplished, however, 
without raising a few but energetic protests. Some 
officers broke their swords ; voices were raised in 
the midst of Parliament to denounce to the country 
an agreement so contrary to its interests, Signor 



136 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Crispi's voice was especially heard, the pleasures 
of office not having then been tasted by him. 

If Italy's accession to the treaty of alliance did 
not constitute an act of hostility it was never- 
theless an act inspired by mistrust and manifestly 
directed against France. Depretis did not dis- 
guise this, but, desirous of palliating its full scope, 
he adopted and maintained a reserved and concili- 
atory attitude. He even showed some eagerness 
to loudly repudiate all thought of ill-will and 
especially of aggression. During his long ministry 
he was able to give the relations between the two 
countries a character of constant courtesy. Mean- 
while his adversaries were moving. Signor Crispi 
was at their head, and attracted notice by his 
violent accusations. At Parma, in 1884, he 
declared that " Italy would have no repose until 
she had avenged the murder of Oberdank." In 
Parliament he remained the implacable enemy of 
the new policy, the first initiators of which had 
been moreover the men of the Right, against whom 
he had always contended. In the course of a 
memorable sitting he launched this most offensive 
insult against the head of the Government : " You 
have made yourself Germany's gendarme ! " he 
said. In concert with his friends, desirous 
like himself of attaining to power, he prepared a 
pamphlet, a kind of appeal to the country or 
indictment against the Ministry. Depretis was 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 135^ 

moved, and he averted the danger by offering 
Signor Crispi the portfoHo for Home Affairs. This 
is how the last President of the Council has himself 
related this incident: "When in March, 1887," 
said he to the Chamber, " Depretis invited me to 
join his Ministry, I demanded to read the treaty of 
1882 which had just been renewed, so as to set 
my conscience at rest. Having come to the 
conclusion that it was defensive and not offensive, 
I was fully satisfied and I accepted." His con- 
version, as one sees, was in a measure instantane- 
ous. This stubborn Irredentist, this uncompro- 
mising patriot considered the treaty of alliance one 
day an accursed piece of work ; on the morrow 
he was fully satisfied with it. Power has seduc- 
tions against which the strongest minds are not 
always proof. Signor Crispi, once a member of the 
Cabinet, secured the very first day that authority 
which an audacious and enterprising spirit is en- 
titled to. The health of Depretis was grievously 
shattered ; he soon succumbed. Signor Crispi 
rallied to his policy, besides being an influential 
orator having the ear of the Chamber, was already 
marked out for forming a new Ministry. The 
King entrusted him with the task. 

Brought up in the Mazzini and Garibaldi school, 
the new President of the Council had long been 
one of its most constant adherents. Ever an 
ardent and faithful disciple, he had rejoined the 



138 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

one in London and followed the other to Sicily. 
Like them, he had always had a taste for temerity, 
and he does not seem to have lost it. On every 
occasion he has boldly tackled the difficulties he 
has encountered in his path. Placed suddenly at 
the head of the Government of his country, after 
a long life passed in opposition, with sentiments 
and antecedents which had not prepared him for 
his new mission, he found himself confronted by a 
situation beset by, to him, contradictory exigencies. 
Yet he had to come to a decision, to fix a policy. 
This obstinate republican, this irreconcilable enemy 
of the former rulers of Italy, breaking with his 
past, without a care for the opinion of his 
brothers in arms, hoists the flag of the Triple 
Alliance, relying on the dominant feeling in Italy, 
every day more hostile to France and more 
sympathetic to Germany. Power was only to be 
held at this price, and he wished to keep it. 
With equal boldness he adapted his conduct and 
acts to his resolve. Anxious to make himself 
agreeable at Berlin, he assumed a haughty de- 
meanour towards France. The chief aim of 
Depretis, in terminating the treaty of commerce, 
was to alter its terms. In accordance with the 
assurances he had given, he appointed negotiators 
for that purpose. They arrived at Paris, and the 
conferences had commenced when Signor Crispi, 
having succeeded to the Presidency of the Council 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 139 

in August, took in September the road to Fried- 
richsruh, which not one of his predecessors had 
ever passed along or known, and from the very- 
home of the German Chancellor he instructed the 
Italian commissioners to stop the negotiations and 
return to Rome. He thus paid for the favour he 
was soliciting before even having received it. What 
was it he required? He wished to enter person- 
ally into the great man's confidence, to raise 
himself to the height of Count Kalnoky, who had 
preceded him a few days before, and to share 
with him the privilege of those secret and at the 
same time invariably noised abroad conversations ; 
to ape, as some one has said, a Chancellor ; to 
take a front rank among statesmen and thereby 
firmly establish his position in Italy. He received 
a welcome which responded to his hopes. The 
semi-official press of Berlin enthusiastically greeted 
the great patriot, the true successor of Cavour. 
He returned to Rome in triumph, his organs in 
the press re-echoing the praises of the Berlin 
newspapers, and stating that, thanks to him, 
Italy had conquered for all time the position 
Russia had deserted in the Councils of the 
Empires. National pride was immensely flattered ; 
and Signor Crispi was able, with head erect, to 
ascend to the Capitol. 

He had certainly not left Friedrichsruh with- 
out entering into some engagements. He had to 



I40 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

give pledges as a guarantee of good faith. He 
gave them. At the earnest request of the French 
Government, the treaty of commerce which ex- 
pired December 31st, 1887, was prolonged for two 
months.^ France, in its desire to avert a solution 
that would be equally regrettable for the two 
interested countries, sought to turn this last and 
final delay to account ; it therefore despatched 
M. Teisserenc de Bort to Rome, entrusting him 
with the mission of renewing negotiations. Our 
commissioner endeavoured in vain to accomplish 
his task. His efforts encountered an irrevocable 
decision, and he was, in a measure, politely dis- 
missed. Signor Crispi has pretended that the atti- 
tude of the Italian Government in this affair was 
forced upon it, by the conviction that France was 
dissembling her intention of not renewing the 
treaty. Upon what information was this convic- 
tion founded ? It has never been known, and the 
incident we have just related proves the contrary. 
We can mention another none the less convinc- 
ing. On December 15th, 1886, the very day on 
which the treaty was terminated by Italy, the 
French Senate, in agreement with the Govern- 
ment, rejected a motion introduced by one of its 
members which souo-ht the same result. Sio;"nor 

^ France had asked for an extension of six months with an 
evidently conciliatory intention. Signor Crispi refused. (See, in 
the Green Book for commercial affairs, the despatches addressed 
to General Menabrea, Nos. 52 and 54.) 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 141 

Crispi has also alleged that the general tariff, 
soon followed by a differential one, and both 
promulgated at Rome, were the one and the 
other of a purely defensive character. Yet what 
was their consequence ? They notably closed 
the Italian markets to our goods. Which of the 
two Governments was the first to adopt such 
deplorably rigorous measures ? " The differential 
tariff," said Signor Crispi in the Chamber, "was 
established by us, only in answer to a similar 
tariff previously put into force by France against 
Italian produce." The President of the Italian 
Council forgets the general tariff, the dispositions 
of which were only made more unbearable by the 
differential one. At what date was the first of 
these two tariffs inserted in the Gazzetta Ufficiale, 
at Rome? In July, 1887, six months before the 
expiration of the treaty. At what date did our 
Chambers, on their side, vote a general tariff? 
Was it before this, as Signor Crispi would have it 
believed by means of a play upon words ? It 
was on December 15th of the same year, nearly 
six months after the publication of the Italian 
general tariff and only fifteen days before the 
stipulated expiration of the commercial treaty. 
The initiative of prohibitive measures was there- 
fore adopted at Rome long in advance. The 
responsibility of the strange position in which 
two nations, equally interested in continuing their 



142 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

peaceful transactions, find themselves, devolves 
exclusively on the Italian Government. 

Has Signor Crispi manifested a more conciliatory- 
disposition on other occasions ? Has he shown 
a desire to maintain political relations with France 
on the footing of a real and sincere friendship ? 
The semi-official press of Rome and Turin has 
credited the Government of the Republic with 
the most underhand schemes. It has stated, and 
still repeats, that we are meditating a descent 
now on Tripoli, now on Spezzia itself ; it has 
pretended that we were making preparations in 
Tunis to seize upon Sicily. It never ceases to 
attribute to us what it considers a still blacker 
design : we are menacing, it asserts, Italian unity 
and independence by encouraging the illusions of 
the Holy See, whose temporal power France 
seeks to restore.^ One does not refute such 
inanities. But we may be permitted to state that 
they are unceasingly repeated in Italy, and that 
public feeling is becoming more and more affected 
by them. Has Signor Crispi taken the trouble to 
deny these rumours, to point out their absurdity ? 
Is it not a statesman's duty to set public opinion 
right when it has been misled, and to acknow- 

1 In connection with the recent utterances of Cardinal Lavigerie 
a ministerial journal, the Capitan Fracassa, published an article 
pretending to show that the understanding between the French 
Republic and the Papacy was an accomplished fact, and that the 
time for dealing with it by the Italian Government had arrived. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 143 

ledge the loyal intentions of a neighbouring- 
country which has been so often and so obsti- 
nately accused by semi-official organs of pre- 
meditating acts of violence ? What would he 
think, if every morning and every night our 
most respectable journals were to state that a 
descent upon Nice or the coasts of Corsica was 
in course of preparation at Spezzia ; that Italy was 
intriguing with different parties in France for the 
overthrow of the Republic, without the French 
Government taking the slightest step to put an 
end to such false allegations? Would he suffer 
Italy's political probity to be thus daily suspected 
and called into question ? Has he the considera- 
tion for the probity of France which sound inter- 
national traditions would inspire ? He has not 
only, by his inaction, encouraged his most zealous 
supporters in Italy to rouse national susceptibilities 
in both countries, he has also himself contributed 
to this end, by his acrimonious language and his 
overbearing attitude on every occasion when, in 
the ordinary course of events, some misunder- 
standing has arisen between Paris and Rome. 
We all remember the incident of Massowah to 
give only one example. France ventured to 
make some observations in the interest of some 
Greek merchants residing in the island under the 
protection of our Consul, and whose trade had 
been saddled with duties they had never paid. 



144 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

It was a matter of no importance, and could give 
rise to no serious disagreement. It was easy 
to settle it rapidly and quietly ; all that was 
necessary was to exchange a few friendly ex- 
planations. Signor Crispi chose to see in the atti- 
tude of the Government of the Republic an attack 
on the sovereignty of Italy. He addressed 
communications to all the Cabinets of Europe 
couched in language that surprised the Ministries, 
accustomed to less acrimony and greater circum- 
spection, far more than the subject that had given 
rise to it. According to him, " France would like 
to make believe that the peaceful progress of the 
Italian nation showed a diminution of her power 
and authority." A phrase which has no sense, 
or else means that France, jealous of Italy's 
influence and conquests, was wickedly endeavour- 
ing to place obstacles in her way. Our inter- 
vention in favour of the subjects of the King of 
Greece, which was justified from the point of 
view of international right, was not sufficiently 
important to provoke such a noisy manifestation. 
But Signor Crispi wished to please Berlin and 
flatter the national pride of the Italians. He was, 
moreover, encouraged by Prince Bismarck, who 
sought every day to envenom the relations be- 
tween France and Italy more and more.^ The 

^ In a report of the Italian Ambassador to Germany, published 
in the Green Book, it is stated that : " In accordance with Prince 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 145 

Paris Cabinet wisely refrained from retaliating-, 
leaving the Italian Minister the full benefit of his 
diplomatic amenities, and so the affair ended. 

What was Signor Crispi's idea when he entered 
on this course, what was his object? As a deep 
and practical thinker, did he foresee that by falling- 
asleep in an expensive peace, Italy was risking a 
terrible awakening ? that a day would come when 
her strength would no longer be equal to her 
sacrifices ? Persuaded of this did he wish, as has 
been pretended, to hasten events, and, by means 
of some far-fetched complication, to stir up a war 
which would have brought matters to a head and 
just when he wished ? There is nothing to justify 
such a conjecture. The statesman who would set 
one half of Europe against the other, both formid- 
ably armed, without being imperiously constrained 
to do so for the salvation of his own country, would 
be a criminal whom the nations would have a right 
to hold up to the execration of present and future 
generations. Such is certainly, we have no doubt, 
Signor Crispi's own feeling. If it be so, why does 
he not imitate his predecessor ? Depretis advised 
his Sovereign to join the alliance of the Emperors of 

Bismarck's orders, Count Miinster has received instructions, in 
the event of M. Goblet speaking to him of the incident of 
Massowah, to let him understand that it v^^ould be prudent, on his 
part, not to embitter matters, for if Italy found herself beset by 
serious complications, she would not be left in an isolated 
position." 

L 



146 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Austria and Germany, but he never ceased to act 
most correctly in his intercourse with the French 
Government. He terminated the treaty of com- 
merce, but with the sole idea of forcing France to re- 
vise it. Signor Crispi has pursued the same policy, 
but with this difference. With Depretis there was 
a show of being conciliatory without being friendly ; 
his successor has been combative when not aggres- 
sive. Let us hasten, however, to make this 
admission : Signor Crispi has latterly seemed to 
wish to attenuate the rigour of his ways. In his 
conversations, as in his more recent speeches, one 
meets with none of those allusions he ventured to 
make on other occasions. He loves France, he 
said at Naples ; " France, that sympathetic smile of 
modern civilisation," he added at Florence. To 
what causes can we attribute this return to less 
hostile, if not more cordial language ? ^ Is it to the 
financial and economic embarrassments which are 
disturbing the country and tormenting the Govern- 
ment, or has Signor Crispi become convinced 
that the Sovereigns allied to Italy, sincerely desire 
to preserve the blessings of peace to their subjects, 
and that it would be useless and even dangerous 
to tempt fortune at this time? Has not Prince 
Bismarck's retirement also had a salutary effect on 

1 It is, however, to be observed that the organs of the Itahan 
press which support him, have in nowise, up to the present, lessened 
either the warmth or the mahgnity of their polemics. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 147 

the Italian Premier's state of mind? All these 
circumstances have, perhaps, contributed to an 
appeasement which will be lasting, if loyally de- 
sired at Rome, notwithstanding the engagements 
into which Italy has entered. 



VIII. 

What are these engagements, what advantage 
are they likely to yield, what are their obligations 
and their perils ? By what arguments, in short, 
has Italy's participation in the Triple Alliance been 
justified ? We know only one treaty or rather 
one text, as we have said ; the one Germany 
signed with Austria in 1879. Did Italy simply 
accede to it, or have fresh and special stipulations 
been added thereto ? This is the secret of the 
contracting parties, and we do not profess to pene- 
trate it.^ Let us then keep to the hypothesis that 
the Government has entered into no other obliea- 
tions than those which were fixed by the two 
Empires in the first instance. 

We have related the circumstances under which 

^ On comparing the terms of the treaty of 1879, with the declara- 
tion Count Miinster had been instructed to make, under certain 
circumstances, to M. Goblet with reference to the Massowah 
incident, one might perhaps form the conclusion that Italy had 
obtained pledges which Germany had not stipulated for with 
Austria, at least in so far as France is concerned. See note on pp. 
144, 145. 

L 2 



148 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Germany and Austria became allied. Germany^ 
we must here repeat, after mutilating France, had 
deprived Russia of most of the advantages her 
victories should have secured to her. Austria, on 
her side, had reaped the benefits of a war she 
had not waged, and, without its costing her either 
a man or a florin, she had been placed in posses- 
sion of the influence which the Court of St. 
Petersburg exercised in the Balkans. The 
Empires of Central Europe, the two accomplices,, 
we might say, had a common interest in maintain- 
ing this state of affairs, and one can understand 
their uniting together in order to shield the new 
balance of power they had formed to the detri- 
ment of France in the West and Russia in the 
East, from all attack. Was Italy, on her part,, 
obliged to look to her position ? Had she new 
acquisitions to protect, perils to foresee and avert i*' 
In the explanations the Italian Government has 
given on this subject, it has always adopted sober 
and laconic language which does not permit one 
to clearly elucidate either the cause or the aim of 
its determination. Signor Crispi, when questioned,, 
has said as follows: "The policy we intend to 
follow is one of peace and not war ; it can only 
be opposed by those who are of opinion that 
Italy would be better off" if she were isolated. .... 
The treaty of alliance is not the cause of our 
armaments Their sole object is the defence 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 149 

of our rights ^x\A frontiersr (Sitting of May 15th, 

1890.) 

Italy, therefore, according to her Prime Minister, 
had allied herself to Austria and Germany, not in 
the interest of her greatness, but to safeguard the 
integrity of her dominions ; and, to leave no doubt 
as to the dreaded enemy, he incidentally alluded 
to the treaty of Campo-Formio which delivered 
over the Venetian Republic to the vanquished of 
Rivoli and Montenotte. How could France, just 
recovering from her terrible disasters, incapable of 
any thought but that of devoting all her efforts 
and all her resources to repairing her discomfiture, 
have had the idea of picking a quarrel with Italy, 
whilst the victorious and powerful enemy of yester- 
day was on the watch ? And why too should she 
have conceived such a chimerical and at the same 
time guilty design ? Was it in order to make up 
for her losses on the Rhine ? But in 1882, when 
Italy gave her signature to the treaty, our army 
was only being formed, its ranks were as in- 
complete as its appliances. Could we, moreover, 
have crossed the Alps without Germany's consent, 
and would she have griven it us ? Would we have 
■combined with the Holy See for the dismember- 
ment of the Kingdom we had helped to establish, 
and would we have wished, do we wish now 
as is so frequently stated, to restore the Pope's 
temporal power? Is it not in Germany that there 



ISO STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

exists a powerfully organised Catholic party, with 
which the authorities have to reckon, which 
demands the return of the Jesuits and openly 
declares its intention of assisting to replace the 
Holy Father in possession of Rome and Its 
territory. To attribute such intentions to the 
French Republic, to a Government of secularisa- 
tion, is to strangely impose on the credulity of 
the public. In alluding to the treaty of Campo 
Formio, Signor Crispi ventured on a sort of inter- 
national anachronism which deceived nobody ; 
he confounded two epochs which had no analogy 
between them, suppressed a whole century in the 
history of France and Italy, during which the 
First Empire laid the foundations of Italian unity 
by setting up a national Kingdom In the north of 
the peninsula, and the second won the battle of 
Solferino, which permitted that unity to be defini- 
tively constituted. One Is justly surprised to hear 
the head of a representative Government use 
such language, and one Is tempted to say with 
Mr. Gladstone, that master of parliamentary 
government, "It would be grotesque if it were 
not fatal." ^ 

Indeed, with Signor Crispl's doctrine as to 
alliances, no State could feel secure if It confined 
itself to maintaining amicable relations equally with 
all Its neighbours. The defence of his frontiers 

^ Conteinpo7'ary Review. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 151 

necessitates that he should ensure the assistance 
of some Powers to protect him against the greedi- 
ness of others. This is a principle of public 
rigfht founded on mistrust which masters of science 
had not taught down to our time. If it were 
universally observed, it would divide Europe into 
two or more groups, armed against one another 
and ever ready to come to blows. Would the 
conception be a happy one, or the result praise- 
worthy ? Alliances have been formed in all 
times ; they were offensive when the contracting 
Powers had an immediate combination in view, 
advantages that were foreseen and definite. 
Prussia united with Austria in order to invade 
Denmark and despoil her. Alliances have been 
defensive under the presentiment of a danger it was 
urgent to avert or encounter. That is the case, 
in a certain measure, with the Austro-German 
union. But, again, who was menacing Italy ? to 
what perils were her unity and independence 
exposed ? She was living in perfect harmony 
with all her neighbours, no necessity forced her 
to alienate her liberty of action, to take a place 
at once in coming struggles if such are to break 
out. What other Power has thought of under- 
taking obligations, of binding itself for contingencies 
which are fortunately not imminent ? The present 
was in no way exposed, why did she engage 
herself for the future ? Can she tell what it has 



J52 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

in Store for her, and would she not have been 
better advised in awaitinof events so as to act 
according to circumstances and to the best of her 
interests ? Without cause, without urgency, why 
has Italy engaged herself, even contingently, to 
draw the sword against France, to guarantee 
Germany the peaceful possession of Alsace and 
Lorraine, and Austria the integrity of her dominions 
including Trieste and Trent ? Ah ! if Silvio 
Pellico, if Confalonieri and all the martyrs who 
have left their bones in the Spielberg dungeons, 
if Cavour and all the illustrious pioneers of Italy's 
deliverance, could leave their graves, how indig- 
nantly they would condemn a policy 'which has 
resoldered the chains of their days of mourning ! 

But if the two arguments, the only ones brought 
forward so far, do not support the discussion, if 
Italy has nothing to fear from France, if isolation 
with its pretended dangers is a sophism more 
captious than diplomatic, what were and what are 
still the advantages the Italian Government has 
in view ? Did it ally itself to the powerful for 
the purpose of participating in the spoils ? Signor 
Crispi protests against such an injurious imputation. 
Yet the treaty stipulates for duties and liabilities. 
What will be the compensations for them, and are 
they sure to be forthcoming ? 

Count Bismarck in 1866, by means of expedients 
analogous to those he employed to catch Italy in 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 153 

liis diplomatic net, Count Bismarck signed treaties 
of defensive alliance with the South German States, 
consequently implying, above all, that their 
sovereign independence should not be assailed. 
Four years afterwards, at Versailles, the Princes 
of these States, who had faithfully placed their 
armies at the disposal of the King of Prussia, 
although they had not engaged to do so, had to 
take rank among the vassals of this same sovereign, 
hailed Emperor of Germany. By recalling this 
historical and undeniable fact, we do not mean to 
say that such will be the fate of the King of Italy. 
It is absolutely far from our mind to suggest such 
an offensive thing. We merely wish to show, 
by a striking example, what becomes of the most 
solemn engfasfements between two Powers of 
unequal strength, and how imprudent it is for the 
weaker to ally itself to the stronger. If the 
Italians chose to recall their ofood and bad treat- 
ment, they might themselves teach us this lesson. 
One of them, a lucid and far-seeing patriot he, 
showed them, last year, in a publication they 
should make their national breviary,^ how care- 
fully they should mistrust Prussia. They would 
see therein that King William, among all the 
Sovereigns of Europe, was the last to recognise 
the new Kingdom, that he did so at France's 

1 The Italia, attributed to M. Visconti-Venosta, who has not 
however, so far as we know, admitted the authorship. 



154 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

solicitation and in order not to separate himself 
from the Emperor of Russia ; they would see 
that the Berlin Cabinet took up the defence of 
the fallen Princes whose subjects had gone over 
to the Piedmontese, in some official communica- 
tions that were arroofant and insultinof for Kino- 
Victor Emmanuel's dignity. They would know 
that, in order to obtain Austria's participation in 
Denmark in 1865, Count Bismarck had promised 
her the assistance of the Prussian army in Venetia 
in the event of France intervening to support an 
aggression on the part of Italy, thus reviving, on 
his own account, the clause of the Treaty of Campo 
Formio which Signor Crispi so lightly recalled. 
But what more particularly deserves their con- 
sideration is the Prusso- Italian treaty, a treaty 
of defensive and offensive alliance entered into 
at Berlin in 1866.^ This document had only been 
signed a few days when Count Bismarck, suddenly 
assuming that he had reason for mistrusting the 
Cabinet at Florence, declared to the neofotiators 
that, in King William's opinion, it only bound 
King Victor Emmanuel. Should Austria, said 
he to them, confine herself to attacking Italy, 
Prussia will not owe you any assistance ; if she 
directs her aggression against our frontiers, Italy 
will owe us the immediate assistance of the whole 

1 It is described besides on the authority of ofificial documents, 
in General La Marmora's work : Un pd pin di luce. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 155 

of her military stength. This interpretation of 
the treaty was not only leonine, it was an insult 
offered to the eood faith of the Italian Govern- 
ment, in the face of a text which admitted of no 
ambiguity. However, the war broke out, and 
after Sadowa, negotiations were opened for an 
armistice. The treaty of alliance stipulated that 
neither armistice nor peace should be concluded 
except by the consent of both parties. Count 
Bismarck received the Austrian plenipotentiaries 
at Nikolsburg, and negotiated and signed with 
them an armistice and preliminaries of peace, 
which omitted nothing of what was ultimately 
contained in the definitive Treaty of Prague, 
without the participation and in defiance of the 
protests of Count Barral, the Italian representative 
at the Prussian headquarters. What a bitter 
mockery ! The first clause of the preliminaries 
was thus worded : "The Kino- of Prussia tmder- 

o 

takes to induce his ally, the King of Italy, to give 
his approval to the preliminaries of peace and the 
armistice as soon as the Venetian Kingdom has 
been placed at the King of Italy's disposal by a 
declaration of the Emperor of the French." The 
work from which we take these facts, which are, 
moreover, notoriously distressful for the Italian 
Government, adds : " Of Kino- William we will 
say but a word : Italy's loyal assistance^ had en- 

^ Austria, previous to the outbreak of hostilities, had offered Italy, 



156 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

abled him to become the most powerful Sovereign 
in Europe, and he was so discourteously ungrateful 
as to not even mention his ally's name in the 
speech he read to the Prussian Parliament on 
the 5th of August following." The King dis- 
played no more deference for Italy's Sovereign 
than Count Bismarck had shown to her Ambas- 
sador. Has France ever treated her ally of 1859 
in this manner ? She looked after her personal 
interests in North Africa, she protected those of 
her commerce and industry ; she has never broken 
faith. She united with Italy to assist her in 
throwing off the foreign yoke. Has she ever 
thouorht of formino- an alliance ao-ainst her with 
some other Power ? 

Will the treaty of the Triple Alliance be more 
loyally observed? We leave it to the Italians 
to answer this question. If they take note of the 
teachings of history, if the past is any criterion 
of the future, they will recognise with us that, in 
this respect, they will do better to pray than 
hope. In any case, if war breaks out and favours 
the allies, the Italians would be foolish to doubt 
that Germany would take the lion's share. The 

through the intermediary of France, to give up Venetia to her, if 
she consented to withdraw from the alliance. In spite of the most 
urgent representations of the Cabinet at Paris, the Florence 
Cabinet declined the proposal, considering that loyalty demanded 
it should keep to its engagements. Count Bismarck and his 
Sovereign were aware of this, Did they remember it at Nikols- 
burof ? 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 157 

Adriatic would certainly become a German lake. 
Great Britain, who is never caught napping, she 
proved it again at the Berlin Congress, would 
turn the Mediterranean into an English lake. 
Whatever advantao^es mioht be attributed to 
Italy, they would not compensate for those her 
partners would be sure to reserve to themselves,, 
the profits having to be in proportion, so it 
would be said, to the forces employed by each 
of them. Signor Crispi has spoken of Campo 
Formio ; why does he not think of the treaties 
of Vienna ? They are of more recent date ; in 
them Italy was looked upon as a geographical 
expression and pulled to pieces, the better to 
dispose of her easily. The next meeting will 
be at Berlin, and there the domineering spirit 
will preside over the deliberations of this new 
Congress, more energetically still than in 181 5. 
Italy may perhaps emerge from it increased in 
size, but relatively diminished, without a counter- 
poise to defend herself against the colossus she 
will have helped to raise in the centre of Europe, 
without France, rendered powerless, who never- 
theless smiled on her both in good and evil 
fortune. If the fate of arms were against the 
allies, would vanquished Germany have more 
consideration for Italy than victorious Prussia 
showed her at Nikolsburo- ? Would she not 
willingly and promptly sacrifice her to obtain 



158 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

peace on less onerous conditions? Has it not 
ever been so when the vanquished , have been of 
unequal strength ? 



IX. 



But without considering^ such g^rave contin- 

gencies any further, let us see with what weight 

the Triple Alliance already presses upon Italy, 

what it costs her in times of peace. She had 

to make the heaviest sacrifices during the period 

of her emancipation, in order to meet what we 

will call her preliminary expenses. She issued 

loans to the extent of ten milliards of lire which 

were negfotiated at Paris. Her Budget of the 

first ten years showed an annual mean deficit of 

334 millions. In 1871 it had dropped down to 

47 millions. It disappeared entirely in 1875, to 

give place to a permanent surplus which amounted 

to 51 millions in 1882, the anno d'oro as this same 

year was called, in spite too, let it be remarked, 

of a decrease in taxation of about 100 millions. 

'vThis state of constant prosperity allowed of the 

abolition of forced currency. 

In this same year of 1882, the Treaty of 
Alliance made its appearance with its train of 
extraordinary expenses, the commixtion of the 
German Great General Staff, the obligation of 
increasing the strength of the army and navy, 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 159 

of forming Alpine battalions, and of constructing 
strategical railways. The deficit immediately re- 
appeared in the Italian Budget ; and clung to 
it to remain there henceforth as master. Such 
was the first consequence of the Triple Alliance. 
It soon produced another : the termination of 
the treaty of commerce with France when, in 
spite of the tariff, the receipts of the customs 
suffered considerable reduction, and have con- 
tinued falling off notwithstanding all the efforts 
of the Government to stay their downward 
tendency.^ Thus the policy inaugurated by 
Depretis and continued in a more pronounced 
manner by Signor Crispi, has had, from the outset, 
the double result of increasing the expenditure 
and reducing the resources of the treasury. 
This can clearly be seen from all the statistical 
papers published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale, and 
has been moreover shown to the world by the 
statement of the Finance Minister in the Chamber 
on January 27th, 1890. Signor Perazzi admitted 
a total deficit of 461 millions for the ordinary and 
extraordinary budgets together.^ During the 

^ Exports during 1887 (including precious metals) 1,109 millions. 
5) 5) 1888 „ „ „ 967 „ 

Decrease 142 millions 
We have seen that the treaty expired on March '^'^sf, 1888. This 

decrease, therefore, is only for the last ten months of the financial 

year. 

^ Signor Gianpietro, a deputy, and a highly distinguished 



i6o STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

first ten months of 1890, according to the latest 
documents we have been able to consult, the 
exports, without having ever ceased to diminish, 
have still further decreased to the extent of 
76 millions. But this does not embarrass 
the President of the Council. What do you 
mean, he said, by speaking of the burdens 
that weigh upon the country ? What, after all, 
does Italy spend on the support of a military 
position which makes her "Austria's and Ger- 
many's equal? Scarcely 18 francs per inhabit- 
ant, whilst Germany pays 19 and France 35." 
Signer Crispi has a singular way of understanding- 
and dealing with economic questions. Without 
checking these figures, the exactitude of which 
seems to us, at first sight, controvertible, we 
will take the liberty of pointing out to him that 
the tax-paying capacity of each inhabitant, when 
compared to that of an inhabitant of another 
country, should be valued according to the 
direct rate of the o-eneral wealth of each of the 
two, and a good economist might perhaps prove 
to him that the 35 francs paid by a Frenchman 
are less burdensome to him than the 18 francs 
which weiofh down an Italian. If he chooses 
to consult the lists of the value of labour on 
either side of the Alps, he will obtain a first 

economist, who was the reporter of the bill on contracts, estimates 
the combined deficits of the last three years at a milliard. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE i6i 

insight which will sufficiently enlighten him. 
However this may be, one has seen the result 
of the repeal of the commercial treaty in Italy ; 
in France, on the contrary, the receipts and 
exports have continued to increase notwithstand- 
ing the injury our transactions have suffered 
with the peninsula. France could, if necessary, 
bear further burdens; could Italy do so? One 
must doubt it after the declarations Signor Crispi 
made to embellish his recent speech at Turin 
which can be resumed in a few words : no more 
loans, no increase in taxation. It is right to 
mention that he was speaking on the eve of 
the elections. 

Why, after all, be alarmed ? say the Allies 
to us. We have united to preserve peace, to 
ensure it if necessary, and we earnestly repudi- 
ate all thought of aggression. It would be im- 
possible to be more affirmative than Prince 
Bismarck has shown himself, in this respect, on 
every occasion ; and little accustomed though we 
are to feel that confidence in a Prime Minister's 
word which it should always inspire, we prefer 
to believe that he has expressed his thought 
entirely. We are equally persuaded that his suc- 
cessor, the faithful interpreter of his Sovereign's 
intentions, is devotmg himself to the same policy. 
Is not Germany's ambition amply satisfied ? 
What interest could lead her into fresh con- 

M 



i62 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

fiicts? In the state in which things are at pres- 
ent, who would dare tempt fortune ? Is not 
war as formidable to the nations to whom it 
brings victory as to those who suffer defeat ? 
It is assuredly not Austria who would care to 
risk such a perilous adventure. As for Italy, 
we have said what we think of her intentions ; 
it is not we who charge her with unavowable 
desires ; it is Signer Crispi's adversaries of the 
Rigfht and Left who attribute to him " bellicose 
designs that were stopped by the great Chan- 
cellor's fall." ^ 

It is therefore peace that is desired — we do 
not gainsay it — but an armed peace with bur- 
dens that irritate and crush the various countries. 
And who is held responsible for it ? France. 
What has been said ? France is arming, she 
is nursing the thought of revenge ; she obliges 
us to multiply our efforts in order to maintain 

1 At the Radical congress presided over by Count Pauciani. On 
the other hand one reads in the Italia^ the work of a Conservative : 
"The sombre genius who directs German policy wanted Italy to do 
more than ruin herself in her public finances ; he required that she 
should also feel ruined in her private fortune, and that, per fas et 
nefas, she might attribute this ruin to a neighbouring Power with 
whom, in Germany's military interest, he wished to see her for ever 
mortally embroiled. 

" And in order to work out this abominable design, he has found 
an Italian statesman who is devoted to his secret schemes, a 
minister whose personal vanity he has roused to the point 
of rendering him completely blind, by making him bring about 
the rupture of commercial relations which were the means of 
livelihood to several million Italian families." 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 163 

our superiority and be prepared to repel any 
aggression. What a derisive way of rendering 
homao-e to truth. France at the end of the 

o 

last war had only the wreck of her armies left 
to her ; she was without weapons and supplies ; 
the victor had carried away all, besides the 
milliards. She went courageously to work to 
reconstruct everything, as the care of her 
defence, her dignity, her legitimate ambition to 
regain her place among the Great Powers, re- 
quired. She entered on this immense task 
without boasting, in the silence of her grief, and 
submitting without complaint to the heavy sacri- 
fices that had to be made. She had committed 
no other crime : who dare blame her for what 
she has done ? Did she owe it to her enemies 
of yesterday to remain at their mercy, and leave 
her future to their generosity, which had already 
been put to the test? Disappointed as they 
were in Germany at seeing France rapidly re- 
pair the ruins caused by the war, they did not 
consider it opportune, during the first years 
following the conclusion of peace, to increase 
the military forces of the new Empire. The 
necessity arose out of the policy inaugurated 
by Prince Bismarck at the Berlin Congress, 
and it is to Germany that we owe the responsi- 
bility for the actual state of affairs in Europe. 
It cannot be laid at France's door. 

M 2 



i64 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

What is this state of affairs, and what is it 
leading- to ? We have no need to relate the 
story of Germany's armaments. The Reichstag" 
has often re-echoed with it. Every one knows^ 
moreover, that fresh Army Corps have been 
formed, and that the troops mustered in Alsace 
and Lorraine have been several times reinforced. 
The object of Prince Bismarck's last parlia- 
mentary campaign, after so many others, was- 
to increase the term of service to seven years, 
and give an additional 40,000 men to the stand- 
ing army. His successor fought his first battle 
to obtain some extraordinary credits from the 
parliament for the Ministry of War. It is an- 
nounced that Count Caprivi will ask for a further 
measure in the coming session. The Austro- 
Hungarian Empire has done its best to extend 
and strengthen its military power. Italy has 
emulated her Allies. We have seen in what 
penury she has plunged her finances ; yet her 
Government does not seem in the least disposed 
to moderate her desire to imitate the other two- 
Powers. Some economy may perhaps be realised 
on public works, on expenditure beneficial to the 
wealth of the country ; but the grants asked for 
by the Ministers of War and Marine will not be 
perceptibly reduced.^ This ruinous fever has 

1 If the new recruiting law is voted, it will add 150,000 men to 
the standing army, 200,000 to the movable militia, and 300,000 to 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 165 

attacked all European States, both great and 
small, like an epidemic calamity. England 
herself has decided to devote 500 millions to the 
development of her maritime power. 

When will this come to an end ? There is 
nothing to assist us in forming an opinion. May 
we hope that a moment will arrive when dis- 
armament by mutual consent will be forced by 
the course of events on all the Powers ? "A 
dream," Prince Bismarck erewhile replied to one 
of his visitors ; ** every one will be mistrustful, no 
one will ever believe in his neighbour's loyalty. 
Stipulate for a control, and the castes belli will 
be perpetually at hand." Europe is therefore 
doomed to large armies ever increasing in num- 
bers, weighing more and more on the taxpayers, 
becoming more and more harmful to industry 
and agriculture, and exhausting all the sources 
of general prosperity. "It is another form of 
war," the ex-Chancellor admitted to his inter- 
viewer, who was a Frenchman, "a war of golden 
guineas. What have you to complain of.^ Your 
wealthy nation is able to support it longer than 
others, and victory will be for the one who can 
hold out the longest." Has not the recluse of 
Friedrichsruh admitted by using such language 

the territorial army, that is to say, 650,000 men, who will have to be 
provided with the necessary arms and equipments, which will entail 
an expense of 150 millions without counting the proportionate 
victualling-. 



i66 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

the imperfections, we will say more, the dangers 
of his work ? Far removed from power, has his 
genius revealed to him that he has launched his 
country, and Europe with her, along a road that 
has no peaceful outlet, or which, in his own mind, 
leads to ruin if not to war? Golden o-uineas 
become exhausted in time, and there is a limit 
to the patient resignation of populations, as of 
Governments. What will happen when the sacri- 
fices are in excess of the resources ? And that 
day will fatally arrive, for the organisation of 
fighting masses, with their armament, is now an 
operation dependent on science, whose duty it 
is to constantly improve them. The rifle, the 
cannon, the vessel, the ammunition, with the ex- 
plosives, invented, manufactured, built, or pre- 
pared yesterday at great cost, become insufficient 
means of destruction to-morrow, and have to be 
replaced by fresh appliances in order that one 
Power may continue as strongly armed as its 
neighbour. It is a struo-orle without end or 
truce, which in each country devours the fruit of 
national labour, to the prejudice of all classes of 
the population. How can one be surprised, then. 
If the less fortunate are roused, if Socialists in 
spite of Draconian laws come in greater num- 
bers to the Reichstag at each election ? Germany 
Is perhaps, of all countries, the one in which 
this state of affairs gives rise to the greatest 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 167 

anger and the most vehement polemics.^ Did 
not Prince Bismarck forget himself, did he utter 
language worthy of him, of a statesman desirous 
of exercising a salutary influence over misled 
public opinion, when he said in his last speech : 
"One does not wage war through hatred, other- 
wise France would be permanently at war, not 
only with us, but also with England and Italy, 
for she hates them both." Prince Bismarck is 
mistaken, hatred is not a feeling which easily 
obtains access into France. What other country 
has given her neighbours more brilliant proofs 
of sympathy and disinterestedness ? The French 
flag has been seen in all parts where a noble 
cause has stood in need of defence. Has 
Prussia's been visible there ? What has she done, 
moreover, to disarm our resentment? Has she 
shown any consideration for the dignity of the 
vanquished of the woeful year? Has she acted 
any better towards Russia, so long her docile 
Ally ? A prey to the feeling she attributes to us, 
she has seen secret agents, an organised system 

^ Last April there appeared in Germany a work entitled, Videant 
Consules, and which is attributed to a General, an ex-Minister of 
Marine. Its object is to show that war must necessarily brea;k out 
before long with France, but especially with Russia, " that veritable 
national enemy who oppresses everything German, who unduly 
holds the Baltic provinces, those countries vv'on over to German 
influence at the price of German blood .... that bulwark of 
Germany .... where Russian barbarism, with its corruption and 
degenerate officials, takes the place of ancient equity and civilisa- 
tion " 



i68 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

of espionage everywhere ; she has expelled, under 
divers pretexts, thousands of Russian subjects 
from the German Empire. Russia has not com- 
plained of the rigour of this measure, she has 
resorted to reprisals. They then attacked Russian 
stocks at Berlin and hampered their negotiation ; 
these sought refuge at Paris, and one knows how 
they were received on our financial market. 
Other steps were taken on both sides, all equally 
actuated by animosity, and uneasy Europe assists 
at the spectacle provided for her by Germany 
and Russia in the north, and France and Italy 
in the south, adjacent Powers in a permanent 
state of administrative and economic hostility, 
applying themselves to a war of tariffs which has 
never been an omen of pacific relations. 

And this is the peace which the Triple Alliance 
offers us and intends to enforce. A peace which 
leads Governments to excessive and irritating 
measures, a peace which exasperates and crushes 
the people, "a heavy and ruinous peace," accord- 
ing to Prince Bismarck's own avowal, "prefer- 
able," he added, " to the ruin which follows a war, 
even a successful one." Why did he not speak 
thus before inflicting the evils of war on Den- 
mark, Austria, and France ? At what price, be- 
sides, is this ruinous peace obtained ? The agree- 
ment of the three Courts, by consolidating the 
interests of the contracting parties, has consoli- 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 169 

dated the respective interests of other Powers. 
France and Russia have concluded no treaty ; they 
are, nevertheless, strongly united by feelings of 
mutual security, surely a more solid bond than the 
kind of sympathy that has brought Italy and Austria 
together. The Triple Alliance has thus divided the 
Continent into two camps constantly under arms, 
and ready on either side to come to blows. Is this 
a peace that is well guaranteed, a peace inspiring 
confidence, encouraging work and mutual dealings, 
bringing nations into closer intercourse and partici- 
pating in their well-being ? In short, is it durable ? 
Can Europe continue paying the cost of it for 
ever? With the burdens it entails, is it not lead- 
ing to war, to a struggle the more slaughterous 
since the combatants will be more numerous and 
more formidably armed ? Yet it is to these 
frightful calamities, unless one succeeds in averting 
them, that the Triple Alliance has destined the 
civilised world. Such is the sad thought which 
the work elaborated by the three Courts brings to 
one's mind, whatever one may think or wish. 
A sense of the general interest of Europe causes 
every one to disavow and condemn it. 



I70 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 



X. 

When one has followed Prince Bismarck step 
by step through his long career, it is impossible 
not to admire the powerful and marvellous faculties 
he placed at the service of his King and country 
during the first fifteen years of his ministry. He 
began at Frankfort, and from the first day he 
penetrated the future as the present, and evolved 
from it the programme he has so brilliantly carried 
out. Called upon to direct Prussia's policy, he 
approached each question successively with a con- 
fidence which neither the virulent opposition of 
the Elective Chamber nor the attitude of the other 
Cabinets could shake. In the Polish matter he 
won over Russia and caused England to draw 
back. Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, 
those two proud champions, fade away in presence 
of his audacity. Without lingering over the nebu- 
lous doctrines of German professors, or the claims 
of the pretenders, he solves the everlasting ques- 
tion of the Duchies to his master's advantage by 
force of arms, and dismembers Denmark whose 
integrity Prussia had nevertheless guaranteed. 
After having led Austria into this first campaign, 
he turns on her, isolates her, fights her, and 
triumphs at Sadowa, thanks to the neutrality of 



r 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 171 

Russia and France, which he had been skilful 
enough to secure. He had still one adversary 
left to conquer, namely, France. He prepared 
himself for the task by obtaining the co-operation 
of the States of Southern Germany, whilst the Great 
General Staff was forging the weapons for the com- 
bat. When the moment for using force seemed to 
him to have arrived, he conceived the candidature 
of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and, in the 
face of astonished Europe, led the French Govern- 
ment to take the initiative of the war. Victory 
rewarded his far-sighted duplicity. Sic itur ad 
astra. Morality was in tears, but he was enabled to 
restore the ancient German Empire. Without a 
doubt the blunders of his adversaries contributed 
to his success ; he himself committed none up to 
the crowning of his work ; and if at that moment 
he had relinquished power to go, like a wise man, 
and meditate on the great things he had achieved, 
he would have remained not only comparable, but 
in some respects superior, to those who have left 
their ineffaceable trace in the history of nations. 

To have been all and to be nothing was to 
abdicate ; heroic effort incompatible alike with 
his temperament and the nature of his mind. He 
had a thought of it, however, it is said ; but 
either he did not know how to, or else could not 
bring himself to make the sacrifice. He must 
regret not having done so. He preferred, without 



172 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

any other ambition perhaps, to dedicate the 
remainder of his Hfe to consoHdating the edifice 
his hands had raised. But fickle fortune imposed 
on him the oblisfation of resiofning" and of sub- 
mitting to the desertion, we will not say insulting, 
of the press which had so slavishly obeyed him. 
The fact is that, with the Empire restored, there 
began what we may be permitted to call his 
second manner, the period of his ministry during 
which his genius went astray. At home he 
raises the Kulturkampf and does not show to 
his advantage. He sets the most formidable 
economic problems by making himself the pioneer 
of state socialism, become a subject of grave 
anxiety for some and of blind aspirations for the 
others. He has not in reality solved a single 
question ; he has left the country a prey to an 
agitation which gave the new Sovereign matter for 
thought. Abroad, he has not spared France ; he 
has threatened her with the idea of keeping her 
in a state of constant inferiority. He did not 
foresee, on this occasion, that Russia, alarmed in 
her turn, would no longer leave him a free hand. 
When he had convinced himself of this, his 
anger was aroused. He regarded the companion, 
so devoted, so constant, of former days, with 
suspicion. He forsook her to fly to other friend- 
ships. He was thus led to disserve Russia and 
load Austria with his favours. He entered 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 173 

passionately into this scheme at the BerHn 
Congress. But, from that moment, it no longer 
sufficed for Germany to mount guard on her 
western frontier, she had also to reckon with the 
powerful Empire of the North. Instead of one 
adversary she had two. And we have seen the 
Chancellor seeking support, applying himself 
eagerly to isolating France, uniting with Austria, 
then with Italy, organising in short, in all respects, 
the Triple Alliance. Unfortunate combination 
for the present generation, fraught with peril for 
generations to come. He has thus more deeply dug 
the abyss which separates the German Empire 
from the two rival Powers ; he has sown hatred, 
to borrow one of his own words of which he 
made such regrettable use, between Austria and 
Russia, between France and Italy. What will 
Germany reap from it ? The future will show ; 
but the future is not less gloomy and full of 
menace for her than for her neighbours. Such 
is Prince Bismarck's last work. 

How immense and brilliant would be the glory 
of the Prince who would undertake to save 
Europe from the perils to which she is exposed ! 
The Man of Iron has laid down the burden which 
he has borne too long for himself as for his 
contemporaries. Will there not arise a new man, 
a genius, that of peace, of true peace, who would 
restore repose and security to the Nations ? Is 



174 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

it then impossible for the Powers to assemble 
together in a spirit of cordiality and sacrifice ? 
Diplomacy has unravelled more complicated situa- 
tions than this. It possesses formidable resources, 
as we have seen at the Berlin Congress, which 
was the triumph of egotism and cupidity ; but it 
has also precious ones, and it would repair the 
harm it has done by entering into transactions 
for re-establishing harmony on the Continent and 
placing the European balance of power on an 
equitable basis, by appeasing legitimate regrets 
and indestructible expectations. Is this but a 
dream ? Who will blame us for indulging in it? 

These pages were written, when suddenly came 
Signor Crispi's fall. Is the retirement of the Italian 
statesman more voluntary than the great Chan- 
cellor's? It is neither more nor less so, but has 
other causes. Prince Bismarck was too power- 
ful for a young Sovereign proud of the glories 
of his ancestors, passionately smitten with the 
traditions of his house. The one or the other 
had to consent to the mutilation of his authority, 
or to abdicate. The master insisting on the full 
exercise of all his rights, the servant bowed before 
him and resigned all his offices. Signor Crispi with- 
drew, in his turn, from the part he had assumed. 
It was certainly not the crown that forced this 
determination on him. No disagreement existed 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 175 

between the President of the Council and the 
Sovereign. It is also to be observed that at the 
time Prince Bismarck relinquished power nothing 
in the internal or external affairs of the Empire 
demanded it. His credit in Europe, like his 
prestige, was immense : he possessed moreover 
the entire confidence of Germany. At every 
opportunity, he had exerted himself to convince 
the different Governments and public opinion of 
his love of peace, and of his firm resolve to main- 
tain it. One has seen in what resounding terms 
he affirmed this in the last speech he pronounced 
in the Reichstag. Was Signor Crispi in as brilliant 
a situation? His policy rested on a pretended 
danger which, threatening the Kingdom's frontiers, 
imposed on the Government the duty of placing 
itself in a position to avert it. The accession of 
Italy to the Triple Alliance, said he, never had 
any other aim. It was thus that he justified the 
armaments to which he devoted all the resources 
of his country without fear of involving it in debt. 
Yet the danger was an imaginary one. No one 
could have been more convinced of this than 
himself. Was he cherishing high and culpable 
ambitions under a false exterior ? Was he dream- 
ing of placing Italy in the front rank of Latin 
Nations ? Did he meet with encouragement in 
this during the confidential conversations at 
Friedrichsruh .'* He may perhaps tell us himself 



176 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

some day ; but we have observed and we re- 
member that his interpretation of the treaty of 
alHance, which is not that of his predecessor, dates 
from the first visit he paid to the German 
Chancellor, He could not however have con- 
cealed from himself for a moment that Italy would 
not be able to continue bearingf burdens out of all 
proportion to her financial and economic power. 
He therefore considered armed peace a chimera 
and the conflict imminent. His attitude towards 
France, from the first to the last day of his 
ministry, justifies us in this opinion. In any 
case, he did not sufficiently bear this one con- 
sideration in mind, that between three allies the 
last word, the mighty resolutions, never belong- 
to the weakest, who, once bound, is dependent 
on the will of the strongest. He has certainly 
at times agitated Europe and alarmed public 
opinion by his turbulent diplomacy. But at what 
price ? Italy knows, and, from North to South, 
she demands the curtailment of expenses, a lessen- 
ing of the heavy sacrifices his policy imposed on 
her. From that moment, the hour for the retire- 
ment of this Minister, yesterday still in posses- 
sion of an uncontested authority, had struck. He 
submitted in his own way by a parliamentary 
rumpus. It was not thus that Prince Bismarck, 
whose glory visibly disturbed him, relinquished 
the reins of power. The one succumbed beneath 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 177 

the weight of his faults, the other beneath 
the excess of his power and of the services he had 
rendered. 

What will be the consequences of this event,, 
which is assuredly of great importance ? Will 
the system disappear with the minister who 
was its incarnation ? We have shown under 
what circumstances and under the influence 
of what incidents the Italian people, misled by 
a wrongly inspired press, had themselves entered 
upon new ways. Proud of their recent eman- 
cipation, all investigation into their affairs, all 
appearance of tutelage irritated them. The 
recollection of services received galled them. 
France had assisted to cast off their chains, they 
drew away from her. But if they are susceptible 
and jealous, easily excited like all southern Nations, 
they are gifted with a deep-rooted and penetrating 
political understanding. When they make a mis- 
take they repair it. Will the crisis they are 
traversing reveal to them the extent of the faults 
committed, will it show them that, in the actual 
state of affairs in Europe, they have naught to fear 
from their neighbours and should no longer sus- 
pect their intentions ? We wish to believe so. 
Italy can indeed prosper and consolidate her power 
without committing herself in respect to disagree- 
ments in the face of which it is, on the contrary, to 
her interest, to preserve her entire liberty of action. 

N 



178 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

The fears instilled into her for the security of 
her frontiers, were never aught but a means to 
conquer and preserve power. Born yesterday, 
everything bids her employ her energy, all her 
resources, in establishing a firm position by en- 
couraging her industries, protecting her commerce, 
and omitting nothing that would tend to freely 
open the sources of public prosperity to her 
national activity. In letters, arts, and politics she 
possesses a glorious past. Henceforth a Great 
Power, why should she not live her own life, 
instead of parting with any portion of her liberty 
under the conditions of an unequal reciprocity, 
whatever Signor Crispi may have said of the 
arrangement ? Why should she not entertain 
perfectly cordial relations with all the States of 
Europe without distinction ? Wrong as the con- 
duct of the fallen Minister has been, France bears 
no malice. Faithful to her old friendship, obeying 
moreover her own interests, she will certainly 
not refuse to renew negotiations, and to arrive at 
an understanding which would enable the two 
countries to resume their commercial relations so 
inopportunely hampered to the detriment of both ; 
jealous of her own independence and liberty, full 
of respect for similar feelings in others, she has 
no ambition for agreements of any different nature. 
If there is an Italy that has been too much heard, 
as has been said, there is another that has not 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 179 

"been heard sufficiently and which has retained all 
its sympathies for France. Whosoever has 
crossed the Alps has had an opportunity of satisfy- 
ing himself on that point. The crisis, after all 
has run its course ; it has been solved by the 
force of circumstances themselves. It behoves 
King Humbert's new advisers to right the situa- 
tion upset by their predecessors, to set the 
pyramid back again on its foundation, if we may 
so express ourselves. To cover the deficit, reduce 
the expenses, place the Budget on a firm footing, 
diminish taxation, facilitate the access of fresh 
markets to national produce, that of France par- 
ticularly, such will no doubt be their programme ; 
they cannot conceive any other. The task may 
be laborious, but it is not difficult. The Chambers 
like the country, too long subjected to undeserved 
trials, will support a policy both reparative and 
fruitful in happy results. Count Rudini and his 
colleagues, by becoming its pioneers, fulfil, with the 
Sovereign's confidence, the expectations of all 
Italy's friends. 

February 15, 1891. 



N 2 



ARMED PEACE 
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. 

The old world is full of activity ; but who is 
directing it, and what is the aim in view? It is 
high time attention were given to the matter. 
At what period of history has the universe had 
more sinister visions or caught a glimpse of a 
morrow so fraught with painful apprehensions?' 
It labours however ; and is discouraged by no 
kind of toil. It is notwithstanding alarmed at the 
exhausting warlike preparations, and is justified 
in wondering what fresh catastrophes threaten 
its near future ? The times are gone when the 
people were strangers to the acts and enterprises 
of those governing them. In our days they know 
what occurs, and form opinions. They take ad- 
vantage of the facilities for investigation placed 
within reach of all social classes, and are thereby 
enlightened ; although they may not possess an 
exact notion of contingent perils and evils, which 
if not close at hand may still suddenly burst upon 
us, they are conscious of them. Universal and 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES i8r 

compulsory military service has initiated the 
most humble, more or less, into all the secrets, 
all the means of destruction that science is un- 
remittingly perfecting, and each has the pre- 
sentiment of disasters unknown until now. No 
one requires, at present, to question a general 
or admiral to learn that bodies of troops or 
whole fleets can disappear in an engagement, 
at the first shock, and that the conquerors may 
be decimated as well as the conquered. The 
preparation of these formidable calamities is of 
itself a first evil that weighs cruelly on the entire 
Continent. The policy of progressive armaments 
■on which the various Governments have entered 
fatally compels them to draw beyond measure 
from the sources of public wealth at the risk of 
exhausting them. Taxation, in a few years, has 
■everywhere attained proportions that are beyond 
the economic power of the different States. These 
necessities engender misery which is already 
ruthlessly creeping into more than one country. 
Distress, in its turn, gives rise to trouble of 
another and a no less alarming order, and causes 
emigrations that recall a distant age ; and they 
do not always meet with kindly welcome. We 
too frequently, indeed, witness the painful sight 
of large crowds crossing and recrossing the 
Atlantic, a lamentable odyssey, in fruitless search 
of a hospitable shore. Should these financial 



i82 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

and social difficulties, manifesdy due to excessive- 
taxation, be and remain the lot of the least 
favoured nations ? When Italy is so seriously 
menaced by them, will other nations easily bear 
with similar drawbacks? No Power possesses 
inexhaustible resources ; so that Europe is 
threatened with becoming a prey either to war 
or poverty. This alarming alternative deserves 
to be examined in all its aspects, and we propose, 
after having pointed out the causes of it, to sum 
up the consequences. 

I. 

Europe was in the enjoyment of profound peace,, 
and there was nothing to disturb her repose, when 
a Prince, already ripened by age, ascended the 
throne of his ancestors. Kinor William I. of 
Prussia, who had long been cherishing ambitious 
views, had at the moment of his accession but one 
thought : it was for the army, for its reorganisation,, 
for its development. What did he intend doing ?" 
Establishing Prussia's hegemony in Europe. 
Count Bismarck had foreseen and proclaimed this 
whilst still only a diplomatic agent at Frankfort. 
The King secured his co-operation by according 
him his entire confidence on raising: him ta 
power. It was thus that the future Emperor and 
future Chancellor, henceforth closely united. 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 183 

resolutely undertook the task they have so glori- 
ously accomplished for themselves, if unfortunately 
for Europe. 

Their first victim was a lamb. The lamb^ 
however, offered firm resistance ; he put all his 
heart into it ; but the wolf had a crony, and the 
two accomplices compelled Denmark to abandon 
to them her two best provinces : Schleswig- 
Holstein, however, had been guaranteed to her 
by a formal act binding all the Great Powers to 
ensure her the peaceful possession of them. Un- 
fortunately, collective guarantees, founded on 
general interest, have usually been upset when 
placed in contact with vigorous or daring action. 
Not one of the contracting parties consented to 
behave in accordance with his oblig["ations. When 
you examine the diplomatic documents of that 
period, you are quite taken aback at the eager- 
ness with which the principal European Cabinets 
accepted the fallacious assurances that Count 
Bismarck unremittingly showered on them, not- 
withstanding the contradiction offered by events 
transpiring in the Duchies. He knew how to calm 
the alarm of some, anticipate the susceptibilities 
of others, sometimes invoking the honour of the 
arms engaged on the Elbe, sometimes the duties 
Prussia was performing, to her great regret, in 
her capacity of a feudal and conservative Power, 
promising, guaranteeing that nothing definite 



i§4 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

should be done without the assent of the other 
Governments. Never at any other period of his 
long career, has he displayed more marvellous 
dexterity. We insist, by the way, on this point, 
because his success, in that first diplomatic 
•engagement, certainly impressed on his mind that 
his convictions were sound, and because he 
gathered from it the certainty of conducting each 
of his ulterior enterprises to a happy issue. His 
patriotic cupidity would henceforth be upheld by 
unlimited confidence. Sovereign and adviser per- 
suaded themselves that, thanks to the services 
rendered to Russia during the Polish insurrection, 
the moment, so longed for, had at last arrived to 
claim for Prussia, the authority and preponder- 
ance she had conquered under the reign of the 
Great Frederick and which his successors had so 
gravely jeopardised. 

The obstacle this time was at Vienna. Prussia, 
indeed, could only assume a dominant position in 
Germany, by expelling Austria ; that result could 
only be attained by force of arms ; they resolved 
to have recourse to them. Whilst the Sovereign, 
on every occasion, repudiated all idea of arriving 
at such an extremity, the Minister made no secret 
of that being his aim. One tranquillised the 
Imperial Court at Vienna in his sweetest tones, 
the other prepared public opinion for coming 
events. The parts being thus distributed, it 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 185 

required two years for each to perform his task ; 
and, on the date they had appointed, General von 
Moltke was able to lead the victorious Prussian 
army forward. The decrepit Germanic Confeder- 
ation was dissolved, Austria confined within her 
hereditary dominions, and Prussia aggrandised 
placed her heavy hand on the whole of Northern 
Germany. This time again Europe remained 
indifferent to the military and diplomatic successes 
of the House of Hohenzollern. 

It has been asserted that Italian unity must 
fatally have engendered Germanic unity. We 
will not absolutely contradict this ; but what is 
far more irrefutable, is that the preponderance of 
Prussia in Germany is due to a sort of tacit assent 
of the other Great Powers, and had it not been for 
their inaction in 1866, the Italian Kingdom would 
have been founded without giving birth to the 
German Empire. How was it possible for all 
these things to be accomplished ? The thunder- 
bolt of Sadowa which was in one single day to 
lay Austria low and ensure Prussia's triumph, was 
foreseen neither at London, Paris, nor St. Peters- 
burg. The Powers made no attempt to draw 
together and agree. They were deterred from 
doing so by their rivalries. We have just seen 
with what astute skill Count Bismarck applied 
himself to encourage their dissensions, speaking 
a language ever suitable to the centre where he 



i86 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

held it. And this explains how Prussia was able 
to engage in a war that nothing had provoked, 
apart from her determined will to take the front 
seat in Germany ; that is how she obtained from 
her victories the prodigious advantages she holds, 
without ever having consented to trouble herself 
about what Europe thought of them. 

Peace came and was siorned at Nikolsburof. 
In what position did it place the Powers who had 
not intervened in the war ? France could not fail 
to see that she would in future have an ambitious 
and enterprising neighbour on her eastern frontier. 
Russia, who had not for long known what it was 
to have a rival in the Baltic, felt herself touched 
in the very centre of her influence. Prussia, 
formerly her vassal, now mistress of the Elbe 
Duchies and all-powerful in Germany, would before 
long be able to dispute her passage to the North 
Sea, and isolate her from Western Europe. Great 
Britain even, always jealous of any preponder- 
ance, saw a State rising in the heart of the Con- 
tinent whose power would disturb the equilibrium 
her traditional policy had so judiciously arranged, 
a State which was already building fleets, and 
which would, one day, claim her share in the 
dominion of the seas. Did France, Russia, and 
Great Britain profit by the lessons taught by these 
recently accomplished events ? France wished to 
ensure her security ; we know what difficulties the 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 187 

efforts of the Imperial Government encountered ; 
Russia remained friendly to Prussia ; England 
confined herself to looking on. 

In the meanwhile a new conflict was in course 
of preparation ; the force of circumstances rendered 
it inevitable, and there was a presentiment on every 
side that it was coming on. In public as in private 
life, one finds difficulty in resisting the winning 
charm, the fascinatino- allurement of success. All 
had smiled on Prussia — fortune, on the battle-field 
as in the lists of diplomacy, had gratified all her 
wishes, crowned all her efforts. Under the in- 
fluence of such marvellous results. King William's 
ambition, encouraged and worked up to a pitch of 
excitement by Count Bismarck, took a new flight. 
The monarch and his adviser were no longer 
satisfied at having- advanced the frontiers of the 
Kingdom, at having united to it, by the annexation 
of Hanover and Electoral Hesse, the two great 
parcels of national territory so long separated, of 
holding in their hands the whole of Germany, 
much more by the authority of might than of 
treaties ; they resolved to have this ill-defined 
state of affairs consecrated by right, to re-establish 
the Germanic Empire, in fact, to the advantage 
of the House of Hohenzollern. Since Prince 
Bismarck has renounced discretion, since he has 
taken pleasure in talking of his good days, he has 
owned in more than one interview that such was 



i88 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

his thought on the morrow of Sadowa, that he 
was the first, as he was the last, workman who 
forged the Imperial crown. He claims, somewhat 
too frequently indeed, both the honour and ad- 
vantage ; and what he says is true. Before he 
had yet exchanged the ratifications of the Treaty 
of Prague he was, in fact, already taking measures 
to avoid paying any attention to it. This treaty 
stipulated that the Southern States should enjoy 
a sort of independence, and guaranteed them full 
autonomy. Prussian authority did not extend 
beyond the Main. He overthrew this barrier 
by imposing fresh clauses on these States, which 
were derogatory to the arrangements concluded 
with Austria, and made them subordinate to 
Prussia in a pretended alliance which was both 
offensive and defensive. 

But if Prussia could, from that moment, dispose 
of the entire forces of Germany by invoking 
the authority of written agreements, these agree- 
ments themselves were contrary to the law of 
Europe, and could not therefore serve as a 
basis for the crowning piece of Prussian domin- 
ation. If Germany were vanquished, prostrate 
at the feet of King William, Europe had not 
abdicated a sing-le one of her international ad- 
vantages. General treaties, that of Vienna 
particularly, conferred on her the right to 
decline to allow any other alterations in the 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 189 

State of things existing in 18 15, than those 
she had ratified. It was thus that Belgium 
could separate from Holland, and Prussia her- 
self had always warmly invoked these stipula- 
tions whenever France had shown a disposition 
to elude them. It is true that at that period 
Count Bismarck had not yet appeared on the 
world's scene, and he consequently had not 
been able to trouble, by his violence, the re- 
spect of public right, whose salutary rules were 
formerly the basis of international intercourse 
and the best guarantee for the maintenance of 
peace. 

But at the point we have reached in this 
rapid statement. King William and Count 
Bismarck were no longer in the necessity of 
seeking suitable methods to lead them to the 
end they had in view, those employed to dis- 
member Denmark, to expel Austria from Ger- 
many, had succeeded admirably ; they decided 
to have recourse to them again to crush the 
obstacle that detained them on the Main and 
prevented German union from the Alps to 
the Baltic. What Power could have the 
audacity to hinder their design? No other 
than France : She must be reduced by war 
to submission, and war with France, from 
that time, became the sole thought of 
the Sovereign and his advisers. They went to 



I90 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

work with the energy of men accustomed to 
triumph. General von Moltke gave all his care 
to tempering the weapon he had forged and 
which was to ensure victory ; Count Bismarck 
souo-ht for the best snare to set for France at 
the proper time.^ 

It was maintained for many years at Berlin, 
that Prussia provoked none of the conflicts in 
which she took part, that she on each occasion 
sharpened her weapons in defence only ; if 
Count Bismarck was less affirmative, the King 
neglected no opportunity to cast the responsi- 
bility of the hecatombs marking his reign on 
others. These constantly reiterated affirmations, 
which have been several times re-edited in 
speeches from the throne, have hitherto led public 
credulity astray ; the opinion of persons gener- 
ally well informed, both in the press and in 
official circles, has suffered lasting influence 
from them. In spite of every effort, of the 
display of documentary evidence, notwithstand- 
ing the indiscretions of the intimate friends of 
the master of Friedrichsruh, and his own 
•confessions, the conviction that France, in 1870, 
wished for and provoked war, has remained 
unshaken. It has prevailed in spite of the 

1 We are aware that Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern's can- 
didature to the Spanish throne was thought of and prepared a 
long: time before it was brought forward. 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES igi 

Opinion and works of conscientious writers, 
in spite of the Chancellors Dangeau,^ Herr 
M. Busch, who divulged everything in a 
book published in 1884^; in spite of Prince 
Bismarck himself, who to please his friends, 
in his rare moments of merry humour, had 
confessed the truth. Madame de Seviofne's 
saying is still true : " They have rhapsodized all, 
but what is said is said, what is thought is 
thought, what is believed is believed." The 
legend, that parasite of history, carefully en- 
couraged by a salaried press, had thrown out 
such strong roots, had become so firmly im- 
pressed on people's minds, that it triumphed 
over all attempts to set it right. It was only 
dispelled by a revolt at the palace ; it required 
the new Emperor, tired of the yoke of an im- 
perious Minister, to come to the determination 
to cast it from him, and pack his adviser off 
into retirement, to his intense discontent : it 
required, moreover, that Prince Bismarck, in 
one of his angry moods, should enumerate all 
his claims to the gratitude of the Hohenzollern 
dynasty, without omitting the responsibility he 
had assumed by taking the initiative of a per- 
fidious manoeuvre, in the sinister thought of 

^ The Marquis de Dangeau was a witty courtier in the reign of 
Louis XIV. and the author of some valuable memoirs. — Traiislator. 
^ Unser Reichs-Kanzler, vol. ii., p. 65. 



192 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

making- war inevitable, without fear of thus 
giving the lie to all his previous affirmations, 
all the assurances to the contrary that he had 
served out to Europe whom he had thus made 
his dupe. We remember the resounding echo^ 
of this unexpected thunderclap. We know 
how the truth escaped, by a return to justice, 
from the mouth of him who had offended by 
denying it. Nothing was wanting this time, 
neither frankness nor details, so that it has 
been possible to re-establish the scene in all 
its exactitude as it occurred on a day that will 
be ever famous. It is meet to retain it, to 
evoke it, to place all the circumstances in their 
real light. If it confound the guilty, it will 
comfort public conscience : it will be a valuable 
lesson for future times. 

It was July 13th, 1870. Generals von Moltke 
and von Roon were dining with Count Bismarck. 
All three were lamenting the peaceful issue which 
seemed likely to be the result of the negotiations 
at Ems. Suddenly a functionary came in with 
a telegraphic despatch from the King.^ It related 

1 This despatch was for a long time confused with a report from 
Prince Radziwill, the King's aide-de-camp. The despatch 
received by Count Bismarck had been sent by Herr von Abeken,, 
Counsellor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had accompanied 
the Sovereign to Ems, for the purpose of keeping the Chancellor 
informed of events. Count Caprivi, in a speech at the Reichstag in 
the month of November, 1892, called attention to this error and 
thoroughly elucidated the matter. 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 193 

the events of the day for the information of the 
Ministers at BerHn ; it in no way conveyed the 
notion of compHcations being imminent, nor of 
the approaching mobilisation of the army. Count 
Bismarck read it to his guests. " Roon and 
Moltke," the Chancellor has since said, in an ac- 
count attributed to him and which he has not dis- 
claimed, " dropped their knives and forks together. 
We were all very low-spirited. We all felt the 
;matter was ending in smoke. I then addressed 
Moltke and put this question to him : 'Is the 
instrument we require for war, our army, is it 
really good enough for us to commence hostilities 
whilst relying in all probability on success } ' — 
' We have never had a better instrument than 
now,' he answered. Roon, in whom, it is true, I 
had less confidence, fully confirmed what Moltke 
had said. 

" ' Very well, then, quietly continue your 
dinner,' I observed to my two colleagues. I 
seated myself at a round marble table placed 
beside that at which we were eating ; I carefully 
read the despatch over again, I took my pencil 
and deliberately obliterated all the passage in 
which it was said Benedetti had asked for another 
audience. I only left the commencement and the 
end of the communication. The despatch, now, 
had quite a diffe^^ent appearance. I read it to 
Moltke and Roon in the new form / had p-iven it. 

<3 



194 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

They both exclaimed : ' Magnificent ! That will 
produce an effect.' We continued to eat with a 
capital appetite. You remember what followed." 

One hardly knows what to think, and is quite 
dumbfounded in presence of these three Germans 
mutually exulting at a feast over the idea of 
crushing the Gaul, showing themselves in turn 
delighted or in dismay accordingly as war seems 
imminent or the affair likely "to end In smoke." 
But it did not suffice to have garbled the despatch, 
so as to alter the exact sense. There remained 
the use to be made of it in order to prodtice an 
effect. The effect anticipated was a double one,, 
rapid and decisive. It must take the form of an 
outburst of national indignation in Germany as a 
result of wounded pride, and a cry should be 
raised for war so as, if necessary, to influence the 
Kino-'s will. At Paris the affair must be reo^arded 
in the light of an outrageous insult, so as to 
force France to take the initiative of hostilities 
and consequently assume the responsibility of 
them in the eyes of Europe. One of the 
principal actors in the scene wrote from the 
commencement: "At Ems there was neither 
insulter nor person insulted." Count Bismarck 
arranged his text in such a way that there were, 
at the same time, two insulters and two persons 
insulted. Any one, indeed, reading the despatch 
after he had revised it, would come to the con- 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 195 

elusion that the Ambassador had been wanting in 
the respect he owed the King, whilst his Majesty- 
had ignored the prerogatives of the French 
representative in an offensive way, by forbidding" 
him his residence. Consequently, both of them, 
at the same time, became insulters and persons 
insulted. In order that the effect might be pro- 
duced with this double inference Count Bismarck, 
before even the meal of the three conspirators 
was at an end, and whilst they continued eating 
with " a capital appetite," gave orders for the 
despatch to be sent round to the evening papers 
with an intimation to the " reptiles " to sound a 
flourish, that is to say an appeal to arms, accord- 
ing to a remark General von Roon attributes in his 
correspondence to General von Moltke. Before 
the end of the evening the despatch had been 
telegraphed to several of Prussia's diplomatic 
agents with instructions to communicate it to the 
Governments to which they were accredited. It 
was foreseen that their French colleagues would in 
this way be rapidly informed, and that the blow 
would produce all the more effect at Paris from 
reaching the capital through the intermediary of 
various foreign Governments. It must be ac- 
knowledged that Count Bismarck, on this solemn 
occasion, did not make the slightest mistake. 
Everything happened in conformance with the 
programme he had prepared. Intense excitement 

o 2 



196 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

spread throughout Germany, like a train of gun- 
powder. The King, on his way back from Ems 
two days later, was welcomed all along the line 
by enthusiastic acclamations ; he left the train at 
Potsdam, and, after a brief council held at the 
railway station, gave orders to mobilise the army. 
The insult was felt in France as deeply as Count 
Bismarck had foreseen, and on July 15th the 
Minister announced the declaration of war to the 
Chambers. 

But it is none the less acknowledged now, that 
this war had been premeditated by Prussia a long 
time previous, and that it was the outcome of her 
Chancellor's duplicity. Habeinus confitentem remn. 
He frankly confesses his misdeed now ; he con- 
siders it his most precious claim to the gratitude 
of his Sovereign and Fatherland. A newspaper 
that he inspires, and which is his acknowledged 
■organ, wrote some time ago : " Prince Bismarck by 
modifying the famous telegram from Ems, by con- 
straining France to assume the initiative and 
responsibility of war, deserved well of his country." 
He has not, however, always held this proud 
language. He has changed it according to cir- 
cumstances and his frame of mind. Shortly after 
peace was re-established, Herr Liebknecht de- 
nounced, in his newspaper, the forfeiture the 
Chancellor had been guilty of, and which was 
already being whispered from ear to ear ; Prince 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 197 

Bismarck had the socIaHst writer prosecuted, and 
he was fined. Things are now the reverse of 
what they were ; and what Prince Bismarck has 
been contradicting for more than five-and-twenty 
years with most solemn denials, he now declares 
to be a positive truth. This truth authorises the 
suggestion that if Prince Bismarck has a right to 
reward for his conduct, he cannot refuse the 
blame it deserves, and history will certainly have 
something more to say : it will conclude from this 
fact, now thoroughly established, that the van- 
quished of 1863 and 1866, the Danes and 
Austrians, sought for war no more than the 
French, and that the Prussian Government was 
on each occasion the aggressor without any 
righteous cause, but actuated solely by motives of 
cupidity. The reprobation of this bloodthirsty 
policy has preceded the judgment of posterity. 
Prince Bismarck's avowals have, in fact, raised a 
general outcry of indignation in Europe ; the 
English, who were so long duped by his man- 
oeuvres, have been wounded in their pride, and do 
not conceal their resentment ; the Germans them- 
selves have felt "the blush of shame rise to their 
brow " on learning that the country had been 
infamously deceived. 

However, we wish to emphasize but one essen- 
tial point in regard to the various matters to which 
we have just called attention ; namely, that Europe 



198 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

would have lived in peace and complete security, 
had Prussia remained within the limit of her 
rights, had she performed all her duties as a 
Continental Power, particularly the one command- 
ing her respect of treaties ; that by giving way to 
her ambition she has extended her frontiers, but 
she has done so by substituting a new arrange- 
ment, devoid of stability and offering none of the 
necessary guarantees for maintenance of universal 
peace, to the old state of things sanctioned by 
time and by the formal consent of all interested 
parties. 

11. 

Have King William and Prince Bismarck ever 
been conscious of this extremely unsettled situa- 
tion ? Have they exerted themselves to remove 
its most prominent disadvantages ? There is 
nothing to indicate such a thing. Peace concluded 
with the foreigner. Prince Bismarck, ever a prey 
to his passion for combativeness, engaged in the 
Kultttrkampf struggle at home, with a powerful 
fraction of the country. He had no serious 
grievance ag-ainst the Catholics of the kingdom ; 
they had fought bravely and shed their blood as 
subjects of the King ; but they formed a party 
with which it was necessary to reckon ; the Chan- 
cellor wished to subjugate, if not to crush, that 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 199 

party. We are aware of the rigorous measures he 
inflicted on their conscience as Christians. They 
defended themselves with all the energy of their 
faith, and, if at the end of this conflict the 
Chancellor did not go to Canossa, both he and 
the Emperor Frederick, had to do penance by 
annulling the draconian laws, one after the other, 
which he had made Parliament vote. In his 
dictatorial zeal he engaged in other measures. 
Until then he had professed free trade opinions ; 
he made himself the apostle of protectionism, 
and, advancing his new doctrines to the last 
extremity, attempted to inaugurate State Social- 
ism in the young German Empire. 

It is thus that we shall see him going astray 
more and more in his erroneous notions. 

Amongst all Prince Bismarck's anxieties France 
continued to occupy the first place. He never 
took his defiant glance off her, however intense 
the hostilities he encountered, or better, that he 
had himself raised in Germany, might be. At 
one moment he fancied the institutions our country 
had bestowed on herself would give him peace, 
for he considered them a powerful obstacle to her 
resuscitation. On leaving Versailles he felt con- 
vinced that it would be long before she could 
repair her disasters, and that the enormous war 
indemnity he had inflicted on her, coupled with 
the necessity of renewing her armament and 



200 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

erecting other lines of defence, would effectuall)r 
incapacitate her from reassuming the position 
she had lost among the Great Powers. When 
he passed through Frankfort on his return ta 
Berlin he had expressed his confidence in peace 
having been ensured for half a century ; the sayings 
was retained and re-echoed throughout Germany, 
France is, fortunately, a more wealthy country 
than he had supposed. The soil is fertile, the 
inhabitants laborious ; one works, the other pro- 
duces. Although the Frenchman may be accused 
of giddiness, he is thrifty and economises. When 
his Government issues a loan, he produces his 
money, convinced by patriotism as much as by 
interest that there is no better investment for it. 
So events soon g-ave a contradiction to Prince 
Bismarck's previsions. France paid him his five 
milliards, not without difficulty, but more promptly 
than he had expected. Order reigned without 
any likelihood of its being disturbed ; work had 
been actively resumed in the factories and fields ; 
and the Government was proceeding successfully 
with the reorganisation of our military forces. In 
1875, when it wanted to form the fourth battalions, 
alarm was felt at Berlin, and war again haunted 
the minds of the King's advisers, if not of the 
Sovereign himself They imagined they had not 
sufficiently crushed France, and resolved to con- 
tinue the work of 1870, being of opinion that: 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 201 

it had not been pushed far enough. The 
venal press opened the campaign. An article 
published in a semi-official newspaper, the Post 
of Berlin, denounced to Germany the schemes 
attributed to the Republican Government, as 
well as the ardent desire of the French people 
to take revenge, and pointed out the imperious 
necessity imposed on the German Empire to 
anticipate these sinister designs. The exportation 
of horses was forbidden at the same time. This 
theme soon became that of every accredited organ 
in Germany ; and the minds of all, even the least 
timid, were soon filled with apprehensions of an 
imminent strug-orle. 

Before hastening the event, they wished to- 
ensure Russia's neutrality. Prince Bismarck and 
General von Moltke could not conceal from them- 
selves that it would be impossible for them to lead 
on the Emperor William until they had obtained 
this precious guarantee. Herr von Radowitz was 
despatched to St. Petersburg, but notwithstanding 
his recognised diplomatic skill, he failed in his mis- 
sion. He was later on disavowed in a view easy 
to understand. " Herr von Radowitz," recently re- 
marked the intemperate hermit of Friedrichsruh,, 
"was never my confidant, for, although he has 
inherited many qualities from his father, he has 
also inherited the habit, fatal in a diplomatist, of 
talking too much, and of Jetting out everything^ 



:202 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

after the third glass ; " an appreciation as devoid 
of reason as of justice. The truth is that Russia, 
in her turn, was becoming alarmed at the pre- 
ponderant part the new Empire, or rather her 
impetuous Chancellor was arrogating to himself in 
Europe, and was convinced he would keep no 
account of the services she had rendered ; she 
had from that moment a just presentiment that 
she would only meet with ingratitude at Berlin the 
first time occasion offered. Herr von Radowitz, 
in presence of this feeling, had lost the suit he was 
entrusted with defending, beforehand. The Em- 
peror Alexander II. had a magnanimous heart; 
as soon as he was informed of the aggressive 
views of the German Government he communi- 
cated them to General Le F16, assuring him that 
he would not permit France to be again invaded 
without just cause and merely to satisfy a brutal 
feeling of ambition. Shortly afterwards he had an 
■opportunity of passing through Berlin, and, having 
■conferred with the Emperor, his uncle, he was 
able to telegraph that all danger was over. 

Prince Bismarck has, since then, openly, obsti- 
inately repudiated the calculations attributed to him. 
He has, however, acknowledged that the Great 
General Staff had conceived them, and had ad- 
vised a second appeal to arms without the least 
delay. The Man of Iron did not confine himself 
to repelling the accusations brought against him 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 203 

personally ; he went further, and cast all the respon- 
sibility of the incident on the chief of the army. 
" Moltke," he told Herr Blum in the course of inter- 
views intended for publication, "was the male- 
factor on that occasion." But when did he use 
that language ? After the illustrious Marshal's 
death. Is it not rather Prince Bismarck who 
deserves this qualification which we have borrowed 
from him, when he glorifies himself for having 
constrained two great nations to settle, by arms, a 
conflict that could easily have been avoided had it 
not been for his wily intervention ? 

Prince Bismarck's interested denials, moreover, 
are daily refuted by documentary evidence which 
throws a vivid light on the crisis we have just 
recalled. The notes left by M. Gavard, our 
Charge d' Affaires at London at this period, have 
recently been published.^ These pages are full of 
valuable information ; they clearly show the 
British Government, first of all hesitating and 
even incredulous, then shortly afterwards con- 
vinced of the imminence of the danger threatening 
peace, and from that moment joining with Russia 
to avert it. We can only refer to them. We 
will nevertheless quote an extract from an inter- 
view between our representative and the Russian 
Ambassador on his return from St. Petersburg and 
having passed through Berlin, because it resumes 

1 See the Correspoiidant of November 25th, 1894. 



204 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

the history of this smart thrill of alarm in a few 

words. " The danger," said Count Schouvaloff 

to M, Gavard, "lies in Prince Bismarck's fixed 

idea that France is preparing to attack Germany ; 

and unfortunately, what is more grave, it is shared 

by Count von Moltke. The latter thinks you will 

be ready in 1876, and that the moment will be all 

the more favourable to you, as you will still have 

a class of old soldiers who have been to war ; the 

Chancellor believes you wish to wait until 1877, 

but they both agree that you must be forestalled. 

They pretend you are the aggressors on the 

theory, new to them, that the real aggressor 

is not the one who attacks but he who renders 

war necessary, and they suggest as the result of 

another campaign an overwhelming indemnity 

coupled with a prolonged occupation. You know 

what our Emperor said to General Le Flo. I was 

instructed to repeat it at Berlin. I saw the old 

Emperor, who seemed first of all astonished at our 

anxiety ; he really did not think war imminent, 

but he was the only person so ill-informed at 

Berlin. It was, therefore, not difficult to bring 

him to the point we desired, after he had been 

told. As to Bismarck, he knows he cannot 

attack Russia because of you, nor you if Russia 

is opposed to it. I therefore consider peace 

ensured." This page of contemporaneous history 

has been written, moreover, by the aid of docu- 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 205 

merits taken from the archives of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and recently pubHshed by M. 
Flourens. They comprise Prince Gortchakoff's ex- 
pressions of regret at the line of conduct adopted 
by Russia in 1870, the terms of the bargain 
proposed by Herr von Radowitz, the declarations 
of Alexander II., who brought an interview with 
General Le Flo to an end by saying to him : 
" I will not permit all the laws of the civilised 
world to be transgressed and Europe plunged into 
the horrors of war again." ^ Such were the lan- 
guage and sentiments of the Czar himself. We 
have seen how his Majesty's Ambassador spoke. 
This is what Lord Derby said at a final interview 
with our Charge d'Affaires, resuming their con- 
versations : "The old Emperor does not wish for 
another war, and was ignorant, as we have seen, 
of the plotting going on around him. Prince 
Bismarck desires it, and is in a hurry to bring it on 
during the Emperor William's lifetime." All the 
•denials of the first Chancellor of the new German 
Empire will not prevail in contradiction to the 
declarations of two such Governments as Great 
Britain and Russia. 

Prince Bismarck, caught in the snare he had 
himself set, and foiled in his attempt to trouble 
peace, conceived a feeling of resentment which 
has ever since led him astray, and which was sure, 

^ Alexandre II., sa Vie, son CEuvre. Paris, p. 292 and following. 



2o6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

before long, to cause him, as we shall shortly see 
happened, to make an irreparable blunder. In a 
memorable speech which he delivered in the 
Reichstag, with a view to justifying his conduct, 
he said : " I have never turned aside from Russia ; 
it was she who repelled me, and at times placed 
me in such a position that I was forced to modify 
my attitude to preserve my own dignity and that 
of Germany. This began in 1875, when Prince 
Gortchakoff gave me to understand how much 
his pride was nettled at the position I had attained 
to in the political world." Thus by his own 
avowal, his difference with Russia dates unmis- 
takably from the year in which the grave incidents 
we have just recalled occurred, and this declaration 
suffices to establish that at that period the Czar's 
Government could have no doubt respecting the 
dark designs formed at Berlin. It has pleased 
Prince Bismarck to attribute the cause of this new 
departure in Russian policy to childish rivalry. 
The argument is not serious ; it is even unworthy 
of so great a mind as his. No one will admit, in- 
deed, that Russia found her inspiration, on this oc- 
casion, in the wounded pride of her Chancellor, who 
was jealous of the laurels gathered by his Prussian 
colleague. Everything, therefore, tends to show 
that the disagreement of the two Courts found its 
origin in the schemes conceived at Berlin in 1875, 
and that Prince Bismarck has himself sfiven this 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 207 

dissension a personal character. It is consequently 
only fair to leave him the responsibility of it, both 
in regard to its origin and consequences. On this 
ground, as on many others, his impetuous and 
haughty nature was fatally certain to lead him to 
most dangerous resolutions. 



III. 



Before the end of this same year which wit- 
nessed the severance of the intimate intercourse 
between Prussia and Russia, an insurrection 
broke out in Herzegovina; it soon spread to 
all the provinces of the Balkan peninsula. It 
was pretended that Prince Bismarck had lent 
a hand to the outbreak ; this accusation has 
never been proved ; it shows, however, the 
tendency of public opinion at that time to 
attribute to him a desire to cause the Czar's 
Government difficulties in the East, where it 
would be at variance with England. If such a 
thought ever entered his head it met with all 
the success he could desire. Russia, after futile 
negotiations both with the Porte and the other 
Powers, in the impossibility of repudiating her 
ancient traditions, compelled to give attention 
to the religious feeling which was so strong in 
all classes of the population, had to take up arms 



2o8 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

and march to the assistance of her co-reHgionists of 
the Ottoman Empire. She declared war against. 
Turkey. We are aware of the sanguinary trials 
and immense sacrifices this struggle imposed on 
hier. Her armies, notwithstanding, crossed the 
Balkans and arrived in sight of Constantinople. 
Turkey, vanquished, signed a treaty at San 
Stefano, which was above all favourable to the 
Christian populations, some being totally released 
from Turkish domination, whilst autonomy, guar- 
anteeing analogous advantages, was bestowed on 
others. It was stipulated in this document, by 
a special clause, that Russia should exercise the 
right of supervision in the execution and main- 
tenance of these arrangements. Great Britain 
saw in this a violation of the eno-ao-ements the 

o o 

Czar's Government had contracted, in 1856, after 
the Crimean War, which would prevent her, she 
said, considering the stipulations of San Stefano 
as forming part of the law of Europe unless 
they were submitted to the approval of all the 
interested parties. 

What were Prince Bismarck's feelings and 
iDehaviour on this momentous occasion ? The 
moment was propitious for dispelling the pre- 
judices he had implanted in the minds of the 
Emperor Alexander and his Government. If the 
Chancellor had acted in that way, Russia united 
to Germany, having nothing to fear from either 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 209 

Austria or France, who were busy dressing their 
wounds, could have braved the anger of the 
British Cabinet and declined her intervention, 
as Prussia had had the courage to do after the 
campaigns of 1866 and 1870. King William's 
Government, or rather his Prime Minister, had 
on both occasions boldly repelled any inter- 
meddling of the Powers in the arrangements he 
had resolved to impose on the vanquished. 
Prince Bismarck would have remained faithful to 
his own doctrine by supporting Russia against 
the pretensions of England, and he could easily 
have renewed the cordial understanding that had 
so long united the St. Petersburg Cabinet to that 
of Berlin. Forgetting the services rendered, 
Russia's friendly neutrality, without which the 
Prussian army would have had neither Sadowa 
nor Sedan to its credit, without which he could 
neither have expelled Austria from Germany, nor 
have invaded France, Prince Bismarck, under the 
influence of a feeling that was a secret for no one, 
espoused the views of the British Cabinet, and in 
conjunction with it compelled Russia to give her 
assent to the meeting of a Congress which at the 
suggestion of England, anxious to show her 
gratitude, assembled at Berlin. 

They therefore met, under the presidency of 
Prince Bismarck, at the capital of the new 
Empire, to which such an honour had never yet 

p 



2IO STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

fallen. The Chancellor acquitted himself of his 
duties as honest broker, according to his own 
expression, which admirably reflected what was 
passing in his mind. What happened indeed ? 
The stipulations of San Stefano were revised, 
notably in regard to the relations of the two 
contracting parties. For the control Russia had 
reserved to herself, was substituted that of all the 
Cabinets assembled ; they thus modified the 
position she imagined she had reconquered in 
the East. And whilst England made the Porte 
abandon the island of Cyprus to her, it was 
decided at Berlin that Austria should occupy 
Herzegovina and Bosnia, which she still retains 
and is preparing to annex definitely. So that 
conqueror and conquered were both sacrificed to 
the passions and covetousness that ruled this 
areopagus. The treaty of San Stefano was thus 
torn to shreds ; Russia retained none of the 
essential advantages she had exacted as the 
price of spilt blood ; and Turkey, convinced, not- 
withstanding, that she had nothing but champions 
at Berlin, lost an island and two provinces there. 
Such was the result of the concerted understandingr 
between Germany and Great Britain, which 
Austria joined, an understanding that owed all 
its strength and influence to Prince Bismarck's 
participation. The Chancellor was avenging 
himself for the rebuff of 1875 ; his pride was 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 211 

satisfied ; he had humiliated his rival Prince 
Gortchakoff, first Russian plenipotentiary at the 
Berlin Congress, in the face of Europe. But, it 
will be inquired, what was the Emperor William's 
attitude on this occasion ? Did he not, in a 
great measure, owe his Imperial crown to the 
affectionate condescension of his nephew the 
Emperor Alexander ? Had he not written to 
him on the eve of quitting Versailles : " Prussia 
will never forget that it is to you she owes the 
fact that the war was not allowed to assume 
greater proportions " ? The Emperor William at 
the commencement of his reign never failed to 
control all the acts of his Government when he 
did not actually inspire them himself History 
will record what part he took and to what extent 
he exercised his sovereign function, although it 
was cast in the background by the rackety 
activity of his Prime Minister ; but at the period 
with which we are occupied fatigue and years 
had weakened his will ; he rarely imposed it, and 
the Chancellor easily triumphed.^ It is, there- 
fore, established that Prince Bismarck, in 1875, 
as in 1878, at the Berlin Congress, conformed to 

^ We have seen from the notes left by M. Gavard, that Prince 
Bismarck, already in 1875, took upon himself to direct German 
policy without submitting his resolutions to the Sovereign's assent. 
We may therefore presume that three years later, taking advantage 
of the Emperor William's age, he proceeded with more absolute 
independence. 

P 2 



212 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

his own personal views, and he is consequently^ 
answerable to his country for the difficulties he 
has created for it, and which at the present day 
are apparent to all. He is certainly conscious of 
them, and since he has been away from power he 
has made a point at the numerous interviews 
to which he has complacently lent himself, of 
declining the responsibility and casting it on his 
successor. Vain efforts that have convinced no 
one, and have only served to place his failings in 
a brighter light and pain his warmest admirers. 
This opinion is current in Germany. In a 
pamphlet that appeared at Leipsic, and which 
has been attributed to a person in a high 
position, Prince Bismarck is denounced as "the 
sole author of the irretrievable rupture that 
has occurred between Russia and the German 
Empire." 

Whilst still master of the destinies of Germany, 
he was, moreover, himself alarmed at the situa- 
tion, the result of his personal policy, and con- 
sidered it urgent to guard against it by means of 
a diplomatic combination. In 1879, the year 
following that in which the Congress assembled, 
he offered Austria a treaty of alliance. Unable 
any longer to look for support from the Empire 
of the Czars, he solicited the assistance of 
the Empire of the Habsburgs. The Vienna 
Cabinet, accomplice and beneficiary of the 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 213 

German Chancellor, having been formally asked 
to consent to this agreement had to do so ; and 
the pact was concluded. That was the origin 
of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. Prince 
Bismarck chose, for a long time, to lead public 
opinion astray in regard to the origin of this 
arrangement. This is no longer a secret for 
any one, and he has contributed himself, both 
before and since his retirement, to edify us on 
this important point of contemporaneous history. 
The treaty was signed at Vienna on October 7th, 
1879, and was shrouded in profound mystery. 
All the German Chancellor desired was that its 
object should be known, and that the St. Peters- 
burg Cabinet should be thoroughly convinced 
that he had found what he wanted elsewhere. 
The reconciliation between Austria and Germany 
was looked upon at first without uneasiness ; but 
it became matter for alarm in the Reichstag in 
1888, when the Government solicited a further 
extraordinary credit for the requirements of the 
army. "So it is the war foreseen in connection 
with the arrangements made at Vienna ? " said the 
members of Parliament. " No," replied Prince 
Bismarck, " the aim of the Treaty of Alliance is 
peace, but to place it beyond the possibility of 
being disturbed we must be in a position to 
impose it." He could see, however, that there 
would be violent resistance, and to avoid this 



214 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

he decided to publish the Treaty uniting the two 
empires.^ 

In a work which is in course of publicatioil 
as we write, The Geinnan Empire in Bismarck s 
Time, by Hans Blum, from whom we have al- 
ready quoted, the author, relying on the confi- 
dences that have been bountifully poured out 
to him at Friedrichsruh, undertakes to give 
us a new version of the causes that separated 
Russia from Germany and gave rise to an under- 
standing between the latter and Austria. He 
relates that by the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, 
an international commission was to assemble at 
Novi- Bazar to fix the boundaries of the frontiers 
of Turkey and the emancipated provinces. The 
Czar, in three successive letters, asked the Em- 
peror William to authorise the German delegate to 
concert with his Russian colleague. "The assent 
of Berlin," the Emperor Alexander is stated to 
have said, "is the condition of the maintenance 
of peace between the two peoples." When Prince 
Bismarck was informed of these applications, 
he pointed out to his Sovereign that if those 
words had been in an official document, he would 



1 The Treaty signed in 1879 had been renewed in 1883 and 
1887 ; Italy had acceded to it ; but Prince Bismarck only divulged 
the first in date, that of 1879, in which the signature of the Italian 
Government does not figure. Up to the present time nothing has 
transpired to explain how the two-fold understanding was con- 
verted into a three-fold one. 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 215 

have been compelled to advise his Majesty to 
mobilise the German army. Unable to indulge 
in this advice, he left Gastein, where he then 
was, for Vienna, in order to acquaint the Aus- 
trian Cabinet of the communications made by 
the Czar to the Emperor William. Under 
what aspect did he present the matter, and 
how did he look at it himself.^ As the pre- 
lude or the revelation of an understanding that 
was imminent or had been concerted between 
France and Russia. "To the Franco- Russian 
Alliance," Count Andrassy, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to the Emperor Francis Joseph, is stated 
to have replied, " There is but one counter-balance, 
it is the Austro-German alliance." 

Thus, accordino- to Prince Bismarck's new 
apologist, writing so to say, under his dictation, 
the paternity of the first treaty, which has since 
become that of the Triple Alliance, must be 
attributed to the initiative of the Austrian 
Minister. But Statesmen who seek to pen the 
history of their own times, however expert they 
be, are often exposed to rectifying themselves the 
errors they seek to prove. Habent stia fata 
libelli. "Count Andrassy," continues Hans Blum, 
"stated he was ready to put his signature to 
the Alliance, feeling certain of his Sovereign's 
consent. Prince Bismarck was not so sure of 
that of the Emperor William ; they neverthe- 



2i6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

less drew out a draft, and the German Chancellor 
returned to Berlin on September 24th. The 
Treaty could not be signed until October 7th. 
The delay in concluding it is explained by the 
fact that the Emperor William would not, first 
of all, listen to anything on the subject of this 
Alliance. ... It was only after long explanations 
that Prince Bismarck succeeded in obtaining his 
adhesion." 

But what was Prince Bismarck's motive in re- 
pairing personally to Vienna, he who, since fortune 
had showered her favours on him, would not con- 
sent to engage in negotiations elsewhere than at 
Berlin ? He went there with the intention of 
concerting with the Austrian Cabinet ; he had 
announced to Count Andrassy by telegraph that 
such was his desire. Admitting that the Emperor 
Francis Joseph's Minister was the originator of 
the proposal, who suggested it to him ? Who, more- 
over, imposed it on the German Emperor ? Was 
it not his Chancellor, as Hans Blum avows, Prince 
Bismarck himself? Must the Chancellor's frame 
of mind on this occasion be attributed, as his 
historian seems to insinuate, to " that considerable 
nervous excitement which the use of the Gastein 
waters invariably produces " ? That would be 
making great things depend on a very miserable 
circumstance. One understands Prince Bismarck 
doing all he can to extricate himself from an im- 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 217 

plication which will assuredly be a stain upon his 
glory, but how can one fail to be surprised when 
one sees him have recourse to such mean pro- 
ceedings to effect his object ? He hurried off to 
Vienna to negotiate the union of Germany with 
Austria, and this initiative gave birth to the Alli- 
ance of the two Empires ; he, therefore, is the 
author of it. Formerly he would have had the 
audacity to acknowledge this without beating 
about the bush ; at present, feeling each day the 
weight of the responsibility he has assumed in- 
creasing, he tries to slip away. Such an attempt 
is unworthy of him. What, moreover, was the 
chief object of these thoughts at this moment ? 
Against what adversary did he wish to arm and 
shelter the German Empire ? Against Russia as 
much as against France. He had mortally 
wounded the first of these two Powers at the 
Berlin Congress ; he could not disguise from 
himself that the injury would remain incurable, 
unless he acknowledged his faults, which was more 
than his excessive pride could bend to. And 
which of the two aggressors does he propose to 
master before the other ? Is it France? She is 
not mentioned in the treaty of alliance. Russia, 
on the contrary, is named as the probable enemy 
of both contracting parties. "If one of the two 
Powers," it is stipulated in Article i, " is attacked 
by Russia, they will reciprocally owe one another 



2i8 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

the assistance of the totaHty of their military 
forces." 

Now what had the Emperor Alexander asked 
his uncle, the Emperor William, who was under 
obligations to him ? An understanding between 
their agents, entrusted in Turkey with the execu- 
tion of certain clauses of the Berlin Treaty, so that 
the Russian representative, seconded by his Ger- 
man colleague, might obtain on the spot the 
attenuation of certain decisions come to at the 
Congress which were contrary to the interests or 
traditions of the Empire of the Czars in the East. 
What a magnificent opportunity Prince Bismarck 
had again this time of pleasing Russia and renew- 
ing the relations which were so seriously strained ! 
Did he hasten to take advantage of it .'* He pre- 
ferred to increase the gravity of a situation that 
was already extremely delicate ; he rushed off to 
Vienna, there to foro-e new arms ao-ainst the Em- 
pire that had rendered Germany such striking- 
service in time of peril. Prince Bismarck's great 
and enlightened intelligence evidently, on this 
occasion, suffered the influence of his temperament. 
Morality, like justice, sooner or later recovers all 
its rights, and the President of the Berlin Congress, 
who placed his signature at the bottom of the 
Treaty of Vienna, will not succeed in escaping from 
the reproaches he has incurred. After having 
been the ardent instigrator of three wars, after 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 219 

having mutilated Denmark and France, blinded 
by pride, by his spirit of domination, he has hol- 
lowed out with his own hands an impassable 
chasm between Germany and Russia, and has 
caused these two great nations to feel implacable 
hatred for one another. By straying along- this 
wrong road he has not merely damaged his own 
renown, he has also bequeathed to Europe a situa- 
tion fraught with the greatest danger. That is 
what we shall endeavour to show. 



IV. 

The prominent and visible feature in Prince 
Bismarck's character, as in his policy, is that his 
temperament invariably makes him go to extremes 
in everything, and resort to haughty or disdainful 
violence according to the occasion, according to 
the position or the authority enjoyed by the adver- 
sary in whose presence he may be. His letters 
dated from Frankfort, when still only a diplomatic 
ag^ent, are bristlino" with bitter sarcasms directed 
against all the Confederate States, without except- 
ing Austria. He estimated the value of his 
colleagues at the cost of the gold braid on their 
uniforms. There was twenty thousand thalers' 
worth, he writes, at a gala banquet. When he 
began his first struggle on coming to power, he 
affected to look with equal contempt on the King 



220 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

of Denmark's rights to the Duchies, and the 
claims of the Pretenders, whose defence had been 
undertaken by the Frankfort Diet. He never 
forgave Count Beust for having upheld the sove- 
reign prerogatives of the Confederate States ; he 
urged the commander of the Army Corps selected 
to invade Saxony in 1866 to secure his person 
either at Dresden or Leipsic, At the conclusion 
of peace Count Beust had to take refuge in Austria. 
Prince Bismarck's resentment had survived his 
political adversary's defeat. Who has forgotten 
his brutal persecution of Count Arnim ? The 
Chancellor thought the Republic in France would 
be a permanent source of trouble and disorder ; 
the Ambassador, in spite of his chief's remon- 
strances, remained persuaded that it would be a 
serious danger to the principle of monarchy in 
Europe ; he committed no other fault, and even 
now Prince Bismarck blackens his memory by re- 
fusing his victim's son to relieve it of a calumny that 
found origin in the interviews at Friedrichsruh. 
Herr M. Busch, collecting morning and night 
the effusions the Chancellor indulged in among 
his Intimate friends during the French war, shows 
him constantly tormented with the necessity of 
injuring the invaded provinces. Prince Bismarck 
reproaches the military with being too lenient 
towards people and objects. They make too many 
prisoners, he said, and some of them, like the 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 221 

Franc-Tireurs and Turcos, should have been mer- 
cilessly shot. The misery of the peasantry seeking 
refuge in the woods does not affect him in the 
least. "If the fugitives fell into my hands," he 
added, " I would take their cows and all they 
possess, accusing them of having stolen the things." 
What a strange doctrine on the lips of a States- 
man ! We could quote a cruel, pitiless expression, 
which lays the Iron Chancellor's soul bare. We 
abstain from doing so because he attributes it to 
Princess Bismarck. We prefer to refer the reader 
to Herr Busch's curious volume.^ 

His propensities undergo no modification at the 
conclusion of peace. He anxiously watches France, 
whose ruin was not sufficiently complete to suit 
him. We have seen how he was thirsting to 
spring on her again as soon as he had reason to 
fear she would soon be herself again. Russia 
places an obstacle in the way of his schemes, she 
dares brave him, he at once turns his anger and 
resentment agfainst her. He humbles her at 
Berlin, he concludes a treaty at Vienna which 
is especially aimed at the Northern Empire. 

It is an error, says Prince Bismarck, to regard 
the alliance of Germany and Austria exclusively 
in the light of an arrangement in view of war ; 
it has but one object, the maintenance of peace ; 

^ Le Comte de Bismarck et sa suite pendani la guerre de France^ 
p. 195. Paris. 



222 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

it is to ensure peace to Europe that this union 
has been concluded and signed. War, he adds 
at the interviews, that echo at his will, has given 
us all we could expect ; it could only expose the 
advantages we have acquired and to strengthen 
which we require peace. But if the repose of the 
world, he was answered, were the Chancellor's 
sole care, why did he not exert all his efforts to 
tighten certain very old ties from which he had 
reaped marvellous benefit ? With Russia satisfied, 
after the war with Turkey, Germany all-powerful 
in the centre of the Continent, what dangers could 
there be to threaten universal peace ? Would 
not an understanding between these two Powers 
have been the best and firmest guarantee for its 
preservation ? Prince Bismarck preferred a rupture 
which was certainly not what his sovereign 
intended ; he is therefore the responsible author 
of it, as we cannot too frequently repeat. But he 
had foreseen the consequences of his action and 
hastened to provide for the obligations it imposed 
on Germany. That was the sole object of the 
reconciliation he forced on the Emperor William 
as much as on the Emperor Francis Joseph. 
Consequently it was not the repose of Europe 
that troubled him and took him to Vienna, it was 
the security of the German Empire, 

In reality he was taking up a position for 
conflicts rendered eventual if not imminent in the 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 223 

north of Europe, by the attitude he had himself 
assumed in regard to Russia, by the duties he 
forced on that Power when dispossessing her of her 
influence on the Danube, of the advantages she 
had conquered, during a sanguinary war, at the 
cost of the greatest sacrifices. It was thus that 
he sowed the germs of a permanent misunderstand- 
ing that have developed more rapidly than he 
anticipated and the fruits of which he can already 
judge of from the innermost recesses of his 
retreat. Competent to form a judicious opinion 
in such a matter, he was not long in perceiving 
the difficulties he had created for his country, 
and he wished to make a display of different 
feelings to Russia. " I have been able to con- 
vince myself," he said in the Reichstag, in a 
speech from which we have already quoted a few 
words, " that the Emperor Alexander had neither 
warlike tendencies against us, nor the intention 
of attacking us, nor a leaning towards aggressive 
wars in general .... I trust, I believe in the 
Czar's word .... we shall exert ourselves to 
respect the rights that Russia takes from treaties 
.... and if she asks us to support her applications 
to the Sultan to bring back the Bulgarians to the 
position created by the understanding of the 
Powers, I shall not hesitate to do so." He spoke 
thus in 1888, without fear, in holding this language, 
to give, an emphatic contradiction himself to all 



224 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

his recent acts, notably to his conduct at the 
BerHn Congress and to the precipitation with 
which he had concluded the treaty that still 
unites Germany to Austria. The fact is, he had 
understood and measured the extent of the two- 
fold mistake he had made, and felt all the weight 
of the responsibility he had assumed. This has 
ever since been present in his mind ; and in his 
retreat, he has never ceased to pretend that he 
had left the relations between Germany and 
Russia in a satisfactory state which permitted of 
their former cordiality being restored to them. 
But new and striking incidents have occurred 
which have proved how unfounded this assurance 
and prevision were. Russia has drawn nearer 
to France, and Prince Bismarck, far from accusing 
himself, attacks his successor. He has allowed 
the flatterers who visit him to hear the reproaches 
he addresses to General Caprivi, so that they 
may repeat them. 

Prince Bismarck has convinced no one, and 
the judgment of his contemporaries will be that 
of posterity. Of what, indeed, does the Treaty 
of Alliance which he concluded at Vienna con- 
sist ? Is it a pledge of peace? No one could 
suggest such a thing, for It Is on the contrary 
an act drawn up in view of war. What does 
it provide for ? Fresh hostilities, and the two 
contracting parties to it stipulate the mutual 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 225 

assistance they shall be under the obligation of 
lendino- to one another when it breaks out. 
Such clauses might, in a certain measure, have 
been justifiable, had they been drawn out solely 
in view of aggression on the part of France. 
The peace signed at Frankfort had left gaping 
wounds, and it might be presumed that they 
could only be cicatrised by vengeance. But in 
1879 Russia had as yet taken no initiative, no 
step revealing an unkindly attitude or invincible 
resentment. We have pointed out that Prince 
Bismarck could on more than one occasion have 
approached the Russian Government, making a 
sacrifice of his rancour, and the Emperor Wil- 
liam would certainly not have placed any obstacle 
in the way of his doing so ; he preferred on 
the contrary to keep it definitely at a distance 
by seeking the co-operation at Vienna which he 
had so long found at St. Petersburg. The rup- 
ture between the Northern Empires is therefore 
his personal work. That is what we desired 
to show. 

But how was it Austria lent herself to engage- 
ments which increased the height of the barrier 
already separating her from Russia ? Austria 
has interests of the first order on the Danube. 
Expelled from Germany, where she had exer- 
cised influence from times immemorial, she had 
suffered a dethronement which gave a serious 

Q 



226 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

blow to her credit among the population in the 
Balkan peninsula. This position, bad as it was 
then, was increased in gravity after the Treaty 
of San Stefano, by the preponderance it gave 
Russia in the East. The Cabinet of Vienna 
could not therefore hesitate to join in the views 
of those of Berlin and London, and become 
their confederate. They offered her Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as the price of her participation. 
These acquisitions compensated Austria for the 
sacrifices that had been imposed on her in 1866, 
by giving her a new and larger base of action 
on her Eastern frontier. Once in possession of 
these two provinces, the road to Salonica was 
open to her ; she relies on inheriting that port 
at the next division of the territory Turkey still 
possesses in Europe and thus acquiring direct 
access to the JEgean Sea. The bait was tempt- 
ing ; we have already said she took it. But 
from that time she became the principal instru- 
ment of Prince Bismarck's policy, and she could 
not conceal from herself that she would be under 
the necessity of following him as far as he chose 
to lead her. The Treaty of Alliance was in germ 
when the arrangements were made at Berlin,. 
and the Vienna Cabinet was certainly resigned 
to giving its signature whenever the German 
Chancellor considered it opportune to conclude. 
They were aware, besides, at Vienna of the 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 227 

facility with which Prince Bismarck performed 
evolutions on diplomatic as on parliamentary 
ground, and they were sure that, if repelled by 
Austria, he would turn again towards Russia. 
Count Andrassy was all the more justified in that 
presumption as the German Chancellor was able 
to inform him, at their first meeting, of the com- 
munications the Emperor Alexander had made 
to the Emperor William and which could have 
been taken advantage of to renew the relations 
that had been broken off. Nor was the Minister 
of the Emperor Francis Joseph unaware that 
the Emperor William regretted the dissent ex- 
isting between his Government and that of his 
imperial nephew, and that it was his desire " to 
die like the expiring sun," after having shone 
with such splendid fire. We have seen Prince 
Bismarck's account of the efforts he had to make 
to persuade his Sovereign to ratify the treaty of 
1879. Austria, being responsible with Germany 
for the mischief done to Russia, had fatally to 
accept all the consequences ; she had placed 
herself in the necessity of acquiescing in a treaty 
which nevertheless presented all the character 
of an act of defiance and even of hostility against 
a powerful Empire which had given neither of 
the contracting parties any cause for alarm. 
This was a first expiation of the crime she 
had been guilty of in consenting to receive the 

Q 2 



228 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Spoils of Turkey, dismembered by the Powers 
who should have defended her. Such is the 
fate of all territory graspers, when their acquisi- 
tions repose on neither right nor justice ; and 
for the space of nearly fifteen years since she 
has in this way lost her liberty of action, she 
has borne the weight, becoming heavier and 
heavier each day, of the duties she has had to 
assume. But, we repeat, that Austria, in 1879, 
had no choice in coming to a decision ; she 
acted in obedience to an influence for which she 
was quite prepared. 

V. 

The Statesman entrusted with the interests of a 
great country who knows he has served them 
badly displays uneasiness in proportion to the 
measure of his faults. That was Prince Bismarck's 
frame of mind after the Berlin Congress. His 
penetrating perspicacity, and particularly his sure 
foresight, which had never deceived him before 
1870, did not permit of his making any mistake 
in regard to the dangers of the new line of policy 
to which the errors of his pride had led him. He 
therefore had but one thought, that of averting 
them. He had ensured the alliance of Austria ; 
he considered it insufficient ; he sought that of 
Italy; he obtained it by arousing her alarm and 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 229 

flattering her passions. He had appHed himself 
to bringing on a conflict in connection with our 
occupation of Tunis, which he had prepared a 
long time before, and had been careful to foment. 
After encouraging our enterprise, he pointed it 
out to Rome as a permanent peril for the young 
kingdom. No one will be surprised that Prince 
Bismarck should have thus understood German 
interests ; but that Italy, a new State, in the 
midst of organisation, should have consented to 
divest herself of her liberty of action by assuming 
obligations that nothing compelled her to contract, 
was what no one could understand, however care- 
ful the Italian Government may have been to 
justify so grave a resolution. To form a correct 
opinion of her conduct, it would really be necessary 
to know the terms of the act she signed, that is 
to say, the extent and nature of the duties it im- 
poses on her. Germany and Austria have in- 
formed all Europe of the treaty binding them, 
notwithstanding that it contains a stipulation pro- 
viding for an understanding that is directly aimed 
at Russia, and notwithstanding that she is explicitly 
named therein. The document devoted to Italy's 
association in their alliance is and continues a 
secret which is obstinately, preserved. Let us 
note, by the way, that contrary to all real principles 
of parliamentary government, the Italian Chambers 
have never been vouchsafed any knowledge of it, 



230 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

although its particular object is to pledge all the 
forces and resources of the country. Notwithstand- 
ing the most energetic efforts of certain fractions of 
Parliament it has been impossible to overcome 
this obstinate obmutescence ; the crown and 
Government are covered by the constitution, which 
is imperfect on this important point. What is not 
less worthy of remark is that the members of the 
Chamber, who had warmly protested against this 
constitutional anomaly, maintained the same 
silence as their predecessors as soon as they came 
to power ; this was notably the case with Signor 
Crispi. Secrecy on this point seems to have been 
a condition on accepting office. Who imposed it on 
them ? Evidently the Sovereign. Who exacted 
that it should be so ? Was it Germany, or was it 
the character and importance of the clauses binding 
Italy to the two Empires, that caused this course 
to be adopted ? 

It would be rash to seek to fathom the import 
of these stipulations ; we should run the risk of 
forming conjectures which would in any case be 
without authority. But it is quite permissible to 
believe that the fact of Italy entering into the 
Triple Alliance led the contracting parties to 
concert in regard to all the contingencies that may 
compel France to appear upon the scene ; that 
they have, at least, mutually guaranteed their 
territorial position ; and that military arrange- 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 231 

ments have been elaborated in that view. If 
Austria therefore has consented to aid Germany 
against Russia, Italy, who could only be of relative 
assistance to them in a conflict with the Northern 
Empire, has intervened, on her side, to unite with 
the two allies against France. It is impossible to 
attribute any other object to this three-fold under- 
standing. 

What reasons, what requirements, could have 
influenced Italy in striking out such a novel line 
of policy and one so contrary to all her traditions ? 
As a matter of fact, what is the Triple Alliance ? 
A sort of Holy Alliance renewed, minus Russia 
and plus Italy, which has been concluded to keep 
the Alsatians and Lorrains in bondage on the one 
hand, and on the other the Italians who are still 
under Austrian rule. King Victor Emmanuel 
would never have lent his hand to such a com- 
bination, imitated from that which so long weighed 
on the peninsula and from which he had the glory 
of freeing himself with French aid. Count Cavour 
must start in his tomb with indignation. We 
should point out that long before the date of the 
engagements contracted by Italy, there had been 
a notable deviation in the policy of the Cabinet of 
Rome. The contagion of democratic institutions 
had alarmed the Conservatives who were then in 
power. The most prominent men among them, who 
until then had only known the road to Paris, took. 



232 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

one after the other, that of BerHn ; it did not 
suffice for them to separate from a Republic that 
had adherents on the other side of the Alps, they 
required the support of powerful monarchies, and 
it was in their minds that the principle of a hostile 
alliance to France germinated. It was necessary 
to justify these tendencies, which were repudiated 
at the time by all the men who had fought for 
independence, who had suffered exile and impris- 
onment. We were credited with the firm intention 
of exercising an influence in Italy outrageous for 
her dignity and the rank she henceforth had the 
right to claim among the Great Powers. Public 
opinion was irritated by speeches, by the press 
remunerated in part from the reptilian fund — 
Ming-hetti acknowledo^ed it in one of his letters — 
and by persistent insinuations. The Tunis affair 
cropped up ; it was a premeditated incident in 
regfard to which a g-reat deal of fuss was made in 
order to embitter the public mind, the French 
Government being accused of a vast number of 
misdeeds of which they had never even thought, 
and notably that of maintaining too intimate a 
connection with the Vatican and encouraging its 
hopes. They thus succeeded in creating an ex- 
pression of opinion which gradually spread over 
all the provinces of the peninsula. At the same 
time Count Robilant, an Italian diplomatist, leader 
of the Conservatives, prepared the ground at 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 233 

Vienna, where he was accredited as ambassador. 
He was encouraged by his friends at Rome and 
adequately supported by Prince Bismarck. 

Victor Emmanuel, with his prudent character 
and clear foresight, was careful to check the errors 
and warmth of this agitation from the commence- 
ment. He was able to restrain the zeal and 
impatience of such of his advisers as lent an 
ear to Prince Bismarck's fallacious insinuations. 
Without forgetting services rendered, without 
rejecting those that were promised, he wounded 
neither his friends of yesterday nor those of the 
morrow ; he, awaiting events, resolved to take 
counsel from circumstances only. He died in 
1878, leaving matters in this state, without having 
contracted any engagement, without having dis- 
contented either France or Germany. Italy soon 
acceded to the Austro-German treaty; this was 
the first important act of the new reign, and 
it revealed a different and well-defined policy. 
There can be no doubt that King Humbert I. is 
a fervent apostle of this attitude of Italy, and in 
saying so we do not think we are making a state- 
ment likely to displease him. Nothing, indeed, 
is further from our thoughts than the intention of 
giving utterance to any assertion calculated to 
wound the Sovereign of a country to which we 
have been, to which we are convinced we shall, 
before long be, closely united. But when one 



234 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

examines such grave events, the first duty is to 
endeavour to fathom, to define the feeHngs of 
those who participated in them, be they Princes 
or Ministers. We have seen that the ItaHan 
constitution gives the Sovereign a large share 
in directing and controlHng the relations of the 
Kingdom with the other Powers. He can, as 
we have said, conclude treaties with them in view 
of war, without being compelled to have his 
engagements ratified by the Chambers, without 
beine obligfed even to inform them of what he 
has done. So that the country is actually pledged 
in certain contingencies to unsheathe the sword 
without knowing the causes or necessities that 
have compelled or constrained the King and his 
Government to take such an important decision, 
or the extent of the sacrifices it may have to 
make. 

That is parliamentary government as they 
understand it in Germany, and not as practised 
in countries gifted with a Constitution founded on 
sound principles as in England. However irre- 
sponsible a Prince may be, he evidently, under 
such circumstances, assumes a personal respon- 
sibility both towards his own subjects and 
towards the countries who will benefit or suffer 
from the obligations he has contracted. But the 
Ministers, it will be said, are answerable for the 
Sovereig-n's acts in this case as in others. Such 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 235 

is the theory ; reality is different, as shown in the 
present instance. Ministers come and go, the 
King remains ; and the treaty, always shrouded 
in the mystery of secrecy, is renewed. What 
indicates, moreover, that the King's will is asserted 
in this matter with exceptional and overbearing 
authority, that it is impossible to regard its 
existence in the light of pure fiction, is, that we 
have seen men of considerable standing in the 
Italian Parliament, who, after having violently 
protested against the engagements entered into 
by the two Empires, have warmly approved of 
them on becoming Ministers, and have shown 
themselves their earnest safeguards ; disavowing 
the opinion they had expressed on the benches 
of the Opposition, they have adopted that of the 
King as soon as they have found seats among 
his advisers. " You have made yourselves 
the gendarmes of Germany," exclaimed Signor 
Grispi, when simply deputy, to Depretis and 
his colleagues, reproaching them with having so 
criminally implicated Italy's signature. On being 
appointed Prime Minister he revealed himself 
the impassioned champion of the acts of his 
predecessors. When a democrat, an Irreden- 
tist like himself, performs such a strange evolu- 
tion, one has a right to think, without wounding 
any one's dignity, that King Humbert only ac- 
cords confidence to and admits into his councils 



23,6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

men who consent to share his opinion as to the 
desirabihty of continuing the relations estabHshed 
with Germany and Austria. When the Marquis 
Rudini succeeded Signor Crispi his attitude was 
more circumspect ; a few months after he became 
President of the Council he renewed the Treaty 
which had still nearly two years to run. 

The successor of the galantuomo King, on 
ascending the throne, considered it opportune, 
in the interest of his country, to deviate from 
the line traced out by his father ; and, finding 
inspiration in the traditions of his race, preferred 
taking King Victor Amadeus II., one of the most 
illustrious of his ancestors, as model and guide 
for his conduct. The policy of the house of 
Savoy has always had two poles, the King and 
the Emperor, one at Paris, the other at Vienna. 
The skill this dynasty has displayed has con- 
sisted in abandoning one for the other without 
exposure and with profit. Victor Amadeus, from 
the origin of the war of 1688 to the commence- 
ment of his reign, had assured Louis XIV. that 
in "this encounter he could absolutely rely on 
him." He was not sincere. He was resolved 
on the contrary to go against France, " reserving 
the choice of the moment to take action." He, 
indeed, wrote to the Prince of Orange and opened 
his heart to him ; he entered into negotiations 
with the Emperor whilst waiting to accede to 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 237 

the Augsburg League. The King of France, in- 
formed of these intrigues, demanded guarantees ; 
his troops were allowed to enter Piedmont. That 
pledge being subsequently considered insufficient, 
he required the citadel of Turin to be handed 
over to him. Victor Amadeus was able to delay 
this concession by means of dilatory negotia- 
tions, and by writing an autographic letter to the 
King by which he declared he placed himself 
absolutely in his hands, and undertook to give 
up the citadel as had been demanded. But 
when he had placed the fortress in a state of 
defence he threw the gates open to the Spaniards 
who had come from Milan, where he had signed 
an offensive and defensive alliance the day before 
with the Emperor and Spain, thus accomplishing 
his first plans and his evolution. But this Prince 
" so keen, so dissembling, and so artful " ^ was 
such, that he had hardly entered the coalition, 
than he was already preparing an exit. Indeed 
he did leave it, after long discussions and signing 
new treaties with France, which made him Com- 
mander-in-chief of the troops of the League in 
Italy and Commander-in-chief of the Franco- 
Piedmontese troops. His first allies had pro- 
mised him Provence and Dauphine ; on becoming 
reconciled to Louis XIV,, he considered it pru- 
dent to be satisfied with the restitution of 

^ Letter from Catinat to Louvois. 



238 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Pignerol, some territory in the Milanese, and the 
title of King-, honours of crowned heads, as they 
said in those times. ^ 

We will not continue this historical page, in- 
structive though it be, and though it be illustrated 
at a later date by the same underhand dealings 
and the same artfulness. We have paused at it 
for an instant under the impression that the past 
always serves to enlighten the future. However, 
our only object has been to place certain circum- 
stances and facts side by side ; they are not 
absolutely devoid of analogy, notwithstanding that 
the times and positions are different. To our 
mind they differ particularly in regard to the 
interests at stake. Victor Amadeus feared the 
ambition of Louis XIV., and he had reason to do 
so. France, by possessing Pignerol, had already 
one foot in Italy, and the King, victorious over 
the League, might put forward other claims. 
What danger threatened Italy in 1882, and 
what had she to fear from France, vanquished 
and mutilated ? France at that date, at the time 
when the peninsula became associated with the 
two Empires, was hardly rising from the prostrate 
position in which an unfortunate war had placed 
her ; she had absolute need of peace to reorganise 
her armament, to equilibriate her finances. What 

1 We have taken this brief summary from L'Hisioire de Louvois^ 
by Camille Rousset. See chaps, xi. and following. 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 239 

had she to claim from Italy, what territory, what 
concession ? She asked her solely to tighten 
the economic connection between the two countries, 
which was profitable alike to the commerce and 
industry of both. It has never been seriously 
maintained at Rome that the Republic premeditated 
restoring the temporal power of the Pope. Such 
an accusation would have been ridiculous and 
would have aroused public conscience in Europe. 
Gambetta, in a rebuke which was perhaps more 
severe than he intended, had given a pledge 
which did not allow of suspicion being at- 
tached to the intentions of the men who had 
taken over the government of the country with 
him. Italy, thanks to that luck which had so 
prodigiously assisted her, was at that time in 
possession of all the guarantees for her security 
she could desire. France and Germany's own 
interests compelled them to watch over the inde- 
pendence of the peninsula ; King Humbert's 
Government was certain of the support and 
co-operation of both Powers in all contingen- 
cies that could happen. No more advantage- 
ous international position could have been im- 
agined for a budding State obliged to look 
after its prosperity at home and develop all Its 
resources. 

Therefore, there was no need at Rome to 
renounce the happy neutrality which the respective 



,24o STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

positions imposed on the belligerents of 1870 by 
peace enabled her to observe. They departed 
from it notwithstanding, and their resolution to do 
so had to be justified. What did they pretend ? 
That the Italian kingdom, being of recent creation, 
must contract alliances for the defence of her 
frontiers. The argument was not a serious one ; 
Signor Crispi, however, has never advanced any 
other to his adversaries, to the patriots who have 
remained faithful to the convictions he formerly 
shared with them. But, they answered him, who 
is threatening our frontiers ? where is the peril ? 
Vain efforts ; he showed himself no more disposed 
to enliohten members of Parliament alarmed at 
Italy's new friendships than Depretis had been* 
Signor Crispi on attaining power, had had the 
Treaty of Alliance placed in his hands : did 
this mysterious document impose silence on him, 
against his wish, as it had done on those who 
concluded it ? It therefore contains certain stipu- 
lations calculated to bring about the most unlikely 
conversions. But if its ostensible object is to 
guarantee the possession of provinces of Italian 
origin to Austria, those of Alsace-Lorraine to 
Germany, it must ensure Italy compensative ad- 
vantages. One can hardly imagine Signor Crispi, 
in his turn, making himself the gendarme of the 
former rulers of his country without some future 
remuneration. He always has had, and certainly 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 241 

•Still has, the most lofty ambition. What then 
are the new hopes he is fostering ? Can they be 
those he conceived as soon as the clauses of the 
treaty came to his knowledge ? As they are 
■concealed must one take them to be inavowable ? 
And to the prejudice of what neighbour are they 
to be realised ? It cannot be of Austria, the 
enemy of yesterday, the ally of to-day ; it must 
therefore be of France, and, renouncing to satisfy 
Italy's ambition in the Alps or in the Adriatic, 
they propose to ensure its triumph in the Mediter- 
ranean. If that be so we were not mistaken in 
evoking the insidious proceedings of King Victor 
Amadeus, and in recalling the use he made of them. 
One can understand that Prince Bismarck, separat- 
ing in anger from Russia, should have sought the 
alliance of Austria ; one can also understand that 
the latter, redoubting a reconciliation that is 
always possible between the two Empires of the 
North, should have united with Germany. Neither 
at Berlin nor at Vienna was there any conceal- 
ment. Strange though it appeared to inform 
a Great Power that arrangements had been made 
to fight it if occasion offered, those who did so, 
had the courage to own and make the engage- 
ments they had contracted public. Why does 
not Italy follow this example which is wanting 
neither in audacity nor magnanimity ? Is it because 
she cannot confess all without revealing perfidious 

R 



242 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

and ambitious views that would justify every kind 
of suspicion ? 

VI. 

But it is not war, they never cease to repeat, 
that the Triple Alliance seeks ; it is peace, which 
they propose to maintain by placing it beyond the 
possibility of being troubled. Signor Crispi has 
himself affirmed it ; his behaviour during his first 
tenure of office was but one long contradiction of 
his own words. His every act was a provocation, 
and it was no fault of his if the dissensions he 
provoked did not degenerate into a rupture or a 
resort to arms. The prudent and dignified atti- 
tude of the Government of the Republic frustrated 
all the Italian Minister's calculations. It must how- 
ever be acknowledged that Signor Crispi was not 
supported, and he was perhaps not encouraged, by 
the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, and it is easy 
to understand and explain this first disagreement 
between the three allied Courts. Signor Crispi, 
being a sound-minded man, soon formed a correct 
idea of the consequences the heavy burden 
imposed on his country by her understanding with 
her allies would fatally have for her at no 
distant date ; he understood how urgently 
necessary was a prompt, an immediate solution. 
To the shame of financial discomfort, and its 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 243 

consequences, he preferred war, which alone could 
give Italy the advantages she hoped to obtain for 
the sacrifices she was obliged to make. But if 
Italy had entered the Triple Alliance for future 
and contingent profit, the two Empires had on 
the contrary already received theirs, and peace 
ensured them its possession. That was what 
neither the first negotiators of King Humbert 
nor the Sovereign himself understood when they 
entered into engagements at Vienna. All Signor 
Crispi's efforts have met with failure in presence 
of the calm attitude of France, and more par- 
ticularly so in face of the private and distinctly 
defined interests of the two other allies whose 
satellite Italy has made herself and continues 
to be. 

Let us say, then, that peace, with or without 
Italy's consent, was the sole, the real object the 
negotiators of the Triple Alliance had in view 
from the commencement, and let us see if this 
diplomatic conception offers adequate guarantees 
for the repose of Europe. Political writers of 
every order and every country have examined 
it under all its aspects ; some have blamed, others 
have applauded it ; the former have denounced it 
as a permanent danger, the others have con- 
sidered it a pledge of high value. There is not 
one at the present day, wishing to be of good 
faith, who does not concede that the peace of the 

R 2 



244 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Triple Alliance, is armed peace, that it is Europe 
under arms, ever ready for the struggle, and that 
this catastrophe may burst out suddenly, through 
incidents independent of the will of the various 
Governments. This peril becomes daily more 
apparent, and no one is any longer in doubt on 
the subject. Preparations are being made on 
all sides, and there is no sacrifice one dares recede 
from. Parliament never reassembles without 
being asked to vote further credits for the army 
and to increase the imposts already so heavy for 
the taxpayers of all countries. Military service, 
having become everywhere obligatory, is imposed 
on all, up to the age of forty-five ; some amongst 
us who are still liable to be called out are grand- 
fathers. Germany, which possesses the most 
formidable armament yet known, has just this 
very year increased her effective in a notable 
proportion, drawing the meshes of her organisa- 
tion closer, so that none can escape the duty of 
assembling round the flag. 

What think they in Germany of the peace 
Prince Bismarck, on retiring from power, has 
bequeathed to Europe ? How does the Imperial 
Government itself regard it? It considers it a 
truce, and that there is only just time to arrange 
everything for the next war which will, according 
to the words of the new Chancellor, be "a battle 
for life." To convince one's self, it suffices to 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 245 

peruse the speech that General Caprivi 
deHvered to uphold and justify his last Army- 
Bill tending to increase the effectives and grant- 
ing Government the necessary credits for that 
purpose. He had to give an explanation, to 
convince Parliament of the requirements it was 
urgent to provide for, and he performed his task 
with absolute frankness. His speech was in a 
measure a plan of campaign. "When we crossed 
the frontier of France in 1870," he said, "we 
did so with seventeen Army Corps. . . . Whereas 
only eight Army Corps were opposed to us. . . . 
In the future war," General Caprivi continued, 
reasoning as if war would break out immediately, 
" we shall find French Army Corps before us, at 
least as numerous as those we shall place in line. 
We shall find, moreover, an Army of Reserve of 
about the same value as the Army in the first 
line. But admitting we cross the frontier, that 
we are victorious, what shall we find in France ? 
A line of forts ... on the Meuse and Moselle . . . 
then behind we shall come to the series of great 
French fortresses : Verdun, Toul, Epinal. We 
advance, however, and fight the French Army 
of Reserve ; we proceed to Paris, but it is no 
longer the Paris of 1870 ; we are before a 
stronghold such as the world has never seen, 
surrounded by fifty-six forts." General Caprivi^ 
in speaking thus, did not intend to point out only 



246 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

the obstacles that it would be necessary to over- 
come in the next campaign, obstacles that require 
new and more powerful means to be employed 
in dealing with them than were at hand in 1870 ; 
he at the same time gave a rejoinder to an 
opinion which is sufficiently popular in Germany 
for him to consider it necessary to oppose it at 
the tribune of the Reichstag. What does this 
opinion want ? It advocates a preventive war, 
that is to say, an immediate conflict to reduce 
France to lasting impotence before she has 
given all the development to her military forces 
they still require ; the war, in fact, that Prince 
Bismarck and Count Moltke wished for in 
1875. The fact is worth noting, and it is 
beyond denial, because the Chancellor of the 
Empire himself acknowledged and established it. 
It was not superfluous to call attention to it, 
because it shows that on the other side of the 
frontier, in the German army especially, they 
incline to the view that the sole solution of 
present difficulties lies in war at an early date, 
whilst they loudly accuse France of watching 
passionately for the opportunity to take revenge. 

What has France done to provoke such war- 
like impatience ? What has been her attitude ? 
What line of conduct has she adopted ? The 
Chancellor has indicated this himself in the 
remarks we have just quoted. France has given 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 247 

all her care to placing herself on a proper footing 
of defence. But defence, unless one distorts the 
value of words and the truth of facts, has never 
been offence, and less still an act of aggression. 
What has Germany done in the same order of 
ideas, how have her allies proceeded, what 
measures have been taken by all the European 
States, large and small ? They have armed, they 
have daily given greater extension to their 
military strength. Prince Bismarck, previous to 
General von Caprivi, exacted grants of money 
from the Reichstag, for military purposes which 
were several times renewed; to obtain these grants 
both had recourse to the dissolution of Parliament ; 
the expedient was assuredly constitutional, but it 
proves the importance of the sacrifices imposed 
on the country and the pressure the Imperial 
Government had to exercise on the national 
vote to get the grants passed. England, even, 
that land of poised minds, does not escape the 
general contagion. A few years back, in 1889, 
Parliament voted an extraordinary credit of five 
hundred millions of francs, which were to be 
employed exclusively on new armour-plated 
vessels, apart from what was provided in the 
budget. The totality of the sum has not yet 
been spent, and public opinion is already in 
alarm on the other side of the Straits because a 
Russian squadron has entered the Mediterranean, 



-248 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

and the Government is urged to apply to Parlia- 
ment for another credit of the same importance. 
Did France provoke all these armaments ? Could 
they exact from her that she should leave all 
her gates open without defence ? What they 
had a right to expect from her was that she 
would avoid all subjects for quarrel, that she 
would lend herself to any arrangement to prevent 
dangerous complications ; she has conformed to 
that attitude with a moderation that was not 
devoid of dignity ; she has shown this on several 
occasions, particularly in her Intercourse with 
Italy during SignorCrispi's first ministry. She has 
been occupied entirely In sheltering her territory 
from all danger, and has persevered In that task 
with great prudence, from which she has never 
departed, and at the cost of a public debt which 
exceeds that of any other Power, the heaviest 
that a nation has yet been called upon to support. 
She has braved no one ; she has reflected, and 
she has hesitated at no sacrifice her own dignity 
and the security of the country commanded her 
to make. Does that convey the meaning that 
she has ceased to feel the mutilation she has 
undergone, that all is forgotten? It would be 
an insult to her to think so. But she, like all 
other countries, feels the weight of the burdens she 
has had to be content to bear in order to recover 
herself, and she considers that peace is still, for 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 249 

her, the best of all remedies ; she ardently desires 
to preserve it, leaving the task of curing an ill 
from which all Europe is suffering, as she is, to 
time and the wisdom of Governments. 

Have we any need to say that the Triple Alli- 
ance, which is the cause of this deplorable situation, 
has been a source of difficulties for the Powers 
that formed it, such as they had never yet known ? 
General von Moltke is stated to have observed that 
the acquisition of Metz was equal to an army of a 
hundred thousand men to Germany ; and that 
argument settled the fate of the fortress, it is 
added. It is well known at the present day that 
Germany's aggrandisements on the left bank of 
the Rhine cost the Empire more than they yield 
her in finances and security. They necessitate 
continual development of her military forces and a 
proportional increase in her expenses. The famous 
Marshal's prediction has turned against him. A 
member of the Reichstag affirmed some time back, 
without meeting with contradiction, that in 1879 
five to six marks a head were paid in indirect 
taxes ; owing to the growth of taxation the amount 
is now fourteen marks, that is to say, it has doubled 
in twelve years. The last military law, following 
on to so many others, will raise the peace contin- 
gent by 63,000 men, but it will burden the country 
with a further outlay of sixty million marks. Let 
us mention, moreover, that the French war budget 



2SO STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

for the present year ^ has been fixed at six hundred 
and thirty-three million francs : if the calculations 
that have been made in this respect, and which we 
have not been able to check, are correct,^ the 
German budget will attain eight hundred and 
seventy-nine millions. The budget of the Empire 
comprises revenues of different kinds among its 
receipts, such as the produce of the customs, the 
railways, and telegraphs. But Prince Bismarck, 
foreseeing that these resources would always be 
insufficient, introduced an ingenious clause into 
the Constitution, thanks to which the Imperial 
budget can never be in default. It sets forth, in 
fact, that in case a deficit occurs it shall be met by 
all the Confederate States in proportion to their 
respective populations. No limit is placed to this 
contribution, termed matriculated, which is thus 
of boundless elasticity. In 1879- 1880 it was 
fixed at ninety million marks ; ten years later, in 
1 889-1 890, it rose to two hundred and twenty- 
eight ; for the current financial year, 1 893-1 894, 
it is three hundred and eighty-six million marks. 

^ 1894. — Translate} . 

2 See some comparative tables prepared by M. Jules Roche, 
former minister, and published in the newspaper Le Matiit. It is 
noticeable that our military budget in 1886 exceeded that of 
Germany by a hundred millions. These figures show what sacri- 
fices are being constantly made on the other side of the Rhine. 
According to M. Roche, several items should be deducted from 
the French budget, such as the Gendarmery which, in Germany, 
figures in the budget of the Minister of the Interior. 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 251 

It has, therefore, been quadrupled in fourteen 
years, and this increase is almost entirely due to 
additional outlay in the War Department. We 
could quote other figures in this same order of 
ideas ; those we give abundantly suffice for the 
purpose of forming an opinion on the result of the 
policy imposed by Prince Bismarck on Germany. 
Austria applied herself to the performance of her 
duties with circumspection worthy of commenda- 
tion, but in doing so she did not forget her finan- 
cial position. She followed Germany, but at a 
slower pace, without displaying an ambition to do 
thinors as well or on so laro^e a scale as she did. 

o o 

She does not conceal, however, that she has 
attained the utmost limit of her resources, and 
there is a feeling at Vienna that if these efforts 
have to be continued much longer they will be 
attended with inevitable embarrassment to the 
Government of the Emperor Francis Joseph. To 
this natural uneasiness are joined the differences of 
the various nationalities forming the Austro- Hun- 
garian Empire, differences which exaggerated 
taxation and compulsory military service have 
worked up into a state of exasperation. But 
whilst Austria has been strictly performing her 
duties as an ally of Germany, she has taken par- 
ticular care to keep up relations which she applied 
herself to render easy and even cordial with all 
the Powers, especially Russia. And so she has 



252 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

borne the burdens she has imposed on herself 
without showing visible signs of distress, and no 
disagreement of a bitter nature separates her from 
other countries. 

What a pity we cannot say the same of Italy I 
That noble country, the cradle of our civilisation,, 
had found a sister nation who, extending her a, 
friendly hand, had assisted her to cast off all 
foreign yoke, and to put an end to the painful 
position of being divided into many States, which 
dated back from centuries. Italy under the 
guidance of a skilful and clear-headed Prince, 
aided by enlightened and patriotic advisers, had 
completed her resuscitation with a success that 
had surpassed all expectations. The problem 
was solved. To bring her enfranchisement to a 
glorious issue, she had been obliged at the com- 
mencement to contract loans, and in a measure 
to discount the future ; she had been compelled 
to have recourse to paper money and obligatory 
currency. Her budgets in early years showed 
deficits. By the Sovereign's prudence and the 
skill of his Ministers all these difficulties had 
been mastered, the country freed from onerous 
expedients; and the liquidation of the financial 
law at last showed a surplus, when new men 
having grasped the reins of power embarked 
the kingdom in the Triple Alliance adventure. 
We have no need to relate what ensued. No 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 253 

one moreover, can be mistaken, in the painful 
sight that Italy now presents to astounded 
Europe. What could we add to Signor Crispi's 
avowals on returning to power? "Italy's posi- 
tion is grave," he said, "more grave than it 
ever has been." What shows him to be tho- 
roughly sincere, this time, is the proposal, or 
rather the prayer ad misericordiam, which he 
addressed to the representatives of the people 
to abdicate all authority, all control, in his favour. 
"" The difficulties we have to overcome," he added, 
"are considerable, and to raise our credit, re- 
organise the finances, assert the authority of the 
law, and give the country confidence again, we 
require the co-operation of the Chamber without 
distinction of parties. In that view we ask you 
for the truce of God," That is to say, to vote 
what Signor Crispi considers the most advantage- 
ous without inquiring into the subject and without 
discussion. At no period has the Prime Minister 
of a constitutionally governed country been heard 
to hold such strange language. It is not merely 
a question of the deficit increasing and of those 
in authority at Rome being in doubt as to the 
possibility of meeting the requirments of all the 
departments of State ; the country is also excited 
and full of anxiety. The association of the fasci 
in Sicily violently assails the fisc which is obliged 
to persecute the tax-payers, and this movement 



254 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

spreads into the provinces round Naples and 
Rome, also weighed down by excessive taxa- 
tion. It is easy to conceive that Signor Crispi 
has recourse to extraordinary and unconstitutional 
expedients. 

To whom or what does Italy owe this painful 
state of things ? Evidently to the Triple Alliance, 
to Prince Bismarck's work, which has been equally 
disastrous to all the European continent as well 
as to present and future generations. To arm is 
no small matter ; armaments mean outlay ; those 
who raise the largest contingents, who manufacture 
new cannon or build armoured ships of greater 
size, must pay for them ; and this constant pro- 
gression, with the discoveries of modern science 
laughing at established security, no longer knows 
any limit. It drags along with it the progression 
of the budgets, which already at the present 
moment exceed the normal resources of all the 
various States. And not only do these require- 
ments absorb the revenues, they hinder national 
labour, the development of industry, of agriculture, 
and paralyze commerce i they engender misery 
and discontent ; they thus trouble order at home 
and threaten international peace. It would be 
childish to conceal from one's self that military 
service, obligatory for all, imposing on the 
Governments the duty of diverting a large portion 
of the public revenue to form new battalions and 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 255. 

new fleets instead of using it for the welfare and 
relief of the people, has, on the other hand 
caused or facilitated the propagation of doctrines 
subversive of all social order. And this calamity 
of a new kind is becoming more serious and is 
spreading everywhere. Formerly we only knew 
of socialists ; we are now in presence of anarchists 
and the " country less " are announced. A short 
time ago these doctrines were followed by only a 
few adepts ; they now have representatives in all 
the Assemblies, and the numbers increase each 
time parliament is renewed. This Is an unshaken 
fact In Germany ; It has just asserted itself In 
France. Thus the flood rises without end, that 
of public burdens as that of Ideas tending to the 
destruction of all society. 

There Is the peace Prince Bismarck has wished 
to guarantee to Europe ; there are its bitter fruits. 
It puts the old world In presence of two alterna- 
tives — misery or war ; unless it leads it to another 
catastrophe which is none the less redoubtable — 
social strife. In presence of facts of which we 
are all witnesses no one Is justified in lulling him- 
self with the Illusion that each country In Europe 
can Indefinitely raise Its taxes ; such however, is 
the obligation which the involuntary hermit of 
Friedrichsruh has Imposed on all of them. This 
Is compulsory ruin at a date more or less distant. 
Italy's fate bears Irrefutable testimony to It, and 



256 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

that is what is fatally reserved to all other countries. 
Each will delay the settling day in proportion to 
the extent of its national wealth, but none have 
the certainty of indefinitely escaping it. It will 
be the war of guineas, as Prince Bismarck re- 
marked with that humouristic wit which is one of 
his distineuishinsf characteristics. But when the 
store is exhausted, with what reserves will they 
manufacture this new kind of projectile ? Let us 
be serious, and acknowledge that science, by a 
mockery of fate, herself sterilises, so to say, all 
the sacrifices that are made to place and keep the 
military forces on a proper footing, by rendering 
it necessary, through fresh discoveries, to be con- 
stantly renewing them. By increasing sometimes 
the resisting power of the armour plates, some- 
times the penetrating power of the projectiles or 
else the range of the rifle or field piece, she 
renders the outlay of yesterday on her own in- 
dications, useless to-morrow.^ No one therefore 
can uphold the theory that the day will come 
when it will be possible to pull up on this 
slippery and never-ending slope. Europe is con- 

1 Formerly it did not cost three million francs (^120,000) to 
build a large frigate of the line armed with one hundred and 
twenty cannon. The last ironclads that have been launched 
have been built at an outlay of twenty-seven million francs. There 
are some on the stocks that will cost thirty million francs. 
Formerly we were obliged to keep an armament for an army 
of 500,000 men in our arsenals ; at the present day we must keep 
up an armament for four millions of men. 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 257 

demned to drag herself along there until worn 
out, until the revolt of public conscience which 
will prefer the supreme struggle, the battle for 
life as General Caprivi expressed himself, to 
ruin and misery. That is armed peace, there 
are the consequences of it, there is where the 
personal policy of Prince Bismarck has led 
the whole of Europe, people and Governments 
alike ! 

This redoubtable calamity is happily not immi- 
nent. A new and providential occurrence places 
a barrier in the way, the understanding between 
France and Russia, the sole benefit we owe to 
Prince Bismarck. These two Powers, against 
whom the Triple Alliance was directed, now closely 
united, guarantee an honourable peace to Europe- 
No one can suspect the feelings of the Emperor 
Alexander III. The new Chancellor of the 
German Empire paid striking homage to their 
sincerity in one of his recent speeches. With less 
warmth, but equal good faith, we believe, he 
recognised that the Republic cherished the same 
sentiments. The telegrams the Czar and M. 
Carnot exchanged at the time of the departure of 
the Russian fleet from Toulon conveyed the 
same impression to the mind of every one. No^ 
aggression to fear on either hand. Let us hasten 
to add that there is no more desire for war at 
Berlin or Vienna than at St. Petersburg or Paris. 



258 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

We are no longer living in the times when 
Count Moltke looked on war as a social 
necessity, as a benefit, pursuing his master with 
his obtestations to engage in it. Nor are we in 
those dangerous days when he thought advantage 
should be taken of the distress of France to crush 
her for ever. The young Emperor of Germany 
sometimes holds language to his troops which is 
certainly not in harmony with the spirit of the 
times. He says to them : " You must have but 
one will, mine ; but one law, my law." He showed 
himself less temperate still when, addressing the 
4th Army Corps at Erfurt, he pronounced the 
following words which would always be regret- 
table on the lips of a sovereign : "It was here 
that the Corsican parvenu humbled us so pro- 
foundly ; but it was from here, in 181 3, that the 
flash of revenge started which was to lay him 
low." This was an imprudent evocation, and were 
similar remarks heard in France we should be 
bitterly reproached with them ! Such errors may 
be attributed to juvenile enthusiasm and to a 
traditional feeling in the House of Hohenzollern. 
For it is only right to recognise that the Emperor 
William has given proofs of his firm desire to 
preserve peace, and we should not be surprised 
if we were to learn he had taken care to master 
warlike inclinations around him. We have quoted 
a few words from his Chancellor which permit one 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 259 

to think that he has always repudiated all idea 
of a preventive war. 

Unfortunately, apart from the fatal and inevit- 
able contingencies we recently pointed out, there 
remains the mysterious chapter of the unforeseen, 
that master of the universe, especially since Europe 
has been divided into two camps as ready to rush 
on to one another as if we were on the eve of a 
struggle. I have no liking either for triple or 
double alliances, wrote Mr. Gladstone ; for in 
reality the definite aim of these alliances is not 
pacific. The strength of a nation consists, in the 
last extremity, in the economy of its forces. The 
future of Europe, I fear is very black, although 
with the grace of God, the present pacific situa- 
tion may still last some time.^ These remarks, 
emanating from a Statesman of long experience 
and gifted with a mind developed in the world 
of politics, deserve to be retained and meditated 
on. 

In truth, in the state Europe was then, bristling 
with cannon, fortresses, swarming with armed 
men, what an incalculable fund of prudence and 
discretion would be required to avoid a conflict ! 
In 1866 while Austria and Prussia were mobilising 
their armies, some one inquired of Prince Bismarck 
how it was possible hostilities could break out 

1 Letter addressed to Signer Schilizi, Manager of the Corriere di 
Napoli. 

S 2 



26o STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

when there was no lawful reason for war. " Ah^ 
bah! " he answered, "the cannon will talk without 
it." That is the redoubtable unknown, the sword 
of Damocles suspended over the peace of the 
world. We trust there will not be found a heart 
sufficiently steeled, so unchristian-like a soul as to 
hasten the frightful conflagration which may be 
the result of this situation ; but who can foresee 
incidents swift and imperious that leave no one 
any time for reflection ? During the fifty years 
that followed the wars of the First Empire each 
State possessed its peace budget, which was, in a 
way, unalterable ; each had an army of moderate 
and invariable strength ; no one disturbed his 
neighbour. Every fresh war required long pre- 
paration ; there was thus time for explaining 
matters, and mediators could come forward with 
offers of assistance. 

The Germans of our times have taken us back 
to the early days of their ancestors, who were 
always under arms, ever ready to invade territory 
bordering on their possessions. It pleased King 
William I. of Prussia to increase his military 
power, whilst Count Bismarck chose to advise his 
master, who lent a willing ear, to embark in war ; 
and the peaceful condition in which Europe lived 
until their time, has been so thoroughly upset that 
there remains no trace of it. After having re- 
arranged the map of Europe to their fancy and 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 261 

advantage, they returned victorious and loaded 
with laurels to Berlin ; but did they take repose 
and prosperity back to Germany ? The Swabian 
and, even more so, the Pomeranian peasants emi- 
grate to escape the benefits of Prince Bismarck's 
policy. The heavy taxes, the necessity of con- 
cluding alliances, of remaining under arms, either 
on the western or northern frontier, show, on the 
■contrary, that the adviser, of one mind with the 
sovereign, has inaugurated a period of heavy bur- 
dens and protracted anxiety ; that together they 
have cast the country on the road to ruin or 
gigantic struggles ; unless, as we have already 
said, the menace of another scourge, social warfare, 
■constrains the various Governments to arrive at 
an understanding guaranteeing a new period of 
appeasement and concord to the people. 

Is there any necessity to mention the disastrous 
•calamities that another war would inflict on Europe? 
We all foresee them with feelings of horror. 
Armies of several millions of men are not de- 
stroyed in one campaign ; a great number of fort- 
resses dotting all the lines of defence, and provided 
with every technical improvement of modern 
times, are not reduced so easily. The struggle 
would, therefore, be long, sanguinary, devastating 
for all the countries that become the theatre of it, 
on the Rhine, the Alps, the Vistula. The convic- 
tion of this is so painful that Sovereigns and 



262 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Statesmen, all speaking with equal fervour, advo- 
cate the preservation of peace, and, by professions 
of faith reiterated without end, repudiate all ag- 
gressive intention, and bear witness to their ardent 
desire to maintain it. But do they conform to 
this programme by employing their time and 
efforts in the preparation of war, by persevering in 
a state of things that must necessarily produce it ? 
One would search history in vain for a precedent 
authorising one to think so. You do not arm for 
peace, you arm for war, particularly when you do 
so to excess ; when you display such a passion for 
arming, there is always a time when you come to 
blows. Count Bismarck well knew this when he 
assisted King William in developing the Prussian 
army by battling with the representatives of the 
country, by governing without a budget, by devot- 
ing, without credits regularly voted, all the available 
resources to the military forces of the kingdom 
during the first and hardest period of his long 
ministry. 

The Sovereigns and Governments who sincerely 
desire to dispel the black spots accumulating at the 
four corners of the horizon should place their 
solicitude and care in another sphere. We have 
said, and it is not possible to contradict us, that 
by maintaining the present situation, a power 
more imperious than all human determinations 
together, the force of circumstances, what the 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 263 

ancients termed fatality, will lead us direct, in- 
evitably either to war or ruin ; it moreover 
abundantly supplies the most detestable doctrines 
with powerful material for propagation. Before 
long, all the causes of some profound trouble, of 
some perturbation without remedy, will be united : 
misery, anarchy, a conflagration that is imminent. 
These dangers must be attended to, and, in pre- 
sence of that necessity, a Government, formidably 
armed, draws the sword, convinced of purifying 
all by the glaive and brand, having, indeed, no 
other issue from the predicament in which it has 
placed itself. Is it not the duty of every one to 
avoid such contingencies whilst it is still possible ? 
We are, perhaps, in error, but we are inclined to 
think that time, which under such circumstances is 
of advantage to no one, is less prejudicial to France, 
as it passes on, than to other Continental powers. 
The evil it develops is hurtful to the national 
wealth of each country, and we do not think we 
shall be expressing a presumptuous opinion in 
imagining, that our resources permit of our 
supporting longer than most of our neighbours 
the international situation that weighs as heavily 
on them as on ourselves. We believe, neverthe- 
less, that we shall be faithfully interpreting public 
feeling in France by entreating any who are able 
to contribute to such a purpose, to seek the 
solution of this redoubtable problem, which appeals 



264 : STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

both to the solicitude and religion of rulers of 
every order ; to spare the world those hecatombs 
which, come what may, cannot benefit civilisation, 
which would be a mortal shame for the present 
generation, and a lawful ground for the malediction 
of those to come. 

We have performed a duty in pointing out the 
evil, and, In order to fulfil our task in all sincerity, 
we have hidden nothing. It is not within our 
sphere to give the remedy. It will be found in 
the consciences of the powerful of the earth ; let 
them search therein, and they will discover the 
elements of appeasing solutions. The Triple 
Alliance is a deed of defiance and hatred ; facts 
prove this superabundantly at present. It will 
produce what it has had within it in germ since 
its origin : ruin or war, perhaps both scourges 
together. If those who formed it or who have 
become its guardians are not convinced, it is 
because Jupiter has turned them silly in order 
to chastise them the better. Morality would be 
an idle word if this truth, which the wisdom of 
■centuries has bequeathed to us, were not to triumph 
in our time. 

But morality, in history, has overcome all abuse 
of power, and in this instance it will not fail. 
Certain publicists, acting under the influence of a 
feeling that is to be commended, have wished to 
be before the various Governments in the work of 



ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 265 

conciliation for which the populations are offering 
up all their prayers. They have invented arrange- 
ments founded sometimes on exchanges, some- 
times on compensations, without ever having been 
able to conceal from themselves that the great diffi- 
culty lies in Alsace-Lorraine. We cannot follow 
them on this ground, where the most warrantable 
combinations, those even that seem the most im- 
pressive, are put forward without authority or 
sanction. If the question belongs to the domain 
of public opinion in some ways, its solution de- 
pends exclusively on the initiative and agreement 
of Governments. It is for them to attend to it ; 
they are entrusted with the most precious of all 
missions : that of assuring peace and prosperity to 
the nations whose destinies are in their hands. 
The task is that of diplomacy. If the matter is 
left to her she will sail round this tempestuous 
cape. How many are the conflicts she has 
prevented, how many the wars she has stayed ? 
Were she in presence of a Gordian knot, she 
would untie it ; our state of civilisation allows of 
and requires that she should ; or, otherwise, it 
must be severed, recourse must be had to the 
sabre, and the first cut that is given will be the pre- 
lude to disasters that no century has known. Prince 
Bismarck's work will be completed by the glaive 
and brand beyond the limits his pride had fixed 
for it. The responsibility of the originator will 



266 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

be shared by his continuators. If they do not 
wish to incur it, let them hurry, for there is but 
Httle time ; let them consider that war will set 
several millions of formidably armed men fighting. 
" Peace," the Emperor William is reported to 
have said, on hearing of the welcome our fleet 
received at Cronstadt, " no longer rests with me." 
That is an error. Of all European sovereigns 
he better than any other can give peace the basis 
it requires to be durable. Few Princes before 
him have had the good fortune to meet with a 
more noble and glorious task. 

February, 1894. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 

INTRODUCTION 

I HAVE referred in the preface of this volume 
to the book I published in 1871, in which I printed 
the most important of the despatches I sent from 
Berlin during my residence in Prussia, and in- 
cluding- the complete correspondence exchanged 
with the Due de Gramont on the occasion of my 
mission to Ems. In 1872 M. de Gramont issued 
a work entitled La France et la Pritsse avant la 
guerre, in which he saw fit to readjust what he 
termed the inexactness of my comments and to 
particularly call attention to the results I claimed 
to have obtained in the course of this last nesfotia- 
tion, and which he contested. Feeling it impos- 
sible for me to submit to these rectifications, I had 
resolved to reply to them, and with that object 
had prepared a brief statement of the exchange 
of views I had had with the King of Prussia and 
of the account I had given of them to the Imperial 
Government. I was hesitating, however, to 



268 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

engage in a discussion that might in some respects 
be unfortunate, when M. de Gramont died. 
Obedient to a feeling that all will understand, 
I then made up my mind to keep the work 
in my drawer intending to publish it if new 
developments made it an imperative duty for 
me to do so. 

The contradictory versions that have never 
ceased to be given of my conduct and acts, both 
in France and abroad, in regard to a matter of 
eminent interest for the history of our times, have 
made me decide not to wait until I disappear in 
my turn without having rectified the reproaches, 
I might say the accusations, articulated by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs who was my last 
chief. I am sure this resolution will be ratified 
by public opinion. I give this work here in the 
form in which it was written at the specified date, 
adding a few explanatory or complementary notes 
on incidents that became better known afterwards. 
The reader, in perusing these pages, should bear 
in mind that they were penned in 1873, previous 
to various occurrences that have contributed to 
throw light on the events to which they refer. 



Great national catastrophes, whilst exasperating 
the minds of the public, at the same time lead 
their consciences astray. Under the imperious 



MY MISSION TO EMS 269 

infiuence of this ii'ritating trouble, public opinion, 
maddened by a disaster, eagerly seeks the causes 
of it, and in its precipitation forms impressions, 
which, however erroneous they be, soon take root 
and assume the character of belief. 

This psychological phenomenon is often met 
with in our history ; it made its appearance in 
1870 at the time of our first reverses. Public 
opinion, astounded at the defeat of our armies, 
accused the Government of knowino- nothing- and 
its agents of having supplied untrustworthy in- 
formation. Having occupied the Embassy at 
Berlin for several years, these recriminations 
touched me personally. I was however conscious 
of not having been wanting in any of my duties. 
I endeavoured to throw light on matters, and in a 
book entitled Ma Mission en Prusse I placed 
the most essential part of my correspondence 
before the public. I gave the whole of that 
portion of it which I had exchanged with the 
Due de Gramont during the mission I had per- 
formed at Ems, confining myself to briefly 
connecting the facts together, so as to thoroughly 
establish, without drawing any other inference 
from them, that I had faithfully, and not without 
success, accomplished my task both at Ems and 
Berlin. 

M. de Gramont, in his turn, published a work 
called. La France et la Prttsse avant la guerre]. 



270 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

in which he considered himself called upon to 
enter into long explanations to prove that, con- 
trary to my assertions, I had not obtained, whilst 
carrying out his orders, any stifficient and timely 
concession. 

Disavowed by my Chief of the last hour, I 
found myself obliged, on my own part, to com- 
ment on our respective participation in the 
incidents that preceded the war. 

I have no need to refer again to the care I 
took to justify the confidence the Imperial 
Government had shown me, in accrediting me 
as ambassador to the King of Prussia. I proved 
that I had not neglected sending the Minister 
any information it was my duty to transmit to 
him ; I established particularly that I had pointed 
out in an explanatory despatch dated January 
5th, 1868, that it had been firmly resolved at 
Berlin, to restore the German Empire, even by 
force of arms if necessary ; I had foreseen that 
in such a contingency, the whole of Germany, 
Governments and populations alike, would gather 
enthusiastically round Prussia ; I neither omitted 
to mention the armaments that were proceeding 
before my eyes, nor Count Bismarck's efforts to 
ensure the kindly neutrality of Russia, especially 
in view of restraining Austria ; finally, I called 
attention to the candidature of Prince Leopold 
of Hohenzollern to the crown of Spain eighteen 



MY MISSION TO EMS 271 

months before it was avowed at Berlin and 
Madrid, I pointed it out as a stratagem devised 
by the Prussian Cabinet so as to cause the 
Imperial Government difficulties of a diplomatic 
order which might affect both our security and 
our relations with Germany. 

On these points, I have not met with any 
serious contradictions. It therefore only remains 
for me to set the assertions of M. de Gramont 
right in regard to the part I took in the negotia- 
tions he instructed me to open at Ems with King 
William. I know I am undertaking my own 
defence ; I am pleading pro domo '}ned with the 
knowledge that whosoever seeks to defend him- 
self is exposed to more criticism than sympathy ; 
but I am compelled to do so ; and when I have 
placed my acts and conduct, as well as the judg- 
ment passed on them by M. de Gramont, in the 
proper light, it will be recognised that I could 
not abstain from following that course. 

I. 

I was at Wildbad when I received orders to 
repair to Ems, where I was to be joined by a 
courier bearing the instructions of the Imperial 
Government. I left without delay and reached 
my destination on the evening of July 8th. 
What did the Minister's instructions prescribe 



272 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

me ? After having explained the motives that 
rendered it necessary to intervene in this affair 
he wrote as follows : — " Be guided by these 
reasons, impress them on the King, and exert 
yourself to obtain a promise from him that he 
will advise Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern to 
withdraw his acceptance," ^ That was the theme 
set forth in the official despatch ; but to this de- 
spatch was joined a private letter stating more pre- 
cisely the nature of the resolution I was instructed 
to obtain from the King, whilst at the same time 
modifying it ; in this form it read : — "The King's 
Government does not approve of Prince Leopold 
of Hohenzollern's acceptance, and gives him orders 
to reconsider this decision which was arrived at 
without its permission." The Minister added : " It 
will then be necessary to inform me whether 
the Prince, obedient to this injunction, renounces 
his candidature officially and publicly." 

It was not thus that I understood and per- 
formed M. de Gramont's orders : I obeyed his 
official instructions without paying any attention 
to the recommendations in his private letter. I 
did not ask the King to give orders to Prince 
Leopold of Hohenzollern to reconsider his deci- 
sion, I requested him to advise the Prince to 
renounce his candidature. 

^ This document, like all those I shall quote later on, will be 
found in full in my volume Ma Mission en Prusse. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 273, 

Whoever has had anything to do with this kind 
of diplomatic business knows what gentleness, 
what precaution is necessary, in opening an irritat- 
ing discussion, especially when one enters on it 
direct with a Sovereign. Had I adopted the tone 
recommended in the Minister's private letter, I 
should certainly have taken up an attitude that 
would have been wounding for the King ; he 
would have concluded that there was a firm 
determination to inflict a personal retractation 
on him, and I should have brought on an im- 
mediate rupture. I should have reversed the 
parts from the commencement, loaded ourselves 
with all the wrongs we were justified in reproach- 
ing Prussia with ; I should have placed all our 
advantages in jeopardy, especially that resulting 
from the straightforward manner of our proceed- 
ings and the duplicity of the Berlin Cabinet. I 
was all the more constrained to attenuate the form 
I gave to my communications, as I perceived the 
irritation aroused by the utterances of M. de Gra- 
mont at the Corps Legislatif, during the sitting of 
July 6th vibrating in Germany. It was evident to 
me that German pride had been deeply wounded. 

In regard to this, here is what our Minister at 
Stuttgart, a centre, however, where Prussia was 
regarded with distrust rather than sympathy, 
wrote to M. de Gramont on July loth : " I must 
not conceal from your Excellency the feeling of 



274 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

bewilderment and dismay that the declaration 
of July 6th has caused among the public ; we 
are considered generally to have justice on our 
side, on the basis of the incident itself; but it 
is regretted that the sense of our own sterling 
right has not prompted us to greater moderation 
in the form of expression." If for Southern 
Germany we had been wanting in forbearance, 
for the North we had been imperious and 
aggressive. My first duty compelled me to be 
mindful of these feelings, which newspapers of 
all shades on the other side of the Rhine had 
retailed in passionate language. 

But I had a much more powerful reason for 
advancing with extreme prudence over the ground 
I was about to approach ; I knew it to be strewn 
with snares. I had detected Prince Leopold's 
candidature in the month of March of the pre- 
ceding year,; I had conferred on the subject with 
Count Bismarck, who did not contest the accuracy 
of my information, but who had refused to give 
me the assurance that the King would refrain, 
if the contingency occurred, from authorising his 
nephew to accept the Spanish crown. I felt 
convinced that he intended to have recourse to 
this combination whenever he considered it 
opportune to cause a bitter disagreement be- 
tween Germany and France.^ The trap he set 

^ Recent revelations have amply shown with what anxiety, and 



MY MISSION TO EMS 275 

for us in 1870 had been prepared a long time 
in advance ; at Ems my thoughts were parti- 
cularly busy with the determination not to fall 
into it myself and drag the Government of my 
■country along with me.^ 

I was, therefore, very careful at the audience 
the King granted me the day after my arrival, 
not to suggest he should give Prince Leopold of 
Hohenzollern orders to renounce his candidature. 
I confined myself to expressing the hope that 
he would advise him to do so, insisting on the 
reasons that made it a duty for us to intervene 
in this matter. In proceeding thus, I did not 
overlook my official instructions, I conformed 
to them, without exposing myself to be wanting 
in the respect due to the Sovereign of a great 
country ; without departing from the sound tradi- 
tions of diplomacy. 

The King, with his customary courtesy, gave 
me an answer that may be epitomised as follows : 
^' I had no part in the negotiations, which have 
been carried on between the Spanish Government 
and the Hohenzollern Princes exclusively. I 

what desire to find a cause for rupture, my attitude and speech 
were watched. To be convinced of this it will suffice to recall 
tinder what circumstances and with what rapidity of resolve Count 
Bismarck took advantage of the opportunity as soon as we gave it 
Hm, and with what an easy conscience he altered the Ems 
despatch. 

1 See Ma Mission en Pricsse, p. 301 and following. 

T 2 



276 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

limited myself to informing Prince Leopold and 
Prince Anthony, his father, when they solicited 
my approbation, that I did not consider I could 
refuse it them. I have just made inquiries as 
to their present intentions, and I shall wait until 
I have information on that point, to let you 
know what resolutions may be adopted." He 
assured me at the same time, that if Prince 
Leopold showed himself disposed to withdraw 
his acceptance, he would hasten to approve 
that decision. I shall point out, shortly, in 
what frame of mind, and for what reasons, the 
King thus assumed an attitude of apparent irre- 
sponsibility ; but the reader will not forget that 
if the King refused to take any initiative in 
the matter, even that of giving advice — and it 
will be seen that in this respect he showed 
himself absolutely inflexible — he would have still 
more resolutely repelled any suggestion to give 
an order, if perchance I had made one, as M. de 
Gramont commanded me to do in his private 
letter. It is clear that I should have placed an 
insuperable obstacle to any understanding. The 
King, besides,' in announcing to me that he 
had placed himself in communication with the 
Princes, gave us a pledge of his participation 
in the affair, and that was a point gained, and 
one of extreme importance for the issue of the 
negotiations. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 277 

In conveying an account of this first interview 
to my Government, I was very careful to fathom 
what was passing in the King's mind ; and the 
conclusion I arrived at was that if he had no evil 
designs, he proposed arranging matters so as to 
be able to pretend that Prince Leopold had spon- 
taneously changed his views in regard to his 
candidature ; the King would thus avoid the 
necessity of himself personally making a con- 
cession calculated to damage his prestige and 
offend public opinion in Germany. I added that 
I could not, without incurring the risk of making 
it thought I had come to Ems solely with the in- 
tention of bringing about a rupture, abstain from 
acquiescing in the King's desire that I should 
await the answer of the Hohenzollern Princes 
"to resume our conference." 

What reception did this first communication 
meet with from the Imperial Government.^ "The 
King," M. de Gramont wrote to me,^ "is hence- 
forth a party to the affair ; after having made the 
avowal that he authorised acceptance, he must 
advise and obtain renunciation." The same day 
he telegraphed to me: "Write me a despatch I 
can read at the Chambers and publish, in which 
you will show that the King was aware of and 
a,uthorised Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern's 
acceptance, and mention particularly that he told 

1 Letter dated July loth. 



278 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

you he desired to concert with the Prince before 
making known to you what he had resolved." 

If the Imperial Government had decided that 
no arrangement was possible apart from an order 
given by the King to the Prince to renounce his 
candidature or a prohibition to maintain it, M. de 
Gramont would have informed me ; he would 
have urged me to limit myself to obtaining from 
the King, without delay, a formal and explicit 
declaration guaranteeing us Prince Leopold's 
desistance from that moment It was certainly 
not in this sense that I could understand the 
instructions M. de Gramont sent me, after having 
received the account of my first interview with 
the King ; I was, on the contrary, justified in con- 
cluding that the Imperial Government did not 
propose placing any obstacle in the way of the 
understanding the King proposed to arrange with 
his relatives, and that he thought our efforts 
should be directed, especially, to securing Prince 
Leopold's renunciation with the King's assistance. 
I therefore had every reason to believe I was on 
the riofht ground, and ought to remain there. 

Nevertheless, although I had been only two 
days at Ems, M. de Gramont was becoming 
impatient ; he was certainly afraid that there 
was a desire to keep us inactive whilst the 
German army was being mobilised. He was,, 
however, too familiar with diplomatic affairs to. 



MY MISSION TO.EMS 279 

be unaware that a negotiation of this importance 
could not be concluded so rapidly. Notwith- 
standing, without changing his instructions of the 
previous day in any way, he telegraphed to me 
on the evening of the nth: "At the point we 
reached, I must not disguise from you that your 
tone no longer responds to the position taken up 
by the Emperor's Government. You must now 
emphasize it more." I was able to answer him,, 
no later than the following morning : "I had 
understood myself that at the point where matters 
now are I should adopt a firmer tone and become 
more pressing. I acted so yesterday, at a fresh 
interview with the King and previous to receiving 
your last telegrams, as you will see by the de- 
spatch that will reach you to day. You will no 
doubt be of opinion that I could not emphasize 
my language more forcibly without ruining the 
object of my mission." 

In my desire to hasten the solution so im- 
patiently awaited at Paris, I had indeed asked for 
a second audience of the King on the nth, to 
obtain from him the authorisation to inform my 
Government of his intention to advise Prince 
Leopold to renounce the Spanish crown. I made 
energetic exertions in that view. After this 
interview I wrote to M. de Gramont : — 

" . . . . The King deigned to receive me this 
morning, and, in accordance with your directions, I 



28o STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

sought to prevail on him to consent without further 
delay to a resolution that was of a nature to fully 
satisfy us. I therefore asked him to permit me to 
let you know that he would invite Prince Leopold 
of Hohenzollern to renounce his candidature. The 
Prince, I said, being unable to dispense with con- 
forming to the King's views, we should be at once in 
a position to calm all apprehensions. To induce his 
Majesty to favourably entertain the desire I ex- 
pressed to him, I concealed neither the distrust, nor 
the irritation of public opinion in France ; I told 
him of the impatience displayed by the Senate 
and Corps Legislatif, and of the necessity in which 
the Emperor's Government found itself of satisfy- 
ing them, of the peril this state of things occa- 
sioned, and of the additional danger caused by 
every day's delay. . . . The King frequently inter- 
rupted me with objections he had already made at 
a preceding audience. His Majesty particularly 
insisted on the capacity in which he had intervened, 
that of head of the family, which, in his opinion, 
pledged neither the Sovereign of Prussia nor his 
Government. I did not confine myself this time 
to answering that this duality would not be under- 
stood, I added that it was inadmissible from every 
point of view ; that the King was chief of the 
family, because he was the Sovereign, and therefore 
it was impossible to separate, in the present instance, 
these two qualities, and that the Hohenzollern 



MY MISSION TO EMS 281 

Princes owed him absolute obedience simply 
because he united one and the other In his person ; 
that the matter could not be viewed in . any other 
light, and that it was, consequently, easy to under- 
stand why the accession of Prince Leopold was 
rerarded in France in the lig"ht of a Restoration 
of the Empire of Charles V 

" ' Is it not a fact,' I continued, ' that, in case of 
a dissent between the Government of your Majesty 
and that of the Emperor, we should be under the 
necessity of watching our frontier of the Pyrenees 
and consequently dividing our forces ? No one 
would deny it. Our conduct is therefore traced 
-out for us by the requirements of our own security, 
and we cannot, on this occasion, be exposed to the 
reproach of voluntarily raising a conflict.' 

" According to the King I exaggerated the 
consequences of a combination which he, for his 
part, had never desired. He maintained it was 
impossible for him — and the terms in which he 
expressed himself lead me to think that he con- 
sidered it incompatible with his sovereign dignity 
— to modify his attitude and exact that Prince 
Leopold should renounce the Spanish crown after 
having told him he did not forbid him to accept it. 
Unless I make a mistake, what the King does not 
wish is, as I wrote to you, to assume the responsi- 
bility of a retreat or of a concession that would 
offend public feeling in Germany, and it is his firm 



282 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

intention, if he has no other designs, to cast off all 
responsibility, and let it rest on Prince Leopold and 
Prince Anthony, the father, exclusively. 

" ' Besides,' resumed the King, ' there is no 
peril in waiting, and the delay of a day or two 
will not make matters worse. ..." 

" The King, without concealing the impression 
my remarks had produced on his mind (I had 
replied to his observations and advanced new 
arguments), pointed out to me that our persever- 
ance, when he only asked for a very brief delay 
to ascertain the intentions of the two Princes, 
might make him think we aimed at bringing on 
a conflict. I protested against this supposition, 
and offered the King a sure means of ascertain- 
ing our real feelings by begging his Majesty to 
guarantee us Prince Leopold's renunciation. ..." 

In concluding this despatch, I said : — 

"The King asked me again, with real per- 
sistency, to telegraph to you in his name, without 
losing a moment, that he expected a communica- 
tion to-night or to-morrow from Prince Leopold, 
and that he would at once give me a definite 
answer." ^ 

To this despatch I added a private letter, in 
which I wrote to M. de Gramont : 

"The King, notwithstanding all my efforts, 
persists in saying he cannot and will not take on 

1 Despatch dated July nth, 1870. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 283'. 

himself to order Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern 
to withdraw the word he has sent the Spanish 
Government. His Majesty leaves me to surmise, 
and through those about him ffives me to under- 
stand, as Baron Werther^ will tell you, that the 
Prince will spontaneotisly renounce the Spanish 
crown which has been offered him, and the King 
will not hesitate to app7'ove his decision, ..." 

Why was it we asked the King to give us the 
assurance he would advise Prince Leopold to 
renounce the Spanish crown? It was certainly 
not for the purpose of touching him personally ,- 
it was solely with the view of obtaining a 
guarantee for the Prince's desistance without 
wandering through long, tedious negotiations. 
How did the King receive my remarks ? Did 
he decline to enter into them so as to leave us no 
hope of a satisfactory solution.'^ In none of our 
interviews did the King express the thought that 
Prince Leopold had given his word and should 
abide by it. What he never would concede to 
me was to Qrive me an undertakino- that he would 

o o 

constrain him, even by the channel of advice, to 
make a renunciation ; he declined to proceed in 
that manner ; he did not reject the principal ob- 
ject of our complaint, the renunciation of Prince 

1 Baron Werther, Prussian Ambassador at Paris, had preceded 
me at Ems. On the nth, he received orders to return to his post. 
He left the same afternoon, convinced that the crisis would be 
settled the following day by the King's declaration. 



284 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Leopold. I had had a clear presentiment of 
this from the commencement of the negotiations, 
and had very distinctly pointed it out in my com- 
munications of July nth. The King, I said, 
wishes that the Prince's deslstance should appear 
to be the result of a spontaneous expression of 
his own will. I had communicated this decision 
of the King to M. de Gramont early on the 
morning of the 9th, whilst explaining the reasons 
by which he had been Influenced. 

But If I had been unable to persuade the King 
to consent to the measure that would have most 
promptly put an end to the affair, I had never- 
theless brought him to make us the sacrifice of 
his nephew's candidature, and of the political views 
of his own advisers. The KInof would not grlve 
way on the matter of form ; but in regard to the 
broad basis of the question, I had led him to tell 
me he would put no obstacle In the way of Prince 
Leopold's renunciation ; he allowed me to con- 
jecture and even caused me to be informed that 
the Prince mzist spontaneously renounce the crown 
that had been offered him, and that his Majesty 
would not hesitate to approve his resolution. I had 
further obtained the King's promise to give me a 
definite answer within a very brief delay, and It 
has been seen how persistently he had asked me 
to telegraph, in that sense and in his name, to M. 
de Gramont. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 285 



II. 



My second conference with the King had there- 
fore taken place on the 1 1 th at noon ; I gave an 
account of the substance of it by telegraph, and 
the same day sent a despatch embodying all the 
explanations that have just been read ; and I,, 
moreover, added a private letter, as I have said. 
The courier bearing my correspondence reached 
Paris on the morning of the 1 2th. 

Thus on the morning of the 1 2th, it is impor- 
tant to note it, before having had any knowledge 
of the telegram forwarded by Prince Leopold's 
father to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, before 
receiving Baron Werther, before the interpellation 
of M. Clement Duvernois — incidents to which I 
shall return later on — M. de Gramont had been 
correctly informed of the King's intentions. He 
was aware that he absolutely refused to enter into 
an engagement, with zts to give Prince Leopold an 
order or a counsel, that he desired his nephew's 
desistance to have all the character of a free and 
personal resolution, but that he consented to 
acquiesce in it by a declaration which he author- 
ised me to transmit to the Imperial Government. 
M. de Gramont knew finally that this declaration 
would be made to us within a brief delay. 

Did this arrangement, the form of which was 



286 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

approved by the King, whilst it gave us satisfac- 
tion in regard to the main point, respond to our 
lawful requirements ? Ought we to be content 
with the renunciation, reputed voluntary, of Prince 
Leopold of Hohenzollern with the King's simple ac- 
quiescence, or did imperative considerations compel 
us to insist on the King taking the avowed initiative 
of an order or a counsel addressed to the Prince ? 

These questions must evidently have been sub- 
mitted to the judgment of the Emperor and his 
Ministers. What was decided ? What I can 
affirm, is that the first communications addressed 
to me on the 12th, immediately after the arrival 
of my courier despatched on the previous evening, 
fully justified me in thinking that the Imperial 
Government was of opinion that the solution 
I anticipated was sufficiently satisfactory. 

Here, indeed, is what M. de Gramont tele- 
graphed to me at forty-five minutes past twelve : 

" You tell us in your despatch, that the King 
insists with extreme vivacity, on a very brief delay 
to ascertain the intentions of the two Hohenzollern 
Princes, and that, immediately he is acquainted with 
them, he will give us a definite answer. He adds 
that he would take our refusal for a wish to 
provoke a conflict. 

" Our object has never been to provoke a 
conflict, but to protect the legitimate interests 
of France in a question that we did not raise. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 287 

So, whilst contesting the accuracy of the King's 
reasoning, and whilst energetically maintaining our 
pretensions, we cannot refuse the King of Prussia 
the delay he asks us for, but we trust this delay 
will not exceed a day. We approve the language 
yoti tcsed in the last instance T 

This first telegram was followed by another 
despatched at 1.40 and ran as follows : 

" Very confidential. Use all your skill, I would 
even say your subtleness to establish that Prince 
Leopold of Hohenzollern's renunciation is an- 
nozmced, conimttnicated, or transmitted to you by the 
King of Prussia or his Government. This is of the 
utmost importance to us. The King's participa- 
tion should, at any price, be consented to by him 
or result from the facts in a tangfible manner." ^ 

What results from these two telegframs ? That 
from the 1 2 th at noon, I am no longer urged to insist 
that the King v^iW forbid Prince Leopold of Hohen- 
zollern to insist on his candidature nor even that 
he will advise him to renounce it. This proves, 
once more, that such was not the sole object of 
my mission, as has been pretended by M. de 
Gramont. It is shown, on the contrary, that they 
had resolved at Paris to accept the desistance on 
the conditions that were offered us. 

• 1 The precise date and hour of these two telegrams have been fixed 
by M. de Gramont himself. See La France et la Prusse avant la 
guerre^ pp. 102 and 103. 



288 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

The exact sense of these telegrams is given 
us, besides, by M. de Gramont ; this is how he ex- 
presses himself on the subject : " Let us admit 
that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, without the 
King's orders, without the King's advice, alone, of 
his own free impulse renounced his candidature 
and informed his Majesty of his having done so ; 
the King could by becoming the direct medium of 
his cousin's spontaneous resolution, announce the 
desistance himself, with the accompaniment of a 
few kind words. The desistance, transmitted by the 
King, became an official act, a Prussian act, and 
the Government would have found a shadow of 
guarantee in it which, in its love for peace, it 
would have raised to the proportions of a 
satisfactory assurance 

"It was under the influence of these im- 
pressions that the two following telegrams were 
sent to Count Benedetti. . . . " ^ — those of 
the 1 2th, 12.45 ^^^ I-40, which I have just 
reproduced. 

The Emperor's Government, even according to 
M. de Gramont, had therefore found the basis of 
an acceptable arrangement in the information I 
forwarded on the nth. Did it contain merely the 
shadow of a guarantee, and is M. de Gramont 
authorised to pretend that all I had asked had 
been refused, that on the 12th, I had obtained 

^ La France et la Prusse avant la guerre, pp. loi and 102. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 289 

absolutely nothing ? ^ I shall correct this assertion 
further on. At present I will resume this first 
part of the negotiation, and I establish that the 
King, pressed by my demands, had asked for a 
short respite to communicate to me the solution 
he had decided on ; that he allowed me to surmise 
that Prince Leopold would desist, and that he 
would join his sovereign approbation to that 
Prince's renunciation ; that this two-fold declara- 
tion was announced to me for the following day ; 
that the Imperial Government was informed of 
this on the morning of the 12th; that M. de 
Gramont telegraphed to me that the delay solicited 
by the King was granted him ; that he urgently 
told me to establish that the renunciation had 
been announced, communicated, or simply trans- 
mitted to me by the King. I moreover show that 
if nothing had yet been definitely concluded on 
the 1 2 th, the solution was a fact that was morally 
certain, that at that time it had been con- 
sented to by both parties, and that all that was 
wanting- was the King's declaration. As to Prince 
Leopold's initiative, as to the spontaneity of his 
determination, we all knew, on either side, that it 
was a fiction which,,in reality, could deceive no one : 
nobody could have the least doubt in France or 
Germany, or anywhere else, that the Prussian 
candidate's conduct would be in accordance with 

^ La France et la Prusse ava?it la guerre, p. 1 60. 

U 



290 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

the views of his Sovereign. It would therefore 
become evident for Europe that the King, without 
consenting to enter into an engagement with us,, 
had decided, as we had asked, to advise Prince 
Leopold to renounce a crown, which at another 
moment, and without our knowledge, he had 
advised him to accept. 

Moreover, did the King's declaration come in 
time, within the delay proposed on the one side 
and accepted on the other, between Ems and 
Paris ? Was it in accordance with our expecta- 
tions ? Certainly, and on all points. 

On the 13th, indeed, I was able to telegraph to 
M. de Gramont : " The King has received Prince 
Leopold of Hohenzollern's reply; it is from Prince 
Anthony, and informs his Majesty that Prince 
Leopold, his son, has desisted from his candidature 
to the Spanish crown. The King authorises me tO' 
make known to the Emperor's Government that 
he approves this resolution. The King entrusted 
one of his aides-de-camp with the duty of making 
this communication to me, and I reproduce the 
exact terms of it." 

I will relate further on why the King did not 
make this declaration to me himself ; but in the 
form in which it reached me, did it not fulfil the 
programme of the previous day ? What, indeed, 
were the conditions of this programme ? M. de 
Gramont had fixed them himself in the two first 



MY MISSION TO EMS 291 

telegrams of the 12 th. The delay granted to the 
King was not to exceed a day ; Prince de Hohen- 
zollern was to desist ; the King was to communi- 
cate this renunciation to me ; the King's participa- 
tion was, at any price, to be consented to by him 
or to result from the facts in a tangible manner. 
Now, it was certainly the day following the I2th^ 
and within the stipulated delay, that I received the 
King's declaration ; it was to the effect that Prince 
Leopold had renounced the Spanish crown ; I was 
able to inform my Government that the King 
approved of his action. Thus the desistance had 
been announced, communicated, and transmitted to 
me by the King, whose participation was also as 
manifest, as tangible as M. de Gramont could 
desire. 

I should like to terminate these remarks here ;. 
but M. de Gramont has wished, he says, to act the 
part of a redresser, with the sole object of placing 
truth in face of voluntary or involuntary error, ^ and 
he too often puts me on my trial, my assertions are 
too frequently the object of his rectifications, for 
me to abstain from following him. It is not 
without painful feeling, without lively repugnance, 
that I make up my mind to do so ; the reserve I 
observed, in publishing my justificative book, ac- 
cording to M. de Gramont's expression, super- 
abundantly proved my sincere desire to avoid a 

^ La France et la Prusse avant la guerre, p. 6. 

U 2 



292 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

regretful controversy, and if I now cast off this 
reserve it is because I am Imperatively bound to 
do so. 

III. 

I have shown, if I am not mistaken, that on 
the 1 2th, at the moment when M. de Gramont 
sent the telegraphic despatches of 12.45 ^^^ 
1.40, the Imperial Government had resolved 
to consent to Prince Leopold's renunciation 
on the conditions, or rather in the form, con- 
ceded by the King. It is important to bear 
this fact in mind, because it Is from that day that 
one observes the appearance of fresh complications 
which led to war. 

It was Indeed on that afternoon that the Spanish 
Ambassador at Paris received a telegraphic de- 
spatch sent from SIgmaringen by Prince Anthony 
of Hohenzollern, and announcing that Prince 
Leopold, his son, had withdrawn his candidature. 
How did M. de Gramont regard this communi- 
cation, and what determinations were suggested 
by it? On the 12th, at three o'clock, he receives 
the Prussian representative at Paris, Baron von 
Werther, who had arrived that same morning 
from Ems. 

"We had," he says, "hardly exchanged a few 
words when I was interrupted by a message sent me 
by the Spanish Ambassador He brought 



MY MISSION TO EMS 293 

me the news of the desistance of Prince Leopold 
of Hohenzollern and placed before me the tele- 
gram he had just received from Prince Anthony. 
M. Olozaga congratulated himself on this solution, 
for, from the point of view of the Madrid Cabinet, 
it was all the more complete as it was, in reality, 
its own work. For my part, I could not conceal 
from myself that the desistance, coming in this 
form, far from advancing our business, complicated 

it, on the contrary, in a most serious way 

" Not a word anent France," continues M. de 
Gramont, " not a word anent Prussia. All was 
passing between Prince Anthony of Hohenzollern 
and Spain. Thus the hope we had founded on a 
participation even indirect of the King in the 
Prince's desistance faded away. We had thought 
that if the King had informed us of his cousin's 
resolution, it would have been possible to find, in 
this Royal communication, a guarantee, a satis- 
faction that would have sufficed. Here the King 
of Prussia not only communicated us nothing, but 
we heard of the desistance by a public telegram of 
the Havas Company, forwarded without being in 
cipher, and the contents of which had consequently 
become known as it passed along the line to many 
other persons before reaching us It was im- 
possible to make any mistake as to the reception 
the Chambers, the whole country would give to 
this document, the publication of which was 



.294 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

already an accomplished fact The Govern- 
ment was in presence of a new situation. It was 
evidently necessary to think about new expedi- 
ents 

"It would be superfluous to describe here the 
state of people's minds at the time when Prince 
Anthony's despatch reached the hands of the 
public. . . . The outburst of indignation that came 
from every organ of the press, one after the other, 
and which among the masses took the form of 
excitement that was almost disquieting. . . . There 
were only two courses to follow : either to 
associate one's self in a measure with popular feeling 
whilst seeking to restrain it, or to brave it openly 
by declaring that in presence of the refusal of the 
King of Prussia, it was necessary to renounce all 
hope of satisfaction, all guarantee against the 
return of such events, and be contented with the 
simple desistance of Prince Leopold of Hohen- 
zollern." ^ 

Thus spoke M. de Gramont. But it was 
not necessary to choose either of these courses. 
There was a third, which was already traced out 
by the state of our negotiations with the King on 
the 1 2th, and which it was important to firmly 
keep to, I explain it. 

First of all, it will be well at this point to recall 
the circumstances that one requires to have 

^ La France et la Priisse avant la giterre^ pp. 109 and following. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 295 

uppermost in one's mind, if one desires to form 
a correct idea of what occurred on this fatal day. 
Had the Spanish Ambassador shown Prince 
Anthony's telegram to other members of the 
Cabinet before going to M. de Gramont? It has 
been affirmed that it was divulged shortly before 
the opening of the sitting of the Corps Legislatif. 
The President of the Council on reaching the 
Chamber was able to communicate its contents 
to several deputies, notably to M. Thiers, who 
was of opinion that this desistance guaranteed peace 
and was sufficient.^ It must, however, be acknow- 

^ " He (M. Emile Ollivier) hastened up to M. Thiers on reaching 
the chamber : ' You were right ! We have succeeded ! It is 
peace ! ' — ' Now,' M. Thiers said to him, ' you must keep quiet.' — 
•* Be at ease,' he replied, ' we have peace, and we will see it is not 
disturbed.'" (Jules Simon, Souvenirs du 4 Septembre^ p. i6r.) 
Such was so thoroughly the President of the Council's feeling that 
a newspaper, the Constitutiontiel^ which notoriously received hints 
from the Ministry, regarded Prince Leopold's desistance as an im- 
portant success, although it had as yet only been announced by his 
father and without any participation of the King of Prussia. 

" We are satisfied," it said in its number published on the morn- 
ing of the 13th. " Prince Leopold had accepted the Spanish Crown. 
France declared that she could not consent to a political combina- 
tion or family arrangement that she considered threatened her 
interests, and the candidature has been withdrawn. Prince Leopold 
of Hohenzollern will not reign in Spain. We do. not ask for any- 
thing further, and we welcome this pacific solution with pride. 

" It is a great victory that costs neither a tear nor a drop of 
Wood." 

I had pursued no other aim, myself, during my stay at Ems, but 
I had always wished to attain it with the accompaniment of the 
King's sanction, which would have conveyed to this result all the 
aspect of a sound and lasting arrangement. In any case, it is well 



296 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

ledged that this was neither the feeHng of most 
of the members of the Assembly, nor particularly 
that of the journalists who had invaded the rooms 
at the Palais Bourbon. Their indignation was, 
on the contrary, sharp and noisy. M. Clement 
Duvernois ascended the tribune amidst the ex- 
citement and asked to interpellate the Government 
"on the guarantees it intended stipulating for to 
avoid the successive recurrence of complications 
with Prussia." This was the first suggestion 
of the baleful thought to provide against a con- 
tingency that was from every point of view 
unlikely to occur ; until then, the Government, 
at all events, had mentioned neither the necessity 
nor the suitability of it. 

Let us now see what was the character, the 
value, or the import of the telegram communicated 
by M. Olozaga. This despatch came from a 
Prince whom we had ourselves kept apart from 
our discussions. It came neither from the Berlin 
nor the Madrid Cabinet. M. Olozaga had not 
been requested to show it to the French Govern- 
ment. He had done so, but in a private capacity 
and on his own responsibility. There was and 
there could be no mention either of France or 
Prussia in it. It was entirely unconnected with 

to note that at this solemn moment the President of the Council 
was far from sharing the feeling of the Minister of Foreign Affairs^ 
and of regarding Prince Anthony's telegram and the publicity given 
to it in the light- he did. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 297 

the negotiations we had opened at Ems. In a 
word, so far as we were concerned, it did not exist, 
and we ought to have ignored it or have treated 
it as a dead letter. That was the Emperor's 
view. " Prince Anthony's despatch addressed 
to Prim,"^ he wrote to M. de Gramont on the 
evening of the 12th, "is an unofficial document, 
so far as we are concerned, which no one was 
legally entrusted with the duty of showing to us. . . . 
So long as we are without an official communication 
from Ems, we are not supposed to have received 
any reply to our lawful demands. . . ." ^ 

One can understand that the deputies and 
public, knowing nothing of our negotiations, easily 
formed the opinion at the news of Prince Leopold's 
renunciation, announced by the Spanish Ambas- 
sador, that Prussia, that the King himself meant 

^ By the intermediary of M. Olozaga. 

2 This letter will be found at p. 136 of La Frajtce et la Pr-usse 
avant la gicerre. 

I have also had in my hands the minute of a despatch sent to 
King Victor Emmanuel by one of his agents on the afternoon of the 
1 2th, after an interview with the Emperor, and announcing that his 
Majesty felt lively satisfaction at the desistance of Prince Leopold, 
although he as yet only knew of it by his father's message, as the 
pacific issue of the crisis. The King, it was added, could, the 
Emperor said, return to the Alps and peacefully resume chamois 
shooting. The King, indeed, had discontinued this pastime, and 
had returned in all haste to Turin when he heard of the complica- 
tions that had so suddenly arisen. I am not indebted to M. Nigra 
for information in regard to this incident, but I think I can invoke 
his testimony, as he was present at the interview which I think I 
have been right in referring to here. 



298 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

to Steal away and g"Ive the information that 
reached us, in an indirect manner, and under cover 
of a foreign diplomatic agent, for all satisfaction. 
Deputies and public were justified in considering 
this proceeding a fresh insult, added to that which 
the Berlin Cabinet had been guilty of towards 
France by arranging the threads of an intrigue at 
Madrid conceived in a hostile and perfidious spirit. 
This conviction was calculated to cause irritation, 
and it is not unnatural that a voice was raised in the 
Corps Legislatif to interpellate the Government. 

What is not understood is that M. cle Gramont, 
who was thoroughly informed on every point, 
should have shared this impulse, and have 
adapted his language and resolutions to it. He 
knew the value of Prince Anthony's telegram ; he 
knew the moment was close at hand when the 
King would answer our demands ; he knew in 
what terms and under what form the Prussian 
monarch would come to an explanation with us, 
and he was all the more bound to await this 
declaration, as we had granted the King the 
delay he had asked us for. Assuredly the trans- 
mission of Prince Anthony's telegram had been 
arranged between Ems and Sigmaringen ; it had 
preceded the King's declaration ; it had no doubt 
been so arranged to thoroughly establish Prince 
Leopold's spontaneity. He alone had accepted 
the Spanish offers, it was pretended, he alone 



MY MISSION TO EMS 299 

declined them : it was hoped thus to disengage both 
the Emperor's responsibihty and that of his Govern- 
ment ; but no one could have been deceived by 
the manoeuvre ; and, besides, would it not have 
been wise policy to have refrained from noticing 
these efforts which were directed especially 
towards diminishing the irritating impression that 
this incident had produced in Germany ? 

If M. de Gramont had thought, like the Emperor, 
that Prince Anthony's despatch had no value for 
us, and that we were therefore understood to have 
received no answer, what would have happened ? 
The King notified to us on the following day, in 
the official form, through the intermediary of the 
French Ambassador, not only that Prince Leopold 
had desisted, but that he, the King, gave his entire 
approval to that renunciation without any reserva- 
tion. We thus obtained, with every possible 
guarantee, the satisfaction due to us. 

As to the excitement that was almost disquieting, 
which had animated public feeling, as soon as Prince 
Anthony's message became known, that could easily 
have been appeased. This excitement found 
its origin in the thought that the communica- 
tion made to the Spanish Ambassador was the 
only reparation that would be accorded us ; this 
was an error ; it should have been set right, 
a summary statement should have been made to 
the Chamber from the tribune as to the state of 



300 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

our negotiations at that moment. M. de Gramont 
by giving an explanation would have tranquillised 
the Assembly and the public mind, and the next 
day, on learning the step taken by the King, the 
satisfaction would have been all the more pro- 
nounced, as on the previous evening every one had 
experienced humiliating disappointment. It is, 
therefore, not correct to say that we had either 
to associate in the national feeling or brave it. 



IV. 

Yet it was under the Influence of this mistaken 
conviction that the Due de Gramont, who had 
heard at that time of the interpellation of M. Du- 
vernois, resumed the discussion that had been inter- 
rupted by M. Olozaga with the Prussian Ambassa- 
dor. What was its subject ? M. de Gramont has 
been careful to inform us, and it is well to quote 
what he says about it. When explaining his 
Sovereign's real intentions, Baron Werther persist- 
ently maintained, writes M. de Gramont: "that, 
by authorising Prince de HohenzoUern's can- 
didature, the King had never had any intention of 
being offensive to the Emperor and had never 
supposed that the matter could have given 
umbrage to France 

" I therefore pointed out to Baron de Werther," 
continues M. de Gramont, "that from the moment 



MY MISSION TO EMS 301 

he assured me that nothing- had been farther from 
his Sovereign's mind than to offend the Emperor 
or disturb France, such a given assurance would 
certainly be of a nature to facilitate the understand- 
ing we were seeking .... and that being so, I 
submitted to his appreciation whether the proper 
mode to employ would not be a letter from the 
King to the Emperor 

" Baron von Werther on his part, without for- 
mally agreeing to this suggestion, did not oppose 
its discussion, as his despatch shows. I have 
found among my papers the minute of a note I 
wrote there and then, and a copy of which I gave 
him. Its object was to sum up the assurances 
that seemed to me likely to facilitate the under- 
standing we were both in search of. This is how 
it was worded : 

" * By authorising Prince Leopold of Hohen- 
zollern to accept the Spanish crown, the King 
did not think he was injuring the interests or 
dignity of the French nation. His Majesty 
approves of the Prince of Hohenzollern's with- 
drawal and expresses his desire that all cause of 
misunderstanding between his Government and 
that of the Emperor may henceforth disappear.' 

" Such was," M. de Gramont states further on, 
"the course we had suggested to the Prussian 
Ambassador, not with the idea of publishing the 
text of the note, as he has erroneously written, 



302 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

but simply with the thought of making known its 
substance in order to obtain a basis for our con- 
ciHatory and pacific efforts." ^ 

How did the Prussian Ambassador receive this 
proposal ? The two diplomatists are not absolutely 
agreed on this point. " I pointed out to the Due de 
Gramont," M. de Werther has stated in his de- 
spatch, " that such a course would be rendered 
extremely difficult by the explanations he had 
given on the 6th of this month to the Chamber 
of Deputies ; they contained statements that 
must have deeply offended his Majesty the 
King." 

However this maybe, the Prussian Ambassador 
undertook to transmit the suggestion which had 
been made to him to his Sovereign, but only when 
he had been given to understand that I should be 
entrusted with this duty if he refused to perform it 
himself 

M, de Gramont went to Saint Cloud, at the 
conclusion of his interview with the Prussian 
Ambassador, no doubt to confer with the Emperor. 
What passed between them ? M. de Gramont does 
not tell us, neither does he inform us of the 
Sovereign's opinion of this grave incident ; but we 
can gather this opinion from the facts, and it is 
easy to bring it to light thanks to some documents 

^ See La Fra7ice et la Priisse avant la guerre, p. 115 and 
followino-. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 303 

M. de Gramont includes in his work. If the 
Emperor had given his approval to the overture 
made to Baron Werther, if he had considered it 
becoming and opportune, the first duty of his 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, supported by his 
acquiescence, would have been to have informed 
his Plenipotentiary at Ems without delay, and 
instructed him to spare no effort to obtain the 
King's assent to the matter. Yet, what did M. 
de Gramont do ? On returning to his Ministry he 
telegraphed to me : " Seven p.m. We have re- 
ceived the renunciation of Prince Anthony, in the 
name of his son Leopold, of his candidature to 
the throne of Spain through the intermediary of 
the Spanish Ambassador ; in order that this with- 
drawal may have its full effect, it seems necessary 
that the King of Prussia should associate himself 
with it and give us an assurance that he will not 
again authorise this candidature. Be good enough 
to seek an audience of the King to obtain 

this declaration " 

This telegram left me in ignorance of the 
proposal made to Baron Werther and of that 
Ambassador's undertaking to transmit it to his 
Sovereign. M. de Gramont could not, however, 
have overlooked that on the following day, on the 
arrival of the despatch of the Prussian representa- 
tive at Paris, I should find myself in the strange 
position of having to present to the King a very 



304 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

different basis of agreement to the one which, 
unknown to me, Baron Werther would have sent 
him. Is it not already permissible to presume 
that the Emperor had rejected the compromise 
suggested by M. de Gramont, considering, as a 
Sovereign, that the King of Prussia would look 
upon it as incompatible with his dignity ? It is 
evidently on this account that, during the inter- 
view at Saint Cloud, the proposal I was instructed 
to make was substituted for the one which had 
been suo^aested to the Prussian Ambassador. The 
difference was considerable : I had to ask the 
King neither for a letter nor the justification of 
his previous conduct ; I had merely to solicit a 
verbal declaration guaranteeing us against the 
repetition of a candidature we could not sub- 
mit to.^ 

^ There is one point which to me remains absolutely obscure, and 
which I should not know how to attempt to elucidate. It seems to 
me that it cannot be doubtful that the instructions given me on the 
evening of the I2th implied, in the Emperor's mind, the abandon- 
ment of the proposal made during the day to the Prussian Ambas- 
sador. But, in this case, what was the duty of the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs ? To instruct me as to his interview with Baron 
Werther and to authorise me to declare that it was to be considered 
null and void. This is what the Emperor certainly presumed. Was 
it simply an omission on M. de Gramont's part, or did he persuade 
himself that my silence would suffice to show the King of Prussia 
that the French Government did not persist in the desire it had 
expressed to his representative ? This is what I am unable to 
answer. What is certain is that the two proposals reaching the 
King on the same day were bound to mutually damage each other 
and seriously complicate matters, because on presenting the one I 
was not expressly authorised to withdraw the other. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 305 

But what more than abundantly proves that the 
Emperor never for a moment agreed to M. de 
Gramont's suggestion is that, during the evening, 
shortly after their interview, he thought it neces- 
sary, in order to distinctly express his way of 
thinking, to send him the letter from which I have 
already quoted, and which I think it well to give 
in its entirety : — 

" Thinking over our conversations of to-day and 
reading Prince Anthony's telegram again, I see 
we must confine ourselves to ofivino- additional 
emphasis to the despatch you have of course sent 
to Benedetti, by laying stress on the following 
points : — 

" I. We are dealing with Prussia and not with 
Spain. 

" 2. The telegram sent by Prince Anthony to 
Prim is a non-official document for us which no- 
body has been instructed, lawfully, to communi- 
cate to us. 

" 3. Prince Leopold consented to be a candidate 
for the throne of Spain, and it is his father 
who withdraws the candidature. 

"4. It is therefore necessary that Benedetti 
should insist, as he has been instructed to do, upon 
having a reply by which the King would under- 
take, for the future, not to permit Prince Leopold, 
who has made no promise, to follow his brother's 
example and start, one fine day, for Spain. 

X 



3o6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

" 5. So long as we have not received an official 
communication from Ems, we are not presumed 
to have received an answer to our lawful demands. 

"6. It is therefore impossible to make a com- 
munication to the Chambers before being better 
informed." 

The Emperor had certainly thought with his 
Minister, and it is to be regretted he did so, that 
an immediate explanation in the Corps Legislatif 
would be premature. He was no doubt persuaded 
that the excitement occasioned by Prince Anthony's 
telegram would be dispelled by that which I had 
announced for the following day, embodying the 
King of Prussia's declaration. What is more 
certain is that the Emperor did not vary as to the 
value to be attached to the telegram received by 
M. Olozaga, and that he never saw anything in it 
beyond a document that should be ignored. 

M. de Gramont, conforming to the Emperor's 
intentions, sent me another telegram at 11.45 ^^ 
night couched in the following terms : " The Em- 
peror instructs me to point out to you that we 
cannot consider the renunciation communicated to 
us by the Spanish Ambassador, and which is not 
addressed to us direct, as a sufficient answer to 
the lawful demands we have made to the King of 

Prussia " And he again urged me to insist 

with a view to obtaining a declaration that would 
be a guarantee for the future. He thus ratified 



MY MISSION TO EMS 307 

his teleo-ram of seven o'clock in so far as the 
nature of M. Olozaga's visit was concerned.^ 

The reader will therefore bear in mind that on 
the 1 2th, before noon, we considered the desist- 
ance of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern an accept- 
able solution if the King notified it to us himself 
with the accompaniment of his approbation. On 
the afternoon of the same day, after the arrival of 
Prince Anthony's telegram, after the interpellation 
of M. Clement Duvernois, there is a complete 
change. In the existing state of public opinion, 
and the attitude of the parliamentary majority, " it 
was impossible," wrote M. de Gramont, "to accept 
the desistance without stipulating guarantees ! . . ." 
Were these guarantees indispensable, and what 
reasons were there for presuming that the King of 

^ The following day, the 13th, M. de Gramont nevertheless made 
the following declaration to the Corps Ldgislatif : " Yesterday the 
Spanish Ambassador officially announced to us Prince Leopold of 
HohenzoUern's renunciation of his candidature to the Spanish 
throne. The negotiations we are engaged in with Prussia, and 
which have never had any other aim, are not yet concluded. It is 
therefore impossible for us to speak of them and to give the 
Chamber and country a general account of the affair." This was 
not the view of the Emperor, who attributed no official character to 
Prince Anthony's telegram, and he had explicitly pointed out this 
in his letter to M. de Gramont. 

1 could argue from this declaration that if our negotiations never 
had any other object than the renunciation of Prince Leopold, I had 
on my side thoroughly understood the character and aim of my 
mission, and that the way in which I acquitted myself of it deserves 
none of the reproaches, none of the rectifications M. de Gramont 
has bestowed. 

2 See La France et la Priisse avant la guerre, p. 130. 

X 2 



3o8 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Prussia, who had issued from this conflict with 
some damage to his prestige, would consent to 
renew it? Every Cabinet, the press and public 
opinion in every country had blamed the clandes- 
tine way in which this affair had been introduced. 
How, then, could one admit that the King, after 
having approved his nephew's resolution in a com- 
munication made to the French Ambassador, 
could have, would have authorised him to resume 
his candidature ? There was no need to provide 
for this contingency : there was no necessity to 
stipulate for guarantees in the view of preventing it. 
I have finished with the 12th, I come to the 
13th, which completed what the previous day 
commenced, and left the friends of peace no hope 
of preserving it. 

V. 

I had received the two telegrams M. de 
Gramont had sent me on the evening of the 
previous day, during the night ; obedient to my 
instructions I solicited another audience of the 
King in the early morning. 

His Majesty, perceiving me in one of the 
walks, advanced towards me, and I was able, 
without further delay, to inform him that Prince 
Leopold's renunciation was already known at 
Paris. He expressed great surprise. Assuredly 



MY MISSION TO EMS 309 

the King could not have had the hope of making- 
me beheve that he was still ignorant, at that 
moment, as to what the son had resolved and 
the father had done, and that Prince Anthony 
in telegraphing to Paris, had refrained from 
telegraphing to Ems,^ which would have con- 
stituted a breach of courtesy towards the head 
of his house ; but the King, who had given out 
the parts, remained faithful to the one he had 
reserved to himself He wished to continue to 
the end the fiction he had invented to shield 
himself, personally, from any possible reproach of 
having made a concession to France derogatory 
to his dignity. He particularly desired to be 
able to affirm that he had limited himself to 
respecting the entire liberty of his relatives, as 
he pretended he had done at the commencement. 

^ The King had himself told me on the previous day, that he was 
in telegraphic correspondence with the Princes of Hohenzollern. I 
had, indeed, been able to telegraph to M. de Gramont on the 12th, 
at six o'clock in the evening : " The King has just told me he has 
received a telegram informing him that Prince Leopold's answer 
will certainly reach him to-morrow. He added that he would send 
for me as soon as he was in possession of it." This telegram no 
doubt announced to him the departure of the one Prince Anthony 
addressed the same day to M. Olozaga, but the King did not tell 
me so, not desiring to intervene himself until the morrow, as had 
always been his intention, when the renunciation would be a fact 
accomplished and made public without his having had anything 
whatever to do with it, thus adapting each of his acts to the stage 
effect he had decided on from the commencement. I was not 
therefore mistaken, and I had not deceived the Imperial Govern- 
ment, in announcing, immediately after my first audience, how 
matters were proceeding. 



3IO STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Nevertheless, I pointed out to the King that as 
a result of this incident, Prince Leopold's desist- 
ance would not appease the excitement that had 
been aroused by his candidature. I added, that 
to calm all anxiety, to strengthen the good 
understanding between the two countries, it 
seemed desirable to guarantee the future as 
soundly as the past, and in that view I begged 
him to authorise me to transmit to my Govern- 
ment the assurance that his Majesty would, if 
necessary, exert his authority to prevent any 
attempt to resume the candidature that had been 
abandoned. 

"You are asking me," answered the King, 
"for an undertaking without limit and embracing 
all contingencies ; I could not bind myself to 
that." He added that he could not alienate 
his liberty of resolution in that manner, " that 
he had no hidden design, and that this affair 
had caused him too much seriott-s thottght for 
him not to desire it to be irrevocably set aside T 
I pointed out to him in regard to this, that we 
could meet on the ground where the King had 
himself taken up his position, that I was address- 
ing the head of the family, and that in that capacity 
he could assuredly accede to the request I was 
instructed to make him. Vain efforts ; the King 
absolutely refused to consent, whilst expressing 
to me his regfret at being- unable to make "a 



MY MISSION TO EMS 311 

new and unexpected concession." ^ The King, 
moreover, renewed to me the assurance that the 
courier despatched from Sigmaringen would 
arrive in the course of the day, and that he 
would at once send for rne to make me the 
communication he had spoken of at our previous 
interview. I was therefore justified in thinking 
that I should have an opportunity, before the 
day was over, of making another attempt to 
prevail over the resolution I had been unable 
to shake in the morning. 

The opportunity did not occur, and matters 
passed quite differently. The King, instead of 
inviting me to go to him, entrusted his aide- 
de-camp, Prince Radziwill with the duty of 
bringing me his declaration, which was conform- 
able to the assurances I had received, and, at 
3.45, I was able to send M. de Gramont the 
telegraphic despatch I have already quoted.^ 

To what circumstances must this new attitude 
of the King be attributed ? He had up to that 
moment displayed a conciliatory disposition and 
the desire to extricate himself from this difficulty, 
provided that whilst giving France satisfaction, 
he was himself free from all responsibility to- 
wards Germany. He had accepted the dis- 

1 All the developments of this interview will be found in my 
despatch of July 13th. 
^ See p. 290. 



312 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

cussion, and this is all the more deserving of 
remark as, during his whole reign, he had con- 
stantly avoided entering into any diplomatic 
question with the foreign representatives ac- 
credited to him, invariably leaving such matters 
to his Minister. At ten o'clock in the morning, 
he opens, himself, our last interview on meeting 
me ; at three o'clock in the afternoon, notwith- 
standing his promises to receive me, he will only 
communicate through the intermediary of one 
of his officers. He was evidently displeased 
at the overture I had made to him, and had 
given me to understand that such was the case 
when he told me we were requiring a new and 
unexpected concession which, made public, would 
expose and humiliate him. It was in this frame 
of mind and a few minutes after our early 
morning meeting, that he had received Baron 
Werther's despatch which had come by the 
Paris mail.i As a matter of fact M. de Gramont 
had asked him for a still more novel and un- 
expected concession which for my part I was 
absolutely ignorant of and could not withdraw. 
He had evidently made up his mind from that 

^ Baron Werther had declined to accede to the desire that had 
been expressed to him to make use of the telegraph in transmitting 
to the King the communication he had consented to submit to him. 
(See his despatch.) This despatch forwarded from Paris on the 12th, 
reached Ems on the 13th by the same channel and at the same 
time as the ordinary letters. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 313 

moment ; he did not avoid the undertaking he 
had contracted : he had informed me that Prince 
Leopold had desisted, and that he acquiesced 
in the renunciation, but he was thoroughly 
determined not to proceed with the negotiations 
any further, considering they came to an end 
with the communication I had been authorised 
to transit to my Government. I had to telegraph 
to Paris: "The King, in answer to a request 
for another audience, sends me word that he 
cannot consent to resume the discussion respect- 
ing assurances for the future. His Majesty has 
informed me that he abides by what he said 
to me this morning ' The King,' his mes- 
senger further said, ' has consented to give his 
entire and unreserved approbation to the desist- 
ance of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and he 
cannot do more.' " 

It will be remarked that the King did not 
close his door to me, that he simply declined 
to discuss our last proposal again. He received 
me, moreover, before his departure on the follow- 
ing day. Therefore at Ems there was neither 
an insulter nor a person insulted, and I cannot 
too strongly insist on the point, in contradiction 
to the allegations introduced by Prince Bismarck 
whilst disguising the real facts. That, indeed, 
is what he did not hesitate to do, by intervening, 
at this moment, in a discussion to which he had 



314 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

hitherto remained a stranger. How became he 
a party to it, and by the aid of what expedients 
did he bring about the complications of the final 
hour ? I still have this to explain. 



VI. 



On the afternoon of the 13th the King sent 
Count Bismarck^ a telegram, the very same 
that the latter was to alter. In possession of 
this document, and considering it gave him 
authority to take the affair in hand himself,^ and 

^ See General Caprivi's speech in the Reichstag at the sitting 
of November 24th, 1892, which contains the text of the King's 
telegram. In this same speech, the new Chancellor undertakes to 
set the assertions of his predecessor right. Briefly recalling the 
incidents that marked the day of the 13th, at Ems, he expresses 
himself thus : " Count Benedetti made another attempt to approach 
the King, who caused him to be informed that if he asked for an 
audience to return again to the question of guarantees, it could not 
be granted." What the King declined to do, therefore, was to 
resume the interview of the morning. This is shown or rather is 
expressly stated in the report of the aide-de-camp on duty, who 
served as intermediary between the King and Ambassador, and in 
no way differs from the communications I made to M. de Gramont 
in the course of the 13th. This is therefore an historical point 
clearly established by the agreement of all the intervening parties. 
See Ma Mission en Prusse, pp. 278 and following. 

2 This despatch concluded thus : "His Majesty leaves it to your 
Excellency to decide whether M. Benedetti's new demand and the 
refusal it met with should be communicated to our representatives 
abroad and to the press." Until the evening of the 13th, Count 
Bismarck had not been called upon to intervene in the negotiation. 
In any case his participation, whatever it may have been, exercised 
no perceptible influence on the King's attitude. This is shown by 



MY MISSION TO EMS 315 

that in future he had freedom of action, Count 
Bismarck undertook, without losing a moment, 
to render all conciliation impossible and war in- 
evitable. After having altered the sense of the 
King's telegram and given it a meaning it did 
not possess, he communicated it to all his diplo- 
matic agents abroad. He informed all Europe, 
by this insidious manoeuvre, that the King had 
shown the French Ambassador the door, in- 
flicting thereby a humiliation on the Imperial 
Government which the Chancellor foresaw would 
compel it to take the initiative of a rupture. 
After speaking to Europe he addressed public 
feeling in Germany. The newspapers to which 
he gave a tone, published in the evening, all 
gave the same warlike cry in inflammatory and 
arrogant language : they said the King and 
nation had been outraged, and that it was the 
country's duty to rise in a body and wreak 
vengeance for such a deadly oflence. Instead 
of exercising his authority over the press to 
appease this popular irritation in regard to which 
he feigned to be concerned on that selfsame 

his interview with the Generals von Moltke and von Roon during 
which he mutilated his Sovereign's telegram. The three com- 
panions were saddened to see the matter fading into smoke instead 
of ending in a noisy rupture. The King's telegram makes its 
appearance at six o'clock, and they all set their wits to work to use 
it as an instrument to bring on war. Count Bismarck's intervention 
dates therefore from that time. It will be seen, later on, that I was 
absolutely convinced of this in 1873. 



3i6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

evening whilst conversing with the British Am- 
bassador,^ he directed all his efforts towards ex- 
asperating national susceptibilities. 

VII. 

What must we infer from these facts which 
I have just briefly recalled ? Either I am very 
much mistaken, or it is permissible to conclude 
from them that during the few days I was engaged 
in following my negotiations with the King whilst 
conforming to^' my official instructions, no incident 
arose of a nature to endanger their success. I 
graduated the firmness of my language in my 
audiences of the 9th and 1 1 th, as has been seen, 
so as to bring the King to explain himself more 
clearly in regard to his real intentions, to give 
me more satisfactory assurances concerning the 
final resolution Prince Leopold would take and 
his own assent ; but on both occasions I remained 
within the limits of prudent moderation. No one 
will blame me for having observed this attitude in 
such a delicate discussion ; a rash or even an ill- 
considered utterance might make it deviate and 
occasion a sanguinary conflict. 

I ventured to remark in a letter written in the 
month of November, 1870: "Did I succeed in 

^ See the despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus in the Blue 
Book of July 13th, 1870. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 317 

my efforts at Ems ? Yes, assuredly ; I had 
indeed, in four days' negotiations, during which I 
had been careful of all susceptibilities, performed 
the mandate with which I had been entrusted." 
M. de Gramont has vigorously reproached me 
with this declaration. "On the 12th," he says, 
"' the Ambassador had obtained nothing, nothing. 
His instructions not only ordered him to secure 
the Prince's desistance, but to obtain from the 
King that he would advise him to take that 
course, which is quite different. But the King had 
invariably refused to give this assurance." Was 
this declaration indispensable, and was it wise or 
advantageous, in any degree, to make the satis- 
faction which we claimed, and was imminent, 
subservient to it ? I have never thought so. 

" . . . . On the morning of the 13th," writes 
M. de Gramont,^ "when M. Benedetti, furnished 
with the instructions he had received during the 
night, waited on the King and asked him to 
refuse his sanction to a resumption of the 
Hohenzollern candidature, no concession had at 
that moment, been accorded by the King to 
France. 

" All our Ambassador had asked, all, had been 
refused. He had obtained absolutely nothing." 

The facts answer for me. 

Did Prince Leopold desist } Yes. Did the 

^ La Fraftce et la Prusse avant la guerre, p. 159. 



3i8 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

King notify this renunciation to us and did he 
approve it? Yes. Was this declaration made 
to us at an opportune moment, at the right 
time? Yes, once more. I, therefore, obtained 
the concessions that were the objects of my 
mission. 

But how and by what series of new and unfore- 
seen circumstances, did this entire satisfaction so 
laboriously won, become the prelude of war ? 
That has been seen, and I have no need to return 
to the matter, but there is one point on which I 
wish to place additional emphasis. Let it be 
observed that it was on the 13th at forty-five 
minutes past three that I telegraphed the King's 
declaration. Now, at that moment Count Bismarck 
was still a stranger to our negotiations ; he had 
not intervened in them ; he had been in the im- 
possibility of placing obstacles in the way of their 
progress or of raising difficulties of any sort. He 
was at Berlin, blaming his master, but reduced to 
maction and powerless ; he saw, with intense 
bitterness, the affair turning to our advantage. 
To understand how it happened that he was called 
on to interfere, it is necessary to form a very 
precise idea of the impression produced by the 
two demands submitted to the King on the 13th, 
one by me and the other by Baron Werther. 
That which I was entrusted with the duty of 
presenting to him — an assurance guaranteeing us 



MY MISSION TO EMS 319 

against a resumption of the Prussian Prince's 
candidature — certainly upset him ; it was not 
however of a nature to raise redoubtable com- 
plications. We confined ourselves in fact to 
soliciting a verbal declaration without making it a 
condition of the understanding we were endeavour- 
ing to arrange. I had even carefully sought not 
to give it any other significance in my explanation 
with the King. And so, on bringing our interview 
to an end, he assured me he would send for me, 
in the course of the day, as soon as he had heard 
from the Princes of Hohenzollern.^ But Baron 
Werther's despatch arrived bringing the demand 
or suggestion, if you will, made to that Ambassador 
at Paris ; then, the King's frame of mind under- 
goes a complete change. He will only communi- 
cate with me through the intermediary of one of 
his aides-de-camp, and he authorises Count Bis- 
marck to take the continuation of the negfotiation 
in hand. The visit I receive from the King-'s 
messenger terminates at forty-five minutes past 
three, and at that same hour he has the telegram 
sent to the Chancellor authorising him to intervene 
in the discussion.^ 

1 See Ma Missioii eit Prusse, p. 374. 

2 We know now that this telegram was handed in at the telegraph 
office at Ems, at forty minutes past three and that it reached Bedin 
at eight minutes past six. (General Caprivi's speech in the 
Reichstag on November 24th 1892.) It was therefore at the same 
hour and simultaneously that the King took the two-fold resolution 



320 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

Everything was at once precipitated. On the 
night of the 13th, the Prussian Ambassador 
at Paris was recalled ; on the 14th he visited 
M. de Gramont : " Our interview was brief, 
relates the latter ; he informed me, without 
making any comments, that his Government 
had blamed him for the way in which he had 
received our suggestions at our last interview 
on the 1 2th, and that he had orders to go on 
leave." ^ . 

At the sitting of the Reichstag on July 20th, 
Count Bismarck laid several papers on the 
table, notably Baron Werther's despatch : " The 
Federal Ambassador," he said, " gives an account 
in it of an interview he had had at Paris. He 
brings to our knowledge the unacceptable demand 
you are aware of. The King was to write a 
letter of apology, the contents of which were set 
forth. The only official reply I gave to the Am- 
bassador in regard to this matter, was to express 

to cease his interviews with me and refer to the Chancellor. There- 
fore it was not after conferring with me in the morning that he did 
so, because he then intended receiving me in the afternoon, on the 
arrival of the mail he was expecting from Sigmaringen ; it was 
after having read Baron Werther's despatch. Must it not be 
concluded from this that it was not my communication that made 
him decide to have recourse to an aide-de-camp to inform me of 
Prince Leopold's desistance and to telegraph to Count Bismarck .-' 
It seems evident that it was solely the suggestion which came 
direct from Paris, and was transmitted by his Ambassador, that 
caused him to take these resolutions. 

^ La Fra7ice et la Prusse avatit la guerre^ p. 208. 



MY MISSION TO EMS 321 

my conviction that he had misunderstood the 
verbal communications he gave an account of, 
that it appeared to me absolutely impossible that 
overtures of this nature could have been made, 
and that, in any case, I refused to submit the 
despatch to his Majesty's attention." ^ 

It was, therefore, our suggestion at the final 
moment which permitted Count Bismarck to 
place the French Government in the alternative 
of submitting to the most cruel insult or of draw- 
ing the sword. The Chancellor considered war 
with France inevitable, he wanted that war ; for 
over a twelvemonth he had held this affair of 
the candidature of a Hohenzollern Prince to the 
Spanish crown in reserve, as I have said, with 
the intention of turning it to account against us. 
For that reason he is and remains the principal 
and responsible author of the war. Still, he 
would have been unable to bring that war about, 
but for the unfortunate proposals of July 13th. 

Let us suppose for a moment that at Paris, on 
July 1 2th, they had strictly confined themselves 
to the instructions sent to me at forty-five minutes 

^ The King felt this incident quite as keenly. In General de 
Caprivi's speech from which I have already quoted, one notices the 
following passage : " I have here an authentic note from King 
William dated July 13th. It is stated therein : ' It is necessary to 
declare that I am indignant at the demand of the French Ministers, 
and that I intend to act in regard to it as I think fit.' " 



322 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 

past twelve ; that they had paid no attention to> 
Prince Anthony's telegram, as was the Emperor's 
desire ; that they had not taken the initiative of 
any new proposal ; that they had on the contrary, 
patiently awaited the expiration of the delay 
solicited by the King and accorded by us, as 
they had undertaken to do ; what, I ask, on this 
hypothesis, would have occurred ? The following 
day, the 13th, the day agreed upon, the King 
would have made me his declaration, and I 
should have transmitted it to Paris. What 
would have been the effect both on the Chamber 
and on public opinion? It was positively to 
France, this time, that the desistance would 
have been notified, and by whom ? By the 
King of Prussia whom we had addressed direct, 
and who, by adding his approbation, recognised 
the lawfulness of our claims and consequently of 
our intervention. Prince Anthony, the Spanish 
Ambassador, the communication which had 
passed between them, all disappeared in pres- 
ence of the step taken by the Sovereign whom 
we had made a party to the affair. What more 
complete satisfaction could we exact, and how 
could it have failed to meet with the general 
assent of the country and of its representatives ? 
Suppress then, hypothetically, the incidents of 
the last day, and what remains ? What M. de 



MY MISSION TO EMS 323 

Gramont has denied in every form, that is to 
say, that I had fulfilled the mission entrusted 
to me with complete success. The reader will 
decide ; I do not ask for his indulgence, I appeal 
to his impartiality. 

Count Benedetti. 

V\'K\S,/a7iuary, 1873. 



THE END 



KICHARD CLAY AND bONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BUNGAY 



